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Jackson et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1975-1976

SURVEY OF DEVELOPMENTS IN WEST
VIRGINIA LAW: 1975-1976
EDITOR'S COMMENTS

This 1975-1976 Survey of Developments in West VirginiaLaw
is in the format of a student note. This note discusses the significant decisions handed down by the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals in 1975-1976. This is the first article of this nature to
be published in the West Virginia Law Review. If your response to
this article is favorable, we hope to include in subsequent issues
federal district court and circuit court cases, as well as significant
enactments of the West Virginia Legislature.
This survey serves primarily as a reporting system, and we
leave an in-depth discussion of these cases to case comments and
student notes. Unreported cases will be listed in footnotes at the
beginning of each section. Cases with multiple issues will be dealt
with under the major issue, and minor issues may not be discussed.
For greater convenience in comparing developments of the law in
each area, this survey is organized into categories. The categories
under which the developments are treated, in order of presentation, are:
Administrative Law ....................................
C onflicts ..............................................
Constitutional Law ....................................
C ontracts .............................................
Criminal Law and Procedure ............................
Dom estic Relations ....................................
Elections ..............................................
Evidence ..............................................
Local Governm ent .....................................
Practice and Procedure .................................
P roperty ..............................................
T orts .................................................
Workmen's Compensation ..............................
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West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 8

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW'
The cases decided in the area of administrative law involved
judicial review of administrative fact findings and construction of
statutes.

I.

CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

Monongahela Power Co. v. Gerard2 held that a commissioner
who participated in a prior eminent domain proceeding to award
compensation is absolutely disqualified to give evidence of just
compensation at a subsequent jury trial when the same issues are
3
involved.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW

In re Rate Filing of Blue Cross Hospital Service' involved an
appeal by the West Virginia Insurance Commissioner from a final
order of the Kanawha County Circuit Court which had reversed
the Commissioner's decision denying a rate increase to Blue Cross
Hospital Service, Inc. The case is controversial since the majority,
in affirming the trial court decision, ignored the standard for
reviewing administrative decisions as set out in the State Administrative Procedure Act.- Chief Justice Haden, in a strong dissenting
opinion, pointed out, and the majority agreed, that the trial court
was wrong in its legal conclusion that the Commissioner had exceeded the delegated authority given him by the legislature' in
making his decision refusing the rate increase. The trial court had
concluded that the Commissioner could not inquire into underlying causes that had prompted the rate application and then use
I Cases not reported: Mountain Trucking Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 216
S.E.2d 566 (W. Va. 1975) (insufficient fact findings); Comm. on Legal Ethics v.
Pence, 216 S.E.2d 236 (W. Va. 1975) (legal ethics).
2 218 S.E.2d 886 (W. Va. 1975).
3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 54-2-10 (Cum. Supp. 1975) cited by the court, reads in
part:
The cause shall be tried as other causes in such court, except that
any person who served as a condemnation commissioner in the proceeding shall not be examined as a witness in regard to just compensation or
any damages.
214 S.E.2d 339 (W. Va. 1975).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 29A-5-4(g) (1971 Replacement Volume) provides in part
that a decision will be reversed if the decision is in excess of statutory authority of
the agency or is clearly wrong in view of substantial evidence on the whole record.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 33-2-1 to -15 (1975 Replacement Volume).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss4/8

2

Jackson et al.: Survey
of Developments in
West Virginia Law: 1975-1976
LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE
those causes for an administrative finding that the rates were excessive. Because of this erroneous legal conclusion, the trial court
found that the rate application was not excessive, refusing to consider the factual findings of the Commissioner and stating that
"While the Commissioner's reasoning in this regard is persuasive,
I do not believe that it was the intent of the Legislature, under
West Virginia Code, 33-24-6(c), to have the Commissioner correct
such abuses upon a rate filing application." 7 The majority concluded that the Commissioner did have the authority to inquire
into the factors causing Blue Cross to seek a rate increase, yet did
not reverse the trial court and reinstate the Commissioner's findings. The dissent emphasized that the court gave "no persuasive
weight" 8 to the factual findings of the Commissioner, which is in
direct conflict with West Virginia law requiring a court to find an
administrative agency's factual findings "clearly wrong" to warrant judicial interference By not applying the standard for
judicial review of administrative factual findings to the
Commissioner's decision to deny the rate increase, the court has
seemingly undermined the Commisoioner's authority to make such
decisions.
0
Kanawha Valley Transp. Co. v. Public Service Commission'
correctly applied the standard of judicial review of administrative
fact findings. The court held that findings of the Public Service
Commission will not be reversed unless such findings are contrary
to the evidence." This was the holding after the Kanawha Valley
Transportation Company appealed from an order of the Public
Service Commission revoking certificates of convenience and necessity authorizing it to operate as a common carrier by taxicab
service. Sixteen months elapsed between the fact finding by the
Public Service Commission and the time when the final order was
entered. The court reaffirmed the concept that a decision unduly
delayed will not vitiate the order or judgment, but a proceeding in

214 S.E.2d at 346.
Id. at 347.
Id. at 346. Accord, Brown v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 186 S.E.2d 840, 846 (W.
Va. 1972); Caldwell v. Civil Serv. Comm'n 184 S.E.2d 625, 628 (W. Va. 1971);
Billings v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 154 W. Va. 688, 692, 178 S.E.2d 801, 804 (1971).
,0 219 S.E.2d 332 (W. Va. 1975).
" Id. at 337. Accord, Boggs v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 154 W. Va. 146, 174 S.E.2d
331 (1970); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 143 W. Va. 33, 99 S.E.2d
1 (1957); Atlantic Greyhound Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 132 W. Va. 650, 54
S.E.2d 169 (1949).
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mandamus may be brought to compel a decision.'" In light of the
Public Service Commission's failure to include in the record an
item of evidence presented to it,'the court held by way of dictum
that where an agency considers both proper and improper evidence
and the proper evidence is enough to sustain the order, the reviewing court will not reverse unless the order was based on the improper evidence.'"
III.

STATUTES

The case of State v. Riley'4 held that "where a statute is plain
and unambiguous, a court has a duty to apply and not to construe
its provisions." Therefore the court, in determining who is a carrier under statutory law,' 6 held that mere employees do not come
within the definition of "motor carrier." An employee driving a
truck could not be fined for failure to have a license required only
of "motor carriers".

'1219 S.E.2d at 338. Accord, Village of Bridgeport v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
125 W. Va. 342, 24 S.E.2d 285 (1943).
11219 S.E.2d at 340.
" 215 S.E.2d 460 (W. Va. 1975).
15Id. at 462, quoting from Syllabus point 2 of Eggleton v. State Workmen's
Compensation Comm'n, 214 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 1975).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24A-1-2(e), (g) (1971 Replacement Volume).
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CONFLICTS 7
A foreign corporation must have certain minimum contracts
with the state of West Virginia before a state court obtains jurisdic-

tion over such corporation. The minimum contacts must be such
that the maintenance of the action in the state does not offend
notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" In Chase v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,' 9 plaintiff's decedent was riding in a truckmounted camper that had been purchased from defendant A, who
had purchased it from defendant B, the manufacturer. Plaintiffs
decedent was killed in a collision, and the plaintiff alleged that
death was caused by a defective door on the camper. Defendant B
filed a third-party complaint against C who constructed the door
and sold it to B.
The court was faced with a certified question which contained
the following matters concerning the foreign corporation C:
(1) it was not licensed to do business in West Virginia; (2) it
was not doing business in this state; (3) it had made no contracts to be performed in whole or in part in this state; (4) it
had committed no tort in whole or in part in this state; (5) it
had no servants, agents or employees in this state; (6) it owned
no property in this state; (7) it had appointed no one as its
attorney in fact for acceptance of process in this state; (8) it had
not manufactured, sold, offered for sale or supplied a product
which caused injury to person or property in this state; (9) the
only contact [C] had with the state, if any, was that its product came into this 20state as a component part of the third-party
plaintiff's product.
Although the court might have obtained jurisdiction under the
West Virginia long-arm statute" since the foreign corporation had
manufactured, sold and supplied an allegedly defective product
which caused injury to a person, the Chase court held that the facts
were insufficient to establish the minimum contacts required to
satisfy the standard of jurisdictional due process. Other jurisdic11Conflicts case not reported: Michigan Nat'l Bank v. Mattingly, 212 S.E.2d
754 (W. Va. 1975) (which state law governs construction of contracts).
20 Hodge v. Sands Mfg. Co., 151 W. Va. 133, 150 S.E.2d 793 (1966).
1"211 S.E.2d 673 (W. Va. 1975). The court noted that Hodge presented a
question identical to that raised in Chase.
21 Id. at 276.
21

W. VA.

CODE ANN.

§ 31-1-15 (1975 Replacement Volume).
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tions have found the necessary minimum contacts in cases with
facts quite similar to those in Chase.,'
The statute was applied in another 1975 decision to defeat
jurisdiction. In Schweppes U.S.C. Ltd. v. Kiger,1 a West Virginia
resident bought tonic water bottled by Schweppes. The purchase
was made in Maryland, and the tonic water was subsequently
taken to Virginia where the cap blew off of a bottle striking the
plaintiff in the eye injuring her. The plaintiff then brought an
action against Schweppes in the Circuit Court of Monongalia
County, West Virginia seeking damages for her injuries. For the
purpose of obtaining service on Schweppes, the plaintiff served
process on the state auditor.24 Schweppes failed to defend the action, and the circuit court entered a default judgment against the
defendant for $300,000.
On appeal, the sole question was whether the circuit court had
obtained personal jurisdiction over Schweppes by service of process upon the state auditor. The plaintiff contended that jurisdiction5 was obtained under the long-arm statute, but the court noted
that this statute provided for service of process on a foreign corporation in only three situations," none of which applied to the facts
in this case; therefore, the circuit court did not obtain jurisdiction
over the defendant.
n Hearne v. Dow-Badische Chem. Co., 224 F. Supp. 90 (S.D. Tex. 1963);
Hutchinson v. Boyd & Sons Press Sales, Inc., 188 F. Supp. 876 (D. Minn. 1960);
Gray v. Am. Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761
(1961).
214 S.E.2d 867 (W. Va. 1975).
2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-15 (1975 Replacement Volume) amended W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-71 (1972 Replacement Volume) and substituted the secretary of
state for the state auditor as the attorney-in-fact for corporations.
1 A court must have jurisdiction over both the parties and the subject matter
to render a valid judgment; any judgment rendered without such jurisdiction is
void. State ex rel. Smith v. Bosworth, 145 W. Va. 753, 117 S.E.2d 610 (1960).
28 A foreign corporation will be deemed to be doing business in West Virginia:
(a) if such corporation makes a contract to be performed, in whole or in
part, by any party thereto, in this State, (b) if such corporation commits
a tort in whole or in part in this State, or (c) if such corporation manufactures, sells, offers for sale or supplies any product in a defective condition
and such product causes injury to any person or property within this
State notwithstanding the fact that such corporation had no agents,
servants or employees or contacts within this State at the time of said
injury.
W. VA.

CODE ANN.

§

31-1-15 (1975

REPLACEMENT VOLUME).
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Strictly construing the West Virginia long-arm statute, the

court noted that since none of the events in the case occurred in
West Virginia, the statute did not apply; thus, the state auditor
could not accept service so as to confer jurisdiction on the circuit
court. The court left any changes in this area up to the legislature
by noting that "[e]ven if there were sufficient minimum contacts
to hold that Schweppes was doing business in this state, which we
do not determine here, no method of service of process is provided."2

214 S.E.2d at 871.

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 8
CONSTITUTIONAL LAWI
In 1975, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dealt
with a broad spectrum of constitutional disputes. At least four of
the decisions discussed below will have a significant state-wide
impact in the near future. The well reasoned progressivism of the
Haden Court is evident throughout the decisions; yet, each step
forward is couched in terms of realistic application rather than illconsidered policy statements.

I. DISCRIMINATION
Perhaps the most significant decision by the Supreme Court
of Appeals in 1975 in the area of constitutional interpretation
dealt, not with the determination of a constitutional issue, but
rather with the question of whether the West Virginia Human
Rights Commission is statutorily empowered to grant monetary
relief to victims of illegal discrimination. 9 The court readily admitted that the power sought by the Human Rights Commission
was not expressly authorized by statute."0 Nevertheless, in light of
the avowed legislative intent of the present Human Rights Act,:'
the existent power, expressly given to the Commission, to grant
monetary relief in certain instances "including, but not limited to
. . .back pay .
,,3,
and the realization that without the weapon
of damages to give an adequate legal remedy to the victims of
discrimination, the Commission could not hope to reduce the
harmful incidences of prejudice,33 the court held that for purposes
of compensation the Commission can grant monetary damages.
21 The below designated cases, although dealing tangentially with issues of a
constitutional nature, will not be referred to in this survey other than in this footnote as their significance to future decisions, will at best, be minimal: Beaverlin v.
Board of Educ. of Lewis County, 216 S.E.2d 554 (W. Va. 1975)(suspension of a
public school instructor) and, Sisler v. Hawkins, 217 S.E.2d 60 (W. Va. 1975)(incarceration of party for failure to have legal representation is impermissible).
Similarly, the case of Sprouse v. Clay Communication Inc., 211 S.E.2d 674 (W.
Va. 1975), will not be discussed in this section. For a full discussion of Sprouse, see
Comment, 78 W. Va. L. Rev. (1976). Also, the two following cases, both dealing with
budgetary disputes concerning the Legislature, will not be discussed as their effect
will be strictly confined to future budgetary problems: State ex rel. Moore v. Blankenship, 217 S.E.2d 232 (W. Va. 1975) and State ex rel. Brotherton v. Blankenship,
214 S.E.2d 467 (W. Va. 1975).
State Human Rights Comm'n v. Pauley, 212 S.E.2d 77 (W, Va. 1975).
Id. at 78.
Id. at 79.
32 W. VA. CoDE ANN. § 5-11-10 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Id. at 79.
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The facts giving rise to the case were not complicated. Charles
Robinson, after reading a newspaper advertisement, contacted
Edith Pauley in hopes of renting an apartment. Pauley informed
Robinson and his wife that they could have the apartment, but
that she would first have to check their references before making
a final decision. Later, Pauley contacted Robinson's wife and told
her that she could no longer consider them as prospective tenants.
Pauley refused to rent to the Robinsons because Charles Robinson
was black and his wife was white. Pursuant to the provisions of the
West Virginia Human Rights Act, 34 the Robinsons filed a complaint with the Commission charging Pauley with illegal discrimination. The Commission conducted an investigatory hearing,
found Pauley guilty as charged, and assessed damages in the
amount of $680. On appeal, the Circuit Court of Kanawha County
affirmed the finding of the Commission with respect to the illegal
discrimination, but held that the Commission had no statutory
authority to grant monetary awards. Finally, in State Human
Rights Commission v. Pauley, the Supreme Court of Appeals was
given an opportunity to express its viewpoint on the subject.
In deciding whether the legislature had intended that the
Human Rights Commission be able to award the victims of discrimination with pecuniary relief, Justice Caplan delved deeply
into the history of the Human Rights Act. The Commission created
by the Act has been in existence since 1961 .3 The original Act
charged the Commission with the power to "encourage and endeavor to bring about mutual understanding and respect among all
racial, religious and ethnic groups within the state and [to] strive
to eliminate all discrimination in employment and places of public
accommodation . . . . The court characterized the original Act
as "a token expression of disapproval of unfair discrimination"37
since the Commission was given no enforcement power. The authority of the Commission was steadily increased, however, with
amendments in 1967, 1971, and 1973. Today the Human Rights
Act contains a comprehensive list of illegal discriminatory prac"

3' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-1 et seq. (1971 Replacement Volume). (During the
Legislature's first extra-ordinary session of 1973 the article was heavily amended.)
11For an extensive discussion of the history of the Act, see Note, Civil
Rights-AdministrativeEnforcement-Damagesas an AppropriateRemedy, 75 W.
VA. L. REv. 253 (1973).
Acts of the 49th W. Va. Leg. ch. 135 Reg. Sess. (1961), as amended W. VA.
CODE ANN. § 5-11-1 (1971 Replacement Volume).
3, 212 S.E.2d at 79.
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tices ' and empowers the Commission to investigate, hold hearings,
seek cease and desist orders" and, in instances of discriminatory
housing practices, apply to the circuit courts for injunctions.'" All
of the aforementioned remedies are made available to the public
to fulfill the Act's mandate that equal opportunity in a "civil
right" and discrimination "is contrary to the principles of freedom
and equality of opportunity and is destructive to a free and demo'4
cratic society." '
A question that has remained unanswered until Pauley,
though, is the extent to which the Human Rights Commission is
empowered to compensate individuals victimized by discrimination. As the court pointed out, the purpose of the Human Rights
Act manifests a legislative intent for liberal interpretation.2 Section ten of the Act grants the Commission, after a violation is
found, the power to "take such affirmative action, including, but
not limited to, hiring, reinstatement or upgrading of employees,
with or without back pay . . . as in the judgment of the commission, will effectuate the purposes of this article . . . ."I Section
eight directs the Commission "[t]o do all acts and deeds necessary and proper to carry out and accomplish effectively the objects,
functions and services contemplated by . . . this article."" Even
the most liberal reading does not divulge an express argument for
compensatory damages. But as the court noted, a "sound principle
of law" in West Virginia is that administrative agencies possess "in
addition to the powers expressly conferred by statute, such powers
as are reasonably and necessarily implied in the exercise of its
duties in accomplishing the purposes of the act."4 In quest of the
proper logic, the court relied heavily on a 1969 decision by the New
Jersey Supreme Court, Jackson v. Concord Company."
The New Jersey statute dealt with in Jackson was worded
precisely as the one before the West Virginia court in Pauley. The
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
3' Id. § 5-11-8 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
"

,o Id. § 5-11-18 (1971 Replacement Volume).
Id. § 5-11-2 (1971 Replacement Volume).

,2 212 S.E.2d at 79.
,3 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 5-11-10 (Cum. Supp. 1975). The emphasis in the text

was supplied by the court. 212 S.E.2d at 80.
" § 5-11-8(h) (1971 Replacement Volume).
'5 212 S.E.2d at 78, citing Colvin v. State Workmen's Comp. Comm'n, 154 W.
Va. 280, 175 S.E.2d 186 (1970).
Is 54 N.J. 113, 253 A.2d 793 (1969).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss4/8

10

CONSTITUTIONAL
Jackson et al.: Survey
of Developments in LAW
West Virginia Law: 1975-1976
Jackson court held that the words "including but not limited to"
are words of enlargement rather than of limitation or exclusion of
non-stated powers.4 7 Hence, to adequately fulfill its mission, the
New Jersey Human Right's Commission's power to give compensatory damages was inferred from the statute's language."
The West Virginia court agreed with this reasoning, but also
considered and accepted a more significant policy argument as
justification for the final decision. As Justice Caplan stated:
If our society and government seriously desire to stamp out
the evil of unlawful discrimination which is symtomatic of unbridled bigotry, and we believe they do, then it is imperative
that the duty of enforcement be accompanied by an effective
and meaningful means of enforcement. The forceful language
used by the Legislature mandates the eradication of unlawful
discrimination. If this mandate is to be carried into fruition, the
provisions of the 1967 Human Rights Act must be given the
significance intended so as to provide for meaningful enforcement."
Although the court held that the Commission could grant
monetary relief in the future, it denied such relief in this case, since
the record revealed that no specific monetary loss was incurred by
the plaintiffs. The Human Rights Commission, while empowered
to grant monetary damages, must limit these to proven actual
loss.,0
Id. at 123, 253 A.2d at 800.
The purpose of the New Jersey court's upholding the awarding monetary
damages went beyond a mere desire to award the victim of discrimination an
adequate legal remedy. "[Tihe law seeks not only to give redress to the individual
wlio complains, but moreover to eliminate and prevent all such future conduct...
by enjoining further discriminatory practices as to all persons, as well as to deter
others similarly situated from engaging or continuing to engage in such courses of
conduct." 54 N.J. at 122, 253 A.2d at 799.
41212 S.E.2d at 79. The court's rationale is thoroughly logical. Absent the
power to grant monetary relief, the Human Rights Commission, try as it might,
could not possibly succeed in its war against prejudice. To a person denied a home
or a job solely because of his race, religion or on some other illegal justification, a
monetary remedy is perhaps the only adequate relief. No matter what nonmonetary relief could be given, by the time the Commission reached its final decision the job would already be filled or the home sold. The violators of the Act would
have no incentive to comply with the orders of the Commission if only a warning
was issued as punishment. Hence, to promote equal treatment, monetary damages
are a virtual necessity.
11Id. at 81.
'7
"
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PEACE BONDS

bond '

"Peace
proceedings have been criticized as being
"anachronism[s] in a setting of expanding constitutional
rights."5 ' In 1975 the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals
significantly restricted the application of this idiosyncrasy of
American jurisprudence in Kolvek v. Napple. 2
Andy Kolvek appeared before a Marion County justice of the
peace and, under oath, expressed fear that his son was about to
cause him physical harm. The justice issued a warrant for Joseph
Kolvek's arrest and asked for a $500 bond pending a two-week
delay in final adjudication. Joseph asserted that he was financially
unable to post bond, but, nevertheless, he was jailed until the
hearing date. At the ensuing hearing, the justice determined that
the senior Kolvek's fears were substantiated by good cause and
demanded a $500 "peace bond" as security that Joseph would keep
the peace for one year. Again Joseph Kolvek plead indigency and
again he was incarcerated for his inability to pay the required
recognizance. After an unsuccessful application for habeas corpus
relief to the Marion County Circuit Court, Joseph Kolvek's plight
came before the Supreme Court of Appeals.
Kolvek mounted a dual constitutional attack on West Virginia's peace bond procedures. 3 Initially, he challenged whether,
consistent with the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution,54 he could be incarcerated solely because of his indigency while a wealthier defendant, charged under the same statute, could "buy his freedom." Next, he challenged the proposition
that peace bonds can be used to imprison individuals who have not
been proven guilty by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
Peace bond proceedings in West Virginia are commenced by
registering a complaint with a justice of the peace that another
1124 VAND. L. REV.405, 408 (1971).
52 212

S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1975).

11 A third constitutional challenge, that the statute violated the eighth

amendment's ban against cruel and unusual punishment was summarily dismissed
by the court. "[Tihe sentence provided for in the statute, if the person willfully
refuses to give a recognizance, is not shocking to the conscience, does not amount
to torture, is not grossly excessive, inherently unfair or unnecessarily degrading."
212 S.E.2d at 619.
' U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 provides that: "No state shall ...deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; or deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
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person intends to commit an offense against the person or property
of the complainant. 55 The justice is then empowered to issue a
warrant for the arrest of the complainant's alleged antagonist. If
the justice determines that good cause exists to verify the complainant's fear of imminent disruption, he may require the accused
to post security in whatever amount he deems sufficient to deter
the defendant from violating the peace of all the people of the
state, and particularly that of the complainant. Should the defendant fail to come forward with the demanded fee, regardless of the
circumstances, the justice can then commit the accused to jail for
up to one year. 5 Appeals from these proceedings are strictly limited to only those defendants who post bond.
The court recognized, with slight discussion, that the
principles of equal protection in criminal proceedings, originally
formulated by the United States Supreme Court in Griffin v.
Illinois,55 prohibit discrimination based on indigency. Griffin, in
striking down an Illinois rule that allowed appeals only upon the
purchase of a transcript, stated that "the ability to pay costs...
bears no rational relationship to a defendant's guilt or innocence
... and that "[t]here can be no equal justice where the kind
of a trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has."60
Under the Griffin analysis, the West Virginia peace bond statute
clearly contradicted the equal protection clause. The court, therefore, declared unconstitutional the provision of chapter sixty-two,
article ten, section three of the West Virginia Code permitting
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-10-2 (1966).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-10-3 (1966) provides that:
When such person appears, if the justice . . . considers there in good
'

cause [for the complaint], he may require a recognizance of the person
against whom it is, and give judgment against him for the costs of the
prosecution, or any part thereof; and, unless such recognizance be given,
he shall commit him to jail, by a warrant, stating the sum the time for
and in which the recognizance is directed ....

A person from whom such

recognizance is required may, on giving it, appeal to the circuit court of
the county; and in such case the justice from whose judgment the appeal
is taken shall recognize such of the witnesses as he may deem proper.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-10-1 (1966) provides that:
Every justice of the peace shall have the power to require, from persons
not of good fame, security for their good behavior and to keep the peace,
for a term not exceeding one year.
351 U.S. 12 (1956).
'

Id. at 17-18.
Id. at 19.
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incarceration for failure to post bond, where applied to an individual incapable of paying the demanded security.'
Joseph Kolvek's victory over the statute on equal protection
grounds did not mean, however, that he had totally conquered the
effects of his peace bond. Contending that the West Virginia peace
bond proceeding is a criminal action, Kolvek argued that the statutory penalty of either bond or imprisonment upon a showing of
"good cause" alone violated his due process right to be proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."2 This argument was based primarily on interpretations holding that the "bedrock axiomatic and
elementary"63 principle of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a
burden the prosecution must meet in all criminal proceedings.
Kolvek argued that as peace bonds are unquestionably criminal
in nature, the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment is
offended by imprisonment or a fine, even in the nature of a recognizance bond, under any less demanding burden of proof. Such was
the finding in Santos v. Nahiwa," where the Supreme Court of
Hawaii declared unconstitutional a peace bond statute identical in
procedure and effect to West Virginia's. The Hawaii court
reasoned that the possibility of imprisonment alone was indication
that the statute imposed a criminal burden on the defendant and
was enough to justify having the state prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In essence, the Hawaii Supreme Court found unconstitutional any statute designed to prevent future illegalities, by the
imposition of present burdens in the absence of conclusive proof.
There is, of course, small likelihood, if any, that a complainant
could prove the future beyond a reasonable doubt unless blessed
with extraordinary talents.
The West Virginia Attorney General challenged this reasoning
claiming that the peace bond is more closely akin to the posting
of bail 5 than to a criminal statute. This comparison is readily
discernible. Both the peace bond and bail provisions are directed
to the performance of a specific future duty-keeping the peace for
one year and appearing at trial. Further, both statutes rely on
Kolvek v. Napple, 212 S.E.2d at 617.
For a discussion of a defendant's "constitutional right" to be proven guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt under W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-7 (1966) (the 'Red
Men's Act'), see Pinkerton v. Farr, 220 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1975). See note 127 and
accompanying text supra.
,3In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970).
53 Haw. 40, 487 P.2d 283 (1971).
W. Va. Code Ann. § 62-1C-4 (1966).
',
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probable cause for their legal effectiveness, and both permit an
indigent defendant to be released rather than imprisoned for his
pecuniary defect.
The court agreed with the state's argument that the peace
bond statute is not a criminal proceeding and held that a determination of probable cause is sufficient to demand either a monetary
recognizance from one who can afford it or a promise to keep the
peace from one who cannot.66 In finding the statute legitimate by
due process standards, the court noted that a peace bond, or a
recognizance bond as it now seems to be called, becomes criminal
only when a defendant, after notice and hearing, "willfully refuses
to give a recognizance." 7
Certain contradictions in the court's analysis in Kolvek must
be pointed out. The court ruled that procedural due process protections other than notice and hearing are inapplicable since the statute does not charge a defendant with a crime."S However, in finding
the statute unconstitutional on equal protection grounds in permitting incarceration of an indigent defendant, the court relied on
United States Supreme Court rulings in criminal cases. 9 Similarly, prior West Virginia courts have recognized that the burden
of the recognizance alone gives the statute a criminal effect. In
discussing the criminal nature of requiring recognizance, Judge
Poffenbarger in State v. Gilliland, stated that "[i]t would be
difficult to class it as anything other than punishment. When bond
is required and not given, the consequence is imprisonment. It is
required under pain of punishment. How could it be anything else
than punishment?"70 In State v. Scouszzio, a later court acknowledged that "[t]he requiring of security to be of good behavior and
to keep the peace is more in the nature of criminal, or quasicriminal, rather than civil, procedure."'" Finally, as the United
States Supreme Court in In re Gault stated, that "labels attached
212 S.E.2d at 618.
I7
Id.

Id. at 618-19.

The court cited Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (indigent convicted of an
offense punishable by fine only cannot be incarcerated to replace the fine as punishment) and Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)(defendant convicted under
statute permitting sentence imposing fine and imprisonment cannot be sent to
prison for longer than statutory maximum for failure to afford the fine). Both Tate
and Williams were directly based on Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
1051 W. Va. 278, 281, 41 S.E. 131, 132 (1902).
11126 W. Va. 135, 140, 27 S.E.2d 451, 453 (1943).
"
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can not defeat the requirements of the fourteenth amendment."
While Kolvek leaves open instances in which peace bonds can
be imposed, the future of this action may not be very secure. The
court was hesitant in sustaining the peace bond proceedings on due
process grounds. Special consideration was given to the fact that
Joseph Kolvek's freedom was reinstated by the destruction of the
statute's equal protection bias. 73 But the problem with awaiting a
judicial denunciation of peace bonds for all purposes, is that the
statute, although widely used, seldomly reaches the appellate
stage, It seems unlikely that the wheels of justice would run any
less smoothly should peace bond proceedings in West Virginia totally disappear.
II.

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS

During the height of the Arab oil embargo in the early spring
of 1974, Governor Arch Moore issued a controversial decree designated as the "quarter-tank rule." Essentially, the plan attempted
to curb fuel consumption by permitting service stations to sell
gasoline to only those motorists with less than a quarter tank in
reserve. Statewide, general dissatisfaction was expressed with this
remedy to the fuel shortage. In an attempt to have the plan rescinded, several individuals began picketing coal mines in southern
West Virginia. To rectify the work stoppage at one of its mines,
Eastern Associated Coal Corporation obtained a preliminary injunction from the McDowell County Circuit Court. The court order
was ignored. Four days later Eastern Associated requested the
court to issue an order requiring the pickets to show cause why they
should not be held in contempt. After hearing arguments, the trial
court found the demonstrators in contempt for violating the injunction, fined one demonstrator $500 and sentenced him to six
months in jail and fined six others $250 and gave them each thirty
days in jail. Upon agreement to pay the fines and discontinue
future picketing, all seven were released from custody. On appeal,
in Eastern Associated Coal Corp. v. Doe,74 the Supreme Court of
Appeals phrased the issue as being whether "the validity of a preliminary injunction may be collaterally attacked in an action in
72

387 U.S. 1, 27-28 (1967).

11 212 S.E.2d at 618-19.
74220 S.E.2d 672 (W. Va. 1975); see, Note, PreliminaryInjunctions in West
Virginia-DiscretionaryNotice and Due Process, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 113 (1975).
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criminal contempt by asserting the unconstitutionality of the in7' ' 5
junction.
The court recognized that in an ex parte motion for a preliminary injunction many competing considerations must be taken
into account. On the one hand are individuals, engaged in what
may well be a lawful activity, who are barred by court order from
continuing that activity without the benefit of a hearing to debate
the order. 6 On the other hand, however, the order granted "assures
the continued good order of society by giving an immediate remedy
to persons suffering from unlawful interference with the exercise of
7
their rights.
The preliminary injunction procedure is most vulnerable in its
ex parte aspect. Many orders are improvidently granted with little
or no investigation made by the court. 8 The problem is further
exacerbated by the possibility that a court may issue a preliminary
injunction though it lacks the jurisdictional capacity to do so. To.
demand obeyance of an injunction, void for jurisdictional defects,
and later punish violators of the defective court order by finding
them in contempt, seems a particularly harsh remedy. In recognition of these conflicting interests, a "balance must be struck with
the inherent power and duty of courts to enforce their orders and
the concomitant necessity of preventing citizens from ignoring authoritative pronouncements of courts on mere chance that the
order will be subsequently invalidated.""
The pickets in Eastern Associated argued that the circuit
court could not enjoin them from a lawful political demonstration
and, hence, could not punish them for disobeyance of the order.
The weakness of this position is that the pickets failed to challenge
the court order through the available appellate process and instead, willfully disobeyed the court order. The court found that the
judiciary has always assumed the power of maintaining a status
quo while the available procedures are used to sort out the opposing contentions and either verify or declare void earlier pronouncements." In seeking the proper rationale, the court quoted at length
from a United States Supreme Court decision, Howat v. Kansas:
" 220 S.E.2d at 677.

§ 53-5-8 (1966).
220 S.E.2d at 677.
" Id. at 677-78.
7'Id. at 678.
Id. citing United States v. U.M.W., 330 U.S. 258 (1947), wherein the United
7' W. VA. CODE ANN.
"
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An injunction duly issuing out of a court of general jurisdiction
.. . and served upon persons made parties therein and within
the jurisdiction, must be obeyed by them however erroneous the
action of the court may be . . . It is for the court of first
instance to determine the question of the validity of the law,
and until its decision is reversed . . . either by itself or by a
higher court, its orders based on its decision are to be respected,
and disobediance of them is contempt of its lawful authority,
to be punished."'
Armed with this principle, the court found that a West Virginia
court is empowered to enjoin supposedly illegal activities if the
court is possessed with the power to grant the desired relief, the
plaintiffs have demonstrated a set of facts which "arguably invoke
the court's jurisdiction"82 and "the allegations both with regard to
the facts and the applicable law are of sufficient substance to
require the court to make, in an adversary proceeding, a reasoned
determination of its own jurisdiction."m
The court readily acknowledged that the above standards
could lead to unconstitutionally issued preliminary injunctions. To
remedy this unsought, but nevertheless likely occurrence, a court
must investigate its jurisdiction immediately and, upon a finding
that it has exceeded its power, dissolve the injunction without
delay.84 More importantly, if an individual ignores the court order
for any reason, regardless of whether the court is later found to
have exceeded its jurisdiction, contempt is proper unless the enjoined party can demonstrate that the court acted in bad faith. 5
Under these standards, the pickets in question were justifiably
found in contempt of a lawfully executed preliminary injunction.
The defendants next argued that, as they were found guilty of
criminal contempt, they were entitled to, but had been denied, the
full panorama of protections under the due process clause."6 Under
current law, a court which finds its sanctity disturbed can summaStates Supreme Court held that orders issued by a district court must be obeyed
until they are set aside, and, regardless of whether a court is later found to have
acted without jurisdiction, violation of the orders may be punished by contempt.
258 U.S. 181, 189-90 (1922).
220 S.E.2d at 679.
'X Id.
Id. at 680.
'Id.

Although the pickets were given ample notice, and were informed of their
right to be represented by counsel at their contempt hearing, the defendants appeared without legal assistance.
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rily impose contempt penalties trivial in nature. 7 "Trivial" has
been defined as a jail sentence of less than six months.8 As for
monetary fines, an area thus far not addressed by the Supreme
Court, the West Virginia court advised that each particular factual
setting must determine whether the fine imposed is substantial or
trivial."9 Since the pickets enjoined from disrupting work had been
sentenced to less than six months in jail, and their fines were
deemed trivial, the Court affirmed in all respects the contempt
order of the lower court."
IV.

SALARY INCREASES FOR COUNTY OFFICIALS

Since 1971 the West Virginia Legislature has struggled to establish a comprehensive and uniform method of compensating the
state's county officials. The 1971 Legislature found that "the present system of providing compensation for these officials is antiquated and not conducive to attracting and holding the best qualified people in government service."'" To rectify the outmoded pay
scale, the Legislature created an entirely new compensatory
scheme. Statewide, each county official's salary was made dependant upon the position held" and the assessed property value of
the county of employment. 3 The result was a general increase in
the salaries of all county officials. Perhaps in recognition of article
VI, section 38 of the West Virginia Constitution,94 which forbids

17See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974); -Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971); Frank v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
Frank v.Maryland, 395 U. S. 147 (1969).
'
220 S.E.2d at 682.
9 To the extent that the court's ruling on the constitutionality of preliminary
injunctions contradicts the following cases, they were overruled: White v. County
Court, 99 W. Va. 504, 129 S.E. 401 (1925); State ex rel. Fortney Lumber &
Hardware Co. v. B. & 0. Ry. Co., 73 W. Va. 1, 79 S.E. 834 (1913); Powhatan v.
Ritz, 60 W. Va. 395, 56 S.E. 257 (1906); Morgan v. County Court, 53 W. Va. 372,
44 S.E. 182 (1903); Laidley v. Jaspar, 49 W. Va. 526, 39 S.E. 169 (1901); Hebb v.
County Court, 48 W. Va. 279, 37 S.E. 676 (1900); State ex rel. Trudgeon v. Blair,
39 W. Va. 704, 20 S.E. 658 (1894); State v. Cunningham, 33 W. Va. 607, 11 S.E. 76
(1890); State ex rel. Mason v. Harper's Ferry Bridge Co., 16 W. Va. 864 (1879).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-1, as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-1 (1976
Replacement Volume).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-4 to -6, as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-4 to 6 (1976 Replacement Volume).
93W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-3, as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-3 (1976
Replacement Volume). The fifty-five West Virginia counties were divided into
seven categories.
" W. VA. CONST. art. VI, § 38 provides in part: "Nor shall the salary of any
public officer be increased or diminished during his term of office . .. ."
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alterations in the salaries of public officials during their term of
office except upon assumption of newly assigned duties,9" the Legislature specified that all county officials were to engage in "inservice training programs" to "modernize and improve the services
of their respective offices.""6
Pursuant to the newly created statutory pay schedule, the
County Commissioners of Monongalia County increased their salaries from $400 to $500 per month beginning July 1 of 1971. In an
action brought by a Morgantown resident, Delardas v. County
Court, 7 these salary increases were declared unconstitutional
under article VI, section 38, by the Supreme Court of Appeals.
Although the court recognized that the constitutional provision in
question permits increased salaries where "[t]he legislature imposes upon the office new and additional duties . . .which em-

brace a new field, beyond the scope and range of the office as it
theretofore had existed and functioned," 9 the court did not feel
that the "in-service training programs" constituted sufficient
grounds to justify the salary increase.
In answer to Delardas, the Legislature rewrote the portions of
the statutes ruled unconstitutional.99 Rather than requiring officials to attend "in-service training programs," the new provisions
required each county official to assume membership on one of two
newly created governmental agencies. Pursuant to the modified
statutes, each county was directed to establish a Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations and a Commission on Crime, Delinquency and Correction.' 9 Except for this variation in required du'- Harbert v. County Court, 129 W. Va. 54, 39 S.E.2d 177 (1946); Springer v.
Board of Educ., 117 W. Va. 413, 185 S.E. 692 (1936). In Springerthe court defined
newly assigned duties as more than "mere incidents of the office [which the official
holds], but [duties which] embrace a new field, and are beyond the scope or range
of the office as it theretofore had existed and functioned. . . ." 117 W. Va. at 417,
185 S.E. at 694.
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-2, as amended, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-2 (1976
Replacement Volume).
'7 186 S.E.2d 847 (W. Va. 1972).
Id. at 851.
" Acts of the 60th W. Va. Leg. ch. 22, §§ 7-7-1 to -21 Reg. Sess. (1972).
' The Commission on Intergovernmental Relations is composed of the members of the county court, all citizens appointed by them, with the clerk of the county
court sitting as executive secretary. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-1-3(q) (1976
Replacement Volume), specifies that the commission "[aissemble and disseminate information concerning federal programs which provide financial assistance to
the residents of their county."
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ties, the amended statutes closely reflected the content of their
predecessors. Again, though, the salary of virtually very county
official was increased by the new statutes.
In 1975, the statutes again come under constitutional attack
in State ex rel. Goodwin v. Rogers.'0 The issue now was whether
the newly acquired duties of Commissioner Goodwin, as a member
of both the Intergovernmental Relations Commission and the
Commission on Crime, Delinquency and Correction of Boone
County, were more than mere incidents of his job and constitutionally justified his salary increase. The court, after an exhaustive
analysis of the amended statutes, ruled that the modified provisions required county officials to assume "new, additional and
substantially different duties"'' 0 thereby constitutionally warranting the pay increases.
The 1972 legislative actions did not, however, escape unscathed from constitutional challenge. Incorporated into the 1972
amendments was a statutory pay escalator clause. As previously
discussed, each county in West Virginia was placed into one of
seven classifications depending on the assessed value of real property. Chapter seven, article seven, section three of the West Virginia code provided that beginning in March of 1976, and every
four years thereafter, the county court of each county would redetermine into which of the seven classes the county fell. Should the
county be reclassified into a higher valued category, the salaries of
all county officials would correspondingly increase.' 3 As was contended in Delardas v. County Court,'4 "normal fluctuations in
assessed valuations of property within a given county will cause
changes which, if the statute were to be applied as written, would
The Commission on Crime, Delinquency and Correction is composed of the
county court members, all appointed citizens, with the clerk of the circuit court
acting as executive secretary. Pursuant to W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-3-1(r) (1976 Replacement Volume), the commission is instructed to:
[Clollect and compile all data and other information with respect to
police agencies, courts of record and justice of peace courts, prosecution
of crimes, probation, jails, juvenile detention facilities, and such other
matters as might be concerned with the total criminial justice system.
Furthermore, the commission is requested to work closely with state and federal
programs of a similar nature.
101217 S.E.2d 65 (W. Va. 1975).
102 Id. at 73.
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 7-7-3 (1976 Replacement Volume). Any reclassification
directed by a county court is subject to review by the state tax commissioner.
101217 S.E.2d 75 (W. Va. 1975).
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result in automatic salary increases for incumbent county officials
in a manner prohibited by West Virginia Constitution, Article VI,
Section 38."05 The court sustained this argument on the basis that
mid-term salary increases are legitimate only if accompanied by
parallel increases in duties.' 6

"0

'

Id. at 78.
Id. at 78-79.
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CONTRACTS 107
I.

ASSIGNMENT

In Cox v. Galigher Motor Sales Co."' the plaintiff bought a
Ford truck under a retail installment contract from Galigher. The
contract was then assigned to Ford Motor Credit Company, a
wholly owned subsidiary of Ford Motor Company. The truck
proved unsatisfactory for its intended purpose from the time it was
purchased, and numerous repairs were made under the Ford warranty. Upon Ford's refusal to make later repairs, the plaintiff withheld further payments on the installment contract. A credit company representative asked permission to take the truck in for the
repairs. After the truck was taken away, the plaintiff received a
notice from Ford Credit Company that the truck had been repossessed and would be sold at auction.
The installment contract provided that the buyer (plaintiff)
would not assert any claim or defense against a subsequent holder
of the contract. The court noted that if the credit company was an
assignee for value, the matter would be controlled by statute'
which provides that an assignee who takes an assignment for value,
in good faith and without notice of a claim or defense can enforce
the agreement by the buyer not to assert a claim or defense. The
court had to decide who had the burden of proving that the as,
signee took the assignment for value, in good faith and without
notice of the claim. The Cox court, applying principles of the.law
of negotiable instruments,"' held that the person who executed the
installment contract (plaintiff) had the burden of proof. The court
also held that the plaintiff could not assert the defects in the truck
as a defense to the credit company's claim, as this must be asserted
against the seller (Galigher).
"I7Contracts cases not reported: Parker v. Knowlton Constr. Co., 210 S.E.2d
918 (W. Va. 1975) (oral agreement memorialized in writing); Henson v. Prudential
Ins. Co., 215 S.E.2d 211 (W. Va. 1975) (insurance contract); Wheeling Downs
Racing Ass'n v. W. Va. Sportservice, Inc., 216 S.E.2d 234 (W. Va. 1975) (changed
conditions); Burns v. Cities Serv. Co., 217 S.E.2d 56 (W. Va. 1975) (mechanic's
lien); Columbia Gas Transmission Co. v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 217
S.E.2d 919 (W. Va. 1975) (tax adjustment clause).
03 213 S.E.2d 475 (W. Va. 1975).
SW. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-206(1)

(1966).

11Mere possession of a negotiable instrument by an assignee is prima facie
proof that he acquired it bona fide. The burden of proving that a holder did not
acquire it bona fide is on the maker. Marshall County Bank v. Citizens Mutual
Trust Co., 114 W. Va. 791, 174 S.E. 556 (1934).
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Although the plaintiff alleged that the repossession of the
truck was accomplished through deceit, the court, while stating
that such practices were not favored,"' upheld the repossession
since the controlling statute authorized repossession without
judicial process as long as no breach of the peace occurred."'
II.

ARBITRATION

In Board of Education v. W. Harley Miller, Inc.," 3 the West
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals dealt with a standard
arbitration clause contained in a construction contract. Following
a contractual dispute, the board obtained an injunction restraining
the construction company from proceeding with arbitration pending the outcome of a declaratory judgment action. The question
presented was "whether the parties have a contractual obligation
to submit the dispute to arbitration before either may resort to
court action.""' 4
The court noted that the common law permitted arbitration
but allowed revocation of the promise to submit to arbitration at
any time prior to the award"' "because of that principle of law that
parties could not, by agreement, oust the courts of their jurisdiction assigned them by law .

. . .""'

The court also noted that

statutory arbitration"' applies only to existing controversies and
supplements, but does not replace, common law arbitration.)"
Therefore, a suit could still be maintained where the agreement
provided for arbitration as to "future""' 9 or "all"''2 disputes.
The court noted an exception to the common law, however,
which states that "an agreement to arbitrate future controversies
is not revocable where it has been made a condition precedent to
a right of action."'"' Applying this exception to the arbitration
213 S.E.2d at 479.
,,2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-503 (1966).
113221 S.E.2d 882 (W. Va. 1975).
"' Id. at 883.
Id., citing Hughes v. National Fuel Co., 121 W. Va. 392, 3 S.E.2d 621 (1939).
"' Riley v. Jarvis, 43 W. Va. 43, 48, 26 S.E. 366, 368 (1896).
" W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-10-1 to -8 (1966).
"' 221 S.E.2d at 884.
"' Turner v. Stewart, 51 W. Va. 493, 41 S.E. 924 (1902).
'1 Kinney v. Baltimore & Ohio Emp. Relief Ass'n, 35 W. Va. 385, 14 S.E. 8
(1891).
"1 221 S.E.2d at 884,

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss4/8

24

CONTRA CTSin West Virginia Law: 1975-1976
Jackson et al.: Survey of Developments
clause in Board of Education,I2 the court found that arbitration
was mandatory and a condition precedent to any right of action
arising under the contract.'1 The court stated that the common
that arbitration ousted courts of jurisdiction was
law rationale
"archaic," ' and that statutory arbitration "inhibits rather than
encourages the arbitration mechanism. It would appear that a
statute on the subject of arbitration is
modem and comprehensive
'2 5
sorely needed."'

The arbitration provision provided:
All claims, disputes and other matters in question arising out of, or

112

relating to this Contract or the breach thereof,

. . .

shall be decided by

arbitration in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration
Rules of the American Arbitration Association then obtaining unless the
parties mutually agree otherwise. This agreement to arbitrate shall be
specifically enforceable under the prevailing arbitration law. The award
rendered by the arbitrators shall be final, and judgment may be entered
upon it in accordance with applicable law in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.
221 S.E.2d at 885.

Id.

123

Id.
221 S.E.2d at 886. Justice Neely would have completely overruled the common law arbitration doctrine and allowed the parties to freely contract for any
method of resolving existing or future disputes, except in adhesion contracts. 221
S.E.2d at 888. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Berry saw no language in the arbitration agreement which would make arbitration a condition precedent to any right
of action arising out the contract. 221 S.E.2d at 890.
128

121
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CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 2 6

As in the past, the West Virginia court dealt with more criminal cases than any other subject in 1975. In nearly every decision
discussed below, the Supreme Court of Appeals rewrote a significant area of the law. The liberal attitude of the Court reached its
high point in 1975. It can only be hoped that Chief Justice Haden's
appointment to the federal bench will not deter the court from its
recent trend of progressive interpretation.
I.

CONSPIRACY

In Pinkerton v. Farr, the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals held unconstitutional a statute that ninety years earlier a
prior court had characterized as a "'desperate remedy' to combat
"lawless bands of men, known as 'Red Men', 'Regulators', 'Vigilance Committees'" and others, who persistantly inflicted punishment upon and destroyed property of innocent people.'

2

8

Six defendante were indicted for felonious assault and conspiracy to inflict bodily injury. Prior to their trials, four of the six
so charged sought two separate writs of prohibition' 0 from the
Supreme Court of Appeals challenging as unconstitutional West
Virginia's "Red Men's Act.'

3

The "Red Men's Act" is West Vir-

,'6 The following cases were decided by the West Virginia Supreme Court of
Appeals on the subject of criminal procedure during 1975, but will not be discussed
in this survey: State v. Arnold, 219 S.E.2d 922 (W. Va. 1975) (determination of
abuse of discretion); State ex rel. Postelwaite v. Bechtold, 212 S.E.2d 69 (W. Va.
1975) (conflicts in dual representation); State v. Riley, 215 S.E.2d 460 (W. Va.
1975) (operating vehicle without Public Service Commission identification card).
Two other cases will not be discussed since they deal with evidentiary rather than
purely criminal topics; State v. Ramey, 212 S.E.2d 737 (W. Va. 1975); State v.
Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1975). Also, see Note, Due Process-Right to
Counsel at PretrialIdentifications, 78 W. VA. L. REv. 84, 90 (1975), for a discussion
of State v. Moore, 212 S.E.2d 608 (W. Va. 1975) and State v. Stollings, 212 S.E.2d
745 (W. Va. 1975), both cases considering whether or not a preindictment lineup
or "show-up" requires the assistance of counsel.
Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 220 S.E.2d 14 (W. Va. 1975), although a 1975 decision
involving important criminal procedure issues, was published subsequent to our
deadline, and hence, will not be discussed in this volume.
1- 220 S.E.2d 682 (W. Va. 1975).
12 Id. at 687, citing State v. Porter, 25 W. Va. 685, 689 (1885). See also State
v. Bingham, 42 W. Va. 234, 24 S.E. 883 (1896).
121Smith v. Oakley, 220 S.E.2d 689 (1975) was decided in a memorandum
opinion and relied totally on Pinkerton. No reference to Smith will be made other
than to say that the petitioner Smith was indicted as a co-defendant of Pinkerton.
"a W. Va. Code Ann. § 61-6-7 (1966)(the 'Red Men's Act') provides that:
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ginia's conspiracy statute. This statute provides that it is a misdemeanor for one person to "conspire or combine" with another for
the purpose of inflicting bodily injury or defacing public property.
Should the conspirators actually commit the planned assault or
defacement, they may be found guilty of a felony and subject to
ten years imprisonment. Most significantly, however, if the defendant was present and aided and abetted any others in the commission of a crime, the law presumes that the parties were conspirators. Consequently, should the defendant be charged with conspiracy under the "Red Men's Act," he then, interestingly enough, has
the burden of persuading the jury of his innocence. Obviously, the
"Red Men's Act" was a powerful weapon in the hands of the mine
operators in their attempts to destroy the United Mine Workers in
the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.
The defendants raised three constitutional challenges to the
statute's validity. First, they asserted that because the act allows
the prosecution to prove each defendant individually guilty of assault and then shifts the burden to each defendant to exonerate
himself from the charge of conspiracy, the statute violates the right
of an accused to be free from self-incrimination. 31 In other words,
the statute provides that once the state has established each defendant guilty of assault, the guilty party's only available avenue to
prove that he was not a conspirator is to take the stand in his own
If two or more persons. . . combine or conspire together for the purpose
of inflicting any punishment or bodily injury upon any other person or
persons, or for the purpose of destroying, injuring, defacing, or taking and
carrying away any property. . ., every such person, whether he has done
any act in pursuance of such combination or conspiracy or not, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor. ...
If any person, in pursuance of such combination or conspiracy, shall
inflict any punishment or bodily injury upon another person, or shall
destroy, injure, deface, or take and carry away, any property. . . not his
own, he shall be guilty of a felony . . . , and if the death of any person
shall result from the commission of such offense, every person engaged
in the commission thereof shall be guilty of murder of the first degree
If, upon the trial of an indictment hereunder, it be proved that two
...
or more persons. . . were present, aiding and abetting in the commission
of the offense charged therein, it shall be presumed that such offense was
committed in pursuance of such combination or conspiracy, in the absence on satisfactory proof to the contrary. And all persons who were
present, aiding and abetting, at the commission of any offense mentioned
herein, shall be deemed conspirators within the meaning hereof. . ..
"' U.S. CONST. amend. V provides in pertinent part that: "No person. . . may
be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. .. ."
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defense. Hence, merely by charging the defendant with the crime,
the prosecution compels him either to testify in his own behalf or
to remain silent and suffer the consequences of his presumed guilt.
Unlike the typical criminal charge, the "Red Men's Act" converts
the right of an accused to remain silent into an incriminating act.
Since the constitutional protection of freedom from selfincrimination encompasses the defendant's right to remain silent,'32 the court found the "Red Men's Act" unconstitutional, at
least to the extent that it requires the defendant to come forth with
33
evidence to establish his innocence.'
The defendants next attacked the statute's proclamation that
once the state has proven assault and the fact that at least one
other person was present and engaged in the act, "it shall be
presumed that such offense was committed in pursuance of such
134 This provision is obviously
combination or conspiracy ....
contrary to perhaps the most elementary facet of American criminal justice-the defendant's right to a presumption of innocence.
Though not an express constitutional right, this fundamental presumption is nonetheless embodied in the due process clause of both
the state and federal constitutions.'35 Justice Caplan quoted an
1817 English case for the proposition that "this presumption of
innocence is to be found in every code of law which has reason, and.
3
religion, and humanity, for a foundation."' 1
"3 Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605 (1972); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609
(1965); State v. Bragg, 140 W. Va. 585, 87 S.E.2d 689 (1955); State v. Costa, 101
W. Va. 466, 132 869 (1926).
'" See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-6 (1966) as discussed in State v. Taylor, 57
W. Va. 228, 234-35, 50 S.E. 247, 249 (1905);
It is designed to enforce the common law maxim ... which protects the
citizen from being required in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself. One of the most excellent principles of the common law was that
the state took upon itself the burden of proving the guilt of the prisoner
....
So the law, having brought the prisoner into court against his will,
did not permit his silence to be treated or used as evidence against him.
"3' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-6-7 (1966).
'3 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV provides that: "No State shall . . . deprive any

person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law ....

."

The same

language is found in the West Virginia Constitution, Art. III, § 10. For the proposition that a defendant is guaranteed a presumption of innocence, the court quoted
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895): "The principle that there is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and
elementary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation of the administration of our
criminal law." Id. at 439. See, e.g., State v. Pietranton, 140 W. Va. 444, 84 S.E.2d
774 (1954).
'u 220 S.E.2d at 686-87.
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Not only does the statute offend the due process clause in
failing to comprehend the accused's right to a presumption of innocence, but it ignores the principle that in all criminal cases the
state has the burden of proving the defendant's guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt. Although the right of a defendant to have the
state prove his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is nowhere expressly granted as a constitutional right, the due process clause has
been held to contain this fundamental principle "deemed essential
for the protection of life and liberty."' 37
The defendants combined their second attack, that the
statute violates the constitutional right to a presumption of innocence, with the contention that the evidentiary effect of a presumption of guilt is conviction by presumption rather than by
conclusive proof. 38 Again, the court declared that any statute permitting guilt to be proven by presumption is "patently contrary to
the basic concepts of criminal justice"'39 and hence, constitutionally unacceptable.
The state defended the "Red Men's Act" by contending that,
if an assault is carried out by two or more persons "it is more likely
than not that some form of agreement for concerted action existed." 40 Thus, the state argued, the statute legitimately expresses
a "rational connection" between the fact proved and the fact
presumed. The United States Supreme Court has held that to be
constitutional, a "rational connection" must be supported by
"substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more likely than
not to flow from the proved fact on which it is made to depend."''
Applying the "rational connection" test to the "Red Men's Act,"
the court was unable to state with "substantial assurance," that
assault by two or more individuals is the likely result of a conspirrational, was declared to be
acy. Thus the statute, rather than
4 2
irrational and unconstitutional.
"1 220 S.E.2d at 688 quoting Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469 (1895). See
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684 (1975); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970); Leland
v. Oregon, 343 U.S. 790, 802 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
" 220 S.E.2d at 688.
" Id. at 687-88.
'° Id. at 688.
' Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 14 (1969). See also, United States v.
Romano, 382 U.S. 136 (1965); United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63 (1965); Tot v.
United States, 319 U.S. 463 (1943).
"1 220 S.E.2d at 689.
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Although little remained of the "Red Men's Act," the court
had not fully dealt with the concluding sentence of the statute. The
provision making all persons present, aiding and abetting, conspirators, was, in the court's words, an "unequivocal declaration of
guilt.' '

3

This provision meant that the state need not prove any-

thing other than presence and assault; that as a matter of law the
defendants were guilty if charged.' Like the rest of the statute,
this element was stricken as being unconstitutional. Other than as
a bad memory, it is unlikely that the "Red Men's Act" will long
be missed when finally erased from the Code.

I.

DEFENDANT'S RIGHT OF PRESENCE

The right of the criminal defendant in felony cases in West
Virginia to be personally present "from the inception of the trial
upon the indictment to the final judgment inclusive when anything is done affecting him,"'45 has, at various times in the history
of the state, been termed a "constitutional right""'4 or an "inalienable right."'47 The common law rule of presence was incorporated
into the Virginia Codes of 1849 and 1860 and has remained a part
of West Virginia statutory law since 1868.'1 s In a long line of cases,
with only a few isolated and inconsistent exceptions,' the right of
presence has been deemed mandatory and incapable of being
waived by the defendant.' 0 The unwavering application of the
presence rule has caused numerous retrials, even though the defendants could not possibly have been prejudiced by their temporary
absence from the proceedings.' 5'
143Id.

'i Id.

,, State v. Howerton, 100 W. Va. 501, 502, 130 S.E. 655 (1925).
State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S.E. 676 (1901).
"7 State v. Grove, 74 W. Va. 702, 82 S.E. 1019 (1914).
"'
65 W. VA. L. REV. 50 (1962). W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-2 (1966) provides that:
"A person indicted for felony shall be personally present during the trial therefor
"'

State v.. Davis, 153 W. Va. 742, 172 S.E.2d 569 (1970); State ex rel.

Burkhamer v. Adams, 143 W. Va. 557, 103 S.E.2d 777 (1958); State v. Blankenship,
137 W. Va. 1, 69 S.E.2d 398 (1952); State v. Roberts, 122 W. Va. 536, 11 S.E.2d
172 (1940); State v. Lucas, 103 W. Va. 743, 138 S.E. 393 (1927); State v. Parsons,
39 W. Va. 464, 19 S.E. 876 (1894).
- E.g. State v. Sheppard, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S.E. 676 (1901).
,5,
Perhaps the most extreme example of the rigidty of the presence doctrine
occurred in State v. Shepperd, 49 W. Va. 582, 39 S.E. 676 (1901). During the
defendant's absence from the courtroom, a prosecution witness was asked her name
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The demise of the presence doctrine was initiated in a stirring
dissent by Judge Calhoun in State v. Vance.' In Vance, the majority reversed a conviction because the defendant had voluntarily
absented himself from the court for four or five minutes. Calhoun
disagreed and advocated that in future decisions the court view
each absence of presence through the lens of a harmless error standard. 5 3 Calhoun's plea was finally adopted by the Supreme Court
of Appeals last year in the companion cases, State ex rel. Grob v.
Blair 4 and State v. Slie.s1
In Grob, the defendant was identified at trial by an eyewitness
as one of two men who had assaulted and killed a man in Ohio
County. On the day after her incriminating recognition, the witness contacted her attorney and stated that she now wished to
recant her prior testimony. The trial judge, prosecutor, and defense counsel then met with the eyewitness and her lawyer in the
judge's quarters, only to learn that the witness no longer desired
to withdraw her identification. During the examination of the witness the defendant was confined in jail, but his attorney raised no
objection to his absence. At no time was the witness recalled to the
stand and, because the witness' hesitancy had been based, not on
faulty recollection, but upon fear of retribution, her indecision was
kept from the jury. A verdict of guilty was later returned to the
charge of first degree murder.
The defendant in Slie was twice absent during his trial. On the
first occasion, his lawyer, the judge, and the prosecutor met
outside the courtroom to review the trial transcript. No ruling was
made as a result of this meeting. The defendant, however, was
absent, as was his lawyer, when the judge and prosecutor later met
to discuss instructions. She was subsequently convicted of
kidnapping.
and that of her husband. When the defendant was brought before the court, only
moments after the examination, the same question and answers were repeated for
his benefit. The court readily admitted that the defendant could not possibly have
been detrimentally affected by his absence. Nevertheless, the court applied unquestioningly the strict rule of presence, determined that prejudicial error had occurred
and remanded for a new trial.
"1'146 W. Va. 925, 124 S.E.2d 252 (1962).
1'3 146 W. Va. at 942, 124 S.E.2d at 261.
151214 S.E.2d 330 (W. Va. 1975).
155213 S.E.2d 109 (W. Va. 1975). Although Grob and Slie were decided on the
same day, Grob discusses in detail the historical discussion of presence and the
modification brought about by the two cases, She relies wholly on Grob for its
rationale.
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To gain a clear picture of the new presence rule, a distinction
must first be drawn between the constitutional requirement of
confrontation and the statutory doctrine of presence. Both the
United States and West Virginia Constitutions assert that in all
criminal prosecutions "the accused shall . . . be confronted with
the witnesses against him . . .,.5" The object of this provision is:
to prevent deposition or ex parte affidavits . . . [from] being
used against the prisoner in lieu of a personal examination and
cross-examination of the witness in which the accused has an
opportunity, not only of testing the recollection and sifting-the
conscience of the witness, but of compelling him to stand face
to face with the jury in order that they may look at him, and
judge by his demeanor upon the stand and the manner in which
he gives his testimony whether he is worthy of belief.' 7
While numerous exceptions have been carved out of the confrontation clause,'
this provision clearly indicates that crossexamination is a vital need of any defendant and cannot be evaded
by the prosecution if any viable alternative to the attempted infringement exists.
Presence, unlike confrontation, pertains not only during the
introduction of testimony, but at all stages of the proceedings. The
doctrine of presence seeks to avoid any decision by the state without the physical cognizance of the accused. Yet the typical criminal defendant has little familiarity with the subtle intricacies of
our criminal processes. Hence, the Supreme Court has fashioned
a lengthy list of "critical stages" in any criminal proceeding, all of
which require the guiding hand and legally educated mind of a
lawyer. Generally, it is not the defendant's presence, but rather
that of his lawyer which is essential for the fair treatment of the
accused. The United States Constitution requires the presence of
the defendant only when such presence "has a relation, reasonably
substantial, to the fulness of his opportunity to defend against the
charge."'
'"U.S. CONsT.

amend.

VI; W. VA. CONST. Art. III,

§

14.

Mattox v. United States, 156 U. S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
"' See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) for certain constitutionally
permissible exceptions to the confrontation clause.
See Semerjian, The Right of Confrontation,55 A.B.A.J. 152 (1969) for a discussion of the right of confrontation and the hearsay rule.
'I Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1934). Mr. Justice Cardozo
stated in Snyder: "[S]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the extent that a fair and just
'
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The West Virginia Court had recognized this prior to Grob and
Slie on only rare occasions. The trouble was that these exceptions
could not be squared with the vast majority of the case law. To
eliminate these inconsistencies the court stated that
"[h]enceforth, before an accused will be entitled. to count his
absence at a critical stage of the trial proceeding as reversible error,
he must demonstrate a possibility of prejudice in the occurrence."'IGO
Although the new standard was adopted in Grob and Slie,
both defendants persuaded the court that the "possibility of prejudice" existed from their absence. The analysis by Chief Justice
Haden in Grob deserves special mention. Haden recognized that
confrontation and presence are not mutually exclusive and that in
certain circumstances, the defendant's presence is so relevant to
the proper adjudication of his case that his absence would not only
violate his statutory right to presence, but his constitutional right
to confront his accusers as well."6 ' If, then, as in Grob, a key prosecution witness is examined by the court, particularly one whose
story has suddenly changed, the "confrontation right converges
with the presence right, if the accused was absent when the prosecution witness was questioned."'' 2
As a further index of what the court will look to in the future
to judge if a defendant has been prejudiced by his absence at a
particular moment, Haden stated that at any "critical stage in the
criminal proceeding" the accused has a right to be present.163Thus
in Slie, since the defendant was unaffected by the review of the
record outside the courtroom by the judge, prosecutor, and defense
counsel, the court ruled that his absence did not constitute prejuhearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to that extent only." Id. at 107-08.
In distinguishing between presence and confrontation the Court pointed out that:
Confusion of thought will result if we fail to mark the distinction between
requirements in respect of presence that have their source in the common
law, and requirements that have their source, either expressly or by implication, in the federal constitution. Confusion will result again if the
privilege of presence be identified with the privilege of confrontation,
which is limited to the stages of trial when there are witnesses to be
questioned.
Id. at 107.
'W 214 S.E.2d at 337.
,' Id. at 337-38.
,62
Id. at 338.
IId.
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dicial error.'" It is unclear, though, whether this absence was construed to be harmless error because at a critical stage nothing was
done that affected the defendant, or because the consultation of
the record did not involve a critical stage. The court did find,
however, that prejudicial error had occurred when the judge and
prosecutor, without either the defendant or his counsel, later
secluded themselves to consider instructions.'65
Ill. DISCOVERY
"Liberal procedures for discovery in preparation for trial are
essential to any modern judicial system in which the search for
truth in aid of justice is paramount and in which concealment and
surprise are not to be tolerated.""' The above standard reflects the
belief that our judicial system functions at its optimum when the
vestiges of trial by ambush are eliminated in civil litigation. While
the modem rules of discovery have brought clarity and efficiency
into court in civil cases, the criminal defendant, by comparison,
often must enter the arena not knowing at what moment the prosecution may spring an unforseen trap. The need for extensive
defense discovery in criminal trials is sharply brought into focus
in the case of an indigent defendant. Lacking the funds to adequately develop his proof, such a defendant can only formulate his
pretrial strategy in the dark, whereas the prosecution can activate
national, state and local police forces, armed with limitless resources and complex investigatory tools, in an attempt to win its
case. In 1975 the West Virginia court in State v. Dudick' 7 took a
significant step to more evenly balance the scales in criminal trials.
Metro Dudick was convicted of possession of marijuana. One
of two policemen who conducted the incriminating search of Dudick's apartment, testified that the odor of marijuana was noticeable and a burning cigarette believed to contain the illegal substance was found. Refreshing his memory from a police report of
which defense counsel was denied inspection, the officer further
testified that the cigarette was seized, analyzed, and found to contain marijuana. Subsequent to conviction, the defense counsel was
permitted to examine the police report where he discovered that
the state's analysis of the burning cigarette had in fact returned
,s 213 S.E.2d at 116-17.

rn Id. at 117.
Lang v. Morgan's Home Equipment Corp., 6 N.J. 333, 338, 78 A.2d 705, 707
(1951).

1-7213 S.E.2d 458 (W. Va. 1975).
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negative results. Although the defense brought this information to
the trial court's attention in a motion for a new trial, the conviction
was allowed to stand. On appeal, Justice Neely, though noting that
scant authority in prior decisions supported the holding, ruled that
it was reversible error to deny defense counsel the opportunity to
inspect the police records used by the witnesses to aid their
recollections.
West Virginia has long clung to the common law rule that
discovery in a criminal case rests almost exclusively within the
discretion of the trial court; 6 " the notable exception being clearly
exculpatory evidence or information held by the state.'"9 By
statute, West Virginia defendants have recently been entitled to
receive from the state any written or recorded statements or confessions made by the prisoner, results of any physical or mental
examinations and scientific tests made in connection with the case
and inspection rights to any tangible objects seized from the defendant.'10 And only three years ago the Supreme Court of Appeals
gave its permission to defense counsel, with approval of the trial
judge, to view the portions of notes taken to the stand that are
actually used by the witness.'7 '
Dudick is clearly a significant case. Although the trial judge
will continue to exercise great discretion in decisions on pretrial
discovery, Dudick can be cited for the proposition that:
[O]nce a prosecution witness has testified from notes used to
refresh his recollection, the defense is absolutely entitled to look
at the notes from which he testified and must be given a reasonable opportunity to study the material and to prepare crossexamination. When a police report encompasses additional information which is not the subject of direct examination, the
defense is entitled to inspect it as well, unless the judge determines in an in camera proceeding that the material is in no way
relevant to the defendant's case and disclosure of the material
(for example, the names of confidential
informants) would
72
endanger police activities in the future.'
Although unclear from the decision, it appears as if defense counsel
still cannot demand inspection of documents or memoranda not
' State v. Cowan, 197 S.E.2d 641 (W. Va. 1973).
'' Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
'T'

W. VA. CODE ANN.

';'State

§ 62-1B-2

(1966).

v. West, 200 S.E.2d 859 (W. Va. 1973).

,72
213 S.E.2d at 464.
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brought to the witness stand, though used by the state to establish
its case.
The question that must be asked, though, is whether Dudick
goes far enough to eliminate the antiquated theatrical element of
unfair surprise in criminal proceedings. In defense of limited discovery in criminal cases Judge Learned Hand once stated that
"[o]ur dangers do not lie in too little tenderness to the accused.
Our procedure has been always haunted by the ghost of the innocent man convicted. It is an unreal dream. What we need to fear
is the archaic formalism and the watery sentiment that obstructs,
delays, and defeats the prosecution of crime.'

73

But in answer to

Judge Hand, it should be remembered that the object of the prosecution is fulfilled, not when the charged defendant is convicted,
but rather when the guilty party is convicted. As stated by the
United States Supreme Court, the interest of the prosecution in a
criminal trial "is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall
be done."' 74
In tracing the precedent for the court's decision in Dudick,
Justice Neely cited the leading federal case on discovery, Jencks
v. United States.' In Jencks the United States Supreme Court
ruled, not as a matter of constitutional necessity, but as a guide
for federal criminal proceedings, that justice demands that defense
attorneys be allowed to examine all notes brought to the witness
stand by witnesses for the government. In this respect, Dudick
echoes Jencks. Since Jencks, however, many jurisdictions, particularly federal, have greatly expanded the rights of defendants to
know in advance what the prosecution will try to prove and what
basis in evidence supports that aim.'76 The genesis of this recent
movement was the publication of the American Bar Association's
Standards of Discovery and Procedure Before Trial.' The Standards require that the prosecutor furnish defense counsel with: the
names and addresses of persons the prosecutor will call as witnesses, 78 together with any relevant pretrial statements they may
have made;' any portion of grand jury minutes containing testi"
'7

United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646, 649 (S.D.N.Y. 1923).
Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).

353 U.S. 657 (1956).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16; FED. R. EVID. 612; ALAs. R. CRiM. P. 16; FLA. R.
CRIM. 3.220; ILL. SUP. CT. R. 412; N.J. CT. R. 3.
'71 A.B.A. STANDARDS OF DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORR TRIAL (1970).
'T'
';'

179Id. 2.1(j).
179 Id.
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mony of the defendant or the prosecution's witnesses;' 5 and any
record of prior criminal convictions of persons the prosecutor intends to call as witnesses.'"' As a measure of reciprocity, the Standards also provide that "[s]ubject to constitutional limitations,
the trial court may require that the prosecuting attorney be informed of the nature of any defense which defense counsel intends
to use at trial and the names and addresses of persons whom the
defense counsel intends to call as witnesses in support thereof."'' 2
Although the Standards go far beyond present pretrial criminal discovery rules in West Virginia, it is interesting to note that
since 1960, similar standards have governed the civil side of the
docket.'" Justice Neely, in defending the court's decision to hold
the line on pretrial discovery, expressed the arguments advanced
by most American courts.'"4 First, it is generally contended that
"the criminal who is aware of the whole case against him will often
procure perjured testimony in order to set up a false defense. ' "'
Second, it is feared that the intimidation or elimination of hostile
witnesses might occur. Third, discovery cannot be a one-way
street, and since the defendant does not have to reciprocate, he will
gain an unfair advantage over the prosecution. The underlying
premise of this argument is that the privilege against selfincrimination prevents criminal discovery from ever being a twoway street.' 6 Finally, unfairness is the result when the prosecutor
'Id.2.1(iii)
I Id. 2.1(vi).
In Id. 3.3.
" W. VA. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
' 213 S.E.2d at 463.

State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 210, 98 A.2d 881, 890 (1953).
The four justifications on limited discovery mentioned by the court have
been attacked by many commentators in recent years. The leading article criticizing narrow discovery rules as contrary to the presumption of innocense is one
written by Mr. Justice Brennan, then a member of the New Jersey Supreme Court.
Brennan, The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth? 1963
WASH. U. L. Q. 279.
The most often stated defense to restrictive discovery is that liberalization will
lead to perjury. Of course, this objection is merely hypothetical given that the door
to such discovery has generally remained firmly shut. Also, it is questionable that
the severity of criminal prosecutions so exceeds the penalties of similar civil actions
that perjury would occur only in the civil case. E.g., Why might a criminal trial
involving a charge of tax evasion produce perjury while a civil trial for such a
violation remain free of such abuse? Finally, if we are concernd that a criminal
defendant will learn too much of the case against him, we are actually hurting only
the innocent defendant. If a defendant is truly guilty as charged, it would seem that
he already possesses the requisite knowledge to formulate a false defense. See
"
'
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is forced to investigate his case and then turn the work product
over to the accused. Although a full analysis of the above points
is far beyond the scope of this article, it is sufficient to say that
the present trend is toward ABA-like discovery rules in most
states, and little adverse reaction to their implementation has surfaced as of yet.
IV.

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGE

In State v. Sams'8 7 the defendant appealed his conviction for
breaking and entering, asserting that the special judge before
whom his trial was conducted should have disqualified himself
because he was pecuniarily interested in the outcome of the case.
At the time of the crime and of the trial, the judge was a member
of the Elks Club that the defendant was charged with breaking and
entering. In effect a partial owner of the premises, the defense
argued that the judge was financially interested in the outcome of
the case and therefore should have disqualified himself.
As to whether membership in the Elks was reason enough for
disqualification of the judge in this case, the court stated as the
general rule that any pecuniary interest in the trial, however slight,
is grounds for reversal.'88 Typically, disqualification for this reason
occurs when the judge stands to benefit in some manner by the
outcome of the case. Disqualification might also be proper where
the trial judge can be shown to have an interest in retribution
against the defendant. Examples of the latter would be if the defendant had assaulted a member of the judge's family or stolen his
car.
In Sams, defense counsel chose only to attack the possible
pecuniary interest the judge might have had in the defendant's
conviction. But as the Supreme Court of Appeals pointed out, a
special judge's salary is provided for by statute in West Virginia, "I
and regardless of the outcome, no direct monetary benefit would
flow to the judge. While any monetary benefit is grounds for disEverett, Discovery in Criminal Cases-In Search of a Standard, 1964 DuKE L.J.
477; Fletcher, PretrialDiscovery in State Criminal Cases, 12 STAN. L. RED. 293
(1960); Goldstein, The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal
Procedure,69 YALE L.J. 1149 (1960).
197 210 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975).
"I Id. at 917, citing Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927); State ex rel.
Shrewsbury v. Poteet, 202 S.E.2d 628 (W. Va. 1974); Osborne v. Chinn, 146 W. Va.
610, 121 S.E.2d 610 (1961).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-12 (1966).
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qualification, this benefit "must be direct; it must be real and
certain, and not one which is merely incidental, remote, contingent, or possible." ' Hence, as no court official integrally involved
in the litigation stood to gain by the defendant's conviction, the
court held the special judge's membership in the Elks insufficient
ground for disqualification.
V.

GuiLTY PLEAS

In Call v. McKenzie,' an indigent prisoner sought a writ of
habeas corpus on the grounds that the Circuit Court of Marshall
County had denied him the equal protection of the laws by refusing
to provide him with a transcript of the proceedings surrounding his
guilty plea. In State ex rel. Wright v. Boles'92 the principle was
established that an indigent defendant who pleads not guilty is
always entitled to a free transcript of his trial. Wright established
a corollary principle, however, that an accused who pleads guilty,
if represented by counsel, may only obtain a free transcript if he
can demonstrate some constitutional irregularity surrounding the
circumstances of his plea. But as the court recognized in Call,
thereby overruling Wright, it is a contradiction in terms to ask a
prisoner to set forth irregularities in his guilty plea if he is not first
provided with a transcript to ascertain whether or not error was
committed by the sentencing court. Further, the court recognized
93
that in the continuing series of cases following Griffin v. Illinois,'
the United States Supreme Court has demonstrated that the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment will not tolerate
any disparity based on pecuniary excuses in the functioning of our
criminal processes.'94
In awarding the petitioner in Call his transcript, the court also
set forth in extraordinary detail guidelines for trial courts to engage
in prior to the acceptance of future guilty pleas. 99 The impact of
Call on the procedures preliminary to acceptance of guilty pleas
must be properly qualified. As the court readily admitted, future
ignorance of the decision will not invalidate a guilty plea other
than for failure to abide by presently existing standards.196 The
,9 210 S.E.2d at 917.
,' 220 S.E.2d 665 (W. Va. 1975).
192149 W. Va. 371, 141 S.E.2d 76 (1965).
193
351 U.S. 12 (1955).
,9'
220 S.E.2d 668.
"9 Id. at 669-71.
,' Id. at 671.
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question that must be asked, then, is why were the procedures in
Call set forth in such great detail if they are to have no future
effect?
In the past decade the number of habeas corpus petitions has
grown at an alarming rate.'97 At the present time, habeas corpus
decisions occupy more space on the civil dockets of federal and
state courts than any other type of proceeding.'99 Unless some remedy is found soon, many commentators fear the burden may well
become too much to bear. 99 The problem is particularly acute if
the subject of the petition is a challenge to a previously given guilty
plea. After the plea is tendered, often to a lesser included offense
or upon a promise not to enforce an habitual criminal statute, the
state has waived much of its power to enforce the original charge
should the plea prove defective."9 Similarly, should a habeas corpus petition prove successful, the prosecution may be unable to
establish a case from evidence gone stale by passage of time. Thus,
it may be strategically wise to bargain for a lighter sentence than
the crime justifies and then to attack the plea collaterally. As
recognized in Call, the greatest volume of habeas corpus litigation
concerns whether a.plea was intelligently and voluntarily given.2 "'
Suggested remedies to the habeas corpus problem have ranged
from the creation of new courts to an abandonment of our present
standards and a return to the time when habeas corpus was limited
solely to jurisdictional defects. 92 Justice Neely in Call points out
another possible remedy that has perhaps been overlooked in our
"I Y.
ed. 1974):

KAMISAR, W. LAFAvE & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1522 (4th

Briefly, civil filings in United States district courts inceased from 58,329
in 1961 to 96,317 in 1972. Total appeals commenced in the United States
courts of appeals advanced from 4,204 in 1961 to 14,535 in 1972. Petitions
for federal habeas corpus filed by state prisoners jumped from 1,020 in
1961 to 7,949 in 1972.
'g Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
See Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and FederalHabeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,76 HARV. L. REV. 441 (1963); Friendly, Is Innocence Relevant? Collateral
Attack on CriminalJudgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REV. 142 (1970); Kelley, Finality and
Habeas Corpus:Is the Rule that Res Adjudicata May Not Apply to Habeas Corpus
or Motion to Vacate Still Viable? 78 W. VA. L. REV. 1, (1975); Oaks, Legal History
in the High Court-Habeas Corpus, 64 MICH. L. REV. 451 (1966); Weick,
Apportionment of JudicialResources in Criminal Cases: Should Habeas Corpus be
Eliminated?, 21 DEPAUL L. REv. 740 (1972).
2 See, e.g., Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974).

"1220 S.E.2d at 669-70.
202

Ex Parte Lange, 86 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1873).
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rush to create new and innovative rules of law. He argues that,
consistent with present considerations of due process, we cannot
establish technical bars to forbid writs of habeas corpus." 3 We can
however, greatly facilitate our present review standard of these
writs by insuring that when something is done to a criminal defendant, it is done correctly and within the scope of the Constitution."0 4 Once a procedure is properly performed, a habeas corpus
petition can be summarily reviewed and dismissed.
A lurking question though, is whether our trial courts are capable of properly discharging their duties within the framework of
the Constitution so as to leave no room for errors demanding
reversal on appeal. Clearly, this should not be too much to expect
from the courts, though the volume of appeals seems to suggest
otherwise. It seems more consistent with fundamental considerations of due process to demand perfection on the part of courts
rather than expertise on the part of defendants in wandering
through a maze of technicalities in search of the Constitution.
Justice Neeley's contention is that if trial courts fully explain
to a defendant what he is waiving when he pleads guilty, what he
stands to lose by his plea, what he could gain or lose by an opposite
plea, and the simple fundamentals of our criminal system, then
the same courts could escape redetermining the issue on a writ of
habeas corpus.205
To further this aim the West Virginia court has set forth,
almost in textbook fashion, a complete list of rudimentary
operations in which trial courts should engage prior to the acceptance of a guilty plea. The United States Supreme Court has stated
that guilty pleas must be accepted only if voluntarily and
intelligently made.2 0 To expedite this, the West Virginia court
suggests that the defendant be advised in simple, non-technical
language of exactly what is occurring. Much too often the trial
judge discusses the case with the defendant's lawyer rather than
the defendant. Since it is the defendant's understanding of the
220 S.E.2d at 669.
"

Id. at 671.

Id. at 669-71.
2,1 Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
To this end, the dialogue between the judge and defendant should be "spread
on the record" to assure that the defendant actually did voluntarily and intelligently waive his rights to a trial with all its constitutionally required ramifications.
Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1960).
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situation that is required, a judge should, if possible, involve the
defendant in a discussion of the proceedings before him. More
specifically, a judge should inform the defendant of those rights he
waives once he pleads guilty:
1) the right to retain counsel of his choice, and if indigent, the
right to court-appointed counsel;
2) the right to consult with counsel and to have counsel prepare the defense;
3) the right to a public trial by an impartial jury of twelve
persons;
4) the right to have the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt and the right of the defendant to stand mute during
the proceedings;
5) the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers;
6) the right to present witnesses in his own defense and to
testify himself in his own defense;
7) the right to appeal the conviction for any errors of law;
8) the right to move to suppress illegally obtained evidence
and illegally obtained confessions; and,
9) the right to challenge in the trial court and on appeal all
27
pretrial proceedings.
Should the above standards be followed by criminal courts, it
seems very likely that the additional time spent before acceptance
of a guilty plea would be more than compensated for by a greater
savings from the reduction of lengthy habeas corpus hearings.
VI.. LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES

In State v. Bailey'" the defendant was charged with grand
larceny of an automobile. As a defense, Bailey claimed that he was
intoxicated 2°1 on the night of the theft for the purpose of showing
that he lacked the requisite mental capacity to formulate a plan
to permanently deprive the owner of his automobile. Accordingly,
defense counsel requested an instruction by the court that would
220 S.E.2d at 667 (syl. pt. 3).
220 S.E.2d 432 (W. Va. 1975).
The prosecution produced six witnesses, including the two arresting officers,
all of whom testified that not only did the accused appear to be sober at the time
on his arrest, but that no trace of alcohol could be detected on his person. Apparently, no chemical test was given in an attempt to substantiate this testimony
although the defendant was hospitalized for injuries received from the rigors of his
escape attempt, thus, affording ample time for any such test. A fellow jailmate did
testify, though, that he did recognize the scent of alcohol, but that the defendant
did not appear to be intoxicated.
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allow the jury to find the defendant guilty of joyriding 0' rather
than larceny.2"' The trial court refused to give the joyriding instruction, however, and the Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed, stating
that as joyriding is not a lesser included offense of grand larceny,
the instruction could not be given.
As to what constitutes a lesser included offense, Justice Flowers, writing for a majority of three, stated as the general rule: "[i]f
the lesser offense requires the inclusion of an element not required
in the greater offense, the lesser is not necessarily included in the
greater. ' 1 2 Since larceny requires the intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property and joyriding the intent to temporarily deprive the owner, "'joyriding' requires the inclusion of an
element not required in the greater offense of larceny and cannot
be regarded as a 'lesser included offense' to larceny. 2 1 The court
acknowledged that several states do consider joyriding a lesser
included offense of larceny of an automobile. This difference in
definition was attributed to the fact that the minority states define
joyriding as the absence of intent to permanently deprive, 24 while
the West Virginia statute calls for the presence of intent to tempo2,W W. VA. CODE ANN. § 17A-8-4 (1974 Replacement Volume) is the "joyriding"
statute. It provides that:
Any person who drives a vehicle, not his own, without consent of the
owner thereof, and with intent temporarily to deprive said owner of his
possession of such vehicle, without intent to steal the same, is guilty of a
misdemeanor.
211 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 61-3-13 (1966) provides that:
If any person commit simple larceny of goods or chattels, he shall, if they
be of the value of fifty dollars or more, be deemed guilty of grand larceny,
and, upon conviction thereof, shall be confined in the penitentiary not
less than one nor more than ten years....
Larceny is defined as the taking and carrying away of the goods and chattels of
another, with the intent to deprive the owner of his property permanently. Crow v.
Coiner, 323 F. Supp. 555 (N.D.W. Va. 1971); State v. Pietranton, 137 W. Va. 477,
72 S.E.2d 617 (1952).
",

220 S.E.2d at 437.

"1 220 S.E. 2d at 437. E.g., Williams v. State, 250 So. 2d 11 (Fla. App. 1971),
holding that FLA. STAT. ANN. § 814.04 (1971), as amended, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 814.04
(1975), which provides that: "(1) Any person who temporarily uses any motor
vehicle .

.

. without the authority of the owner .

.

. shall, upon conviction, be

guilty of a misdemeanor ... " allows joyriding to be considered a lesser included
offense of larceny.
211 E.g., Spencer v. State, 501 S.W.2d 799 (Tenn. 1973), states that TENN. CODE
ANN. § 59-504 (1968), which provides that the taking of a vehicle unlawfully, but
without the intent to permanently deprive, permits the trial court to instruct the
jury on the possibility of finding the defendant guilty of either joyriding or larceny.
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rarily deprive. Justice Flowers admitted the merit of the minority
interpretation, but stated that our statute forbids such interpretation.
Chief Justice Haden and Justice Neely disagreed with the
reasoning of the majority, though Justice Neely stated that the
facts of this particular case did not warrant an instruction of joyriding.1 ' In retrospect, the dissent seems to have the better argument. Chief Justice Haden pointed out that as the issue of intoxication was at least a question of fact, the trial judge should not
have ruled as a matter of law that the defendant could not possibly
have been intoxicated." 6 Although the only evidence as to the accused's intoxication was given by the defendant, certainly the ultimate decision of this factual question resides primarily with the
jury. The majority defended its decision by stating that disallowing the joyriding instruction "left the state with the more onerous
burden of proving grand larceny and, therewith, a higher attendant risk of the defendant's exoneration." '17 Although this is obviously correct, it seems to place too much emphasis on strategic
guessing games that the prosecution must play when seeking an
indictment. A more objective approach would be to allow the jury
to view all of the evidence and then choose from all of the verdicts
that the facts might reasonably infer. While a jury faced with
mountains of conflicting evidence may opt for the middle ground
of joyriding rather than larceny, if only two choices are given, the
jury may feel that the defendant, while not guilty of grand larceny,
is certainly guilty of something and return a verdict of guilty totally unsupported by the evidence. The concluding statement of
Justice Haden expresses the general criticism of the majority position: "The quality of justice would not be strained if the law should
'21 8
benefit from more realistic application.
VII.

PRELIMINARY HEARINGS

In Spaulding v. Warden, West Virginia State Penitentiary,"'
the Supreme Court of Appeals was asked to decide whether the
preliminary hearing procedure in West Virginia is a "criticial
stage" in the prosecution of a criminal defendent. The "critical
211

220 S.E.2d at 439 (Neely, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

211Id. at

438.

217 Id.

211Id. at 439.
211212 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1975).
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state" test has consistently been applied by the United States
Supreme Court in deciding whether, in a non-trial proceeding, the
denial of counsel would "derogate from the accused's right to a fair
trial."2 The leading case on the right to counsel at pretrial adjudications of probable cause is Coleman v. Alabama."' In Coleman,
the Supreme Court observed, after careful scrutiny of Alabama's
preliminary hearing requirements,2 2 that regardless of whether the
defendant would be denied the opportunity to later assert any
defense, the right of Alabama defendants to cross-examine prosecution witnesses at the hearing, meant that substantial prejudice
could occur should defendants be denied the assistance of counsel
at this stage. By later decisions, however, particularly the Supreme
Court's 1975 ruling in Gerstein v. Pugh,2 11 it is clear that a formal
adversarial preliminary hearing is not a constitutional right and
that not all preliminary hearings create a "critical stage." Hence,
in hearings less formal than those envisioned by the Alabama statutes, a denial of counsel might not necessitate reversal should the
"I United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 226 (1967). In Wade, the United States
Supreme Court required that courts:
[S]crutinize any pretrial confrontation of the accused to determine
whether the presence of his counsel is necessary to preserve the defendant's basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully to
cross-examine the witnesses against him and to have effective assistance
of counsel at the trial itself. It calls upon us to analyze whether potential
substantial prejudice to defendant's rights inheres in the particular confrontation and the ability of counsel to help avoid that prejudice.
388 U.S. at 227.
"Critical stages" have been found in the following cases: Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972)(preparation for trial in misdemeanor cases where imprisonment is a possibility); Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970) (preliminary hearings
at which the defendant is given the right to cross examine); United States v. Wade,
388 U.S. 218 (1967)(post-indictment lineups); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966) (custodial interrogations); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201
(1964)(post-indictment confrontations at which police have access to the conversation); Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52 (1961)(arraignment where right to present
certain defenses is waived if not asserted).
12 399 U.S. 1 (1970).
212 See note 232 and accopanying text infra.
- 420 U.S. 103 (1975). In Gerstein the Court ruled that some form of probable
cause hearing must precede incarceration pending trial. The Court held, however,
that the probable cause hearing need not, under the fourth amendment, take the
form of an adversarial procedure. This standard was justified because a probable
cause determination "does not require the fine resolution of conflicting evidence
that a reasonable-doubt or even a preponderance standard demands, and credibility determinations are seldom crucial in deciding whether the evidence supports a
reasonable belief in guilt." 420 U.S. at 721.
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defendant "go it alone." Underlying this structure is the fact that,
even should the hearing be deemed critical, denial of counsel is
reversible error only if the state fails to demonstrate beyond a
2 4
reasonable doubt that such denial was harmless."
Against this rather complex background, the West Virginia
court was presented with the habeas corpus appeal of Roy Spaulding. Warrants had been issued for the arrest of Spaulding and two
others on a charge of breaking and entering. After being arrested
and handcuffed, Spaulding escaped and eluded his pursuers for
five hours. Apprehended once again, Spaulding was apparently
"roughed up" by the arresting officers,121 then taken to the police
station where he was advised of his constitutional rights. On the
following day Spaulding supposedly signed a confession to which
defense counsel objected at trial on the grounds that it was a forgery. The objection overruled, the confession was admitted into
evidence though no prior hearing was held to determine either the
voluntariness of the confession or the authenticity of the
handwriting. 22 One day after his alleged confession, Spaulding was
taken before a justice of the peace where he was again read his
rights, including the opportunity to waive counsel which he supposedly chose to do. At this time, bail was set at $30,000. On
review, the Supreme Court of Appeals admitted that, from the
date bail was set, the record as to pretrial proceedings, if any, was
confusing.
At the habeas corpus hearing the justice of the peace testified
that she could not remember and had no record as to whether a
preliminary hearing had occurred or whether the defendant had
waived his right to this procedure. Faced with this confusion, as
well as the defendant's statutory right to a preliminary hearing, 27
the Court had to assume either that the defendant had appeared

"IColeman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10-11

(1970).
The arresting officer testified at trial that when he apprehended Spaulding
he "knocked the defendant to the ground" in an attempt to apprehend him. At the
habeas corpus hearing, however, the same officer admitted that the defendant had
been kicked and beaten to such an extent that he was unable to walk.
2' The issue of the denial of a pretrial hearing to determine the voluntariness

of the confession allegedly made by the defendant is considered elsewhere in this
survey. See notes 254 to 271 and accompanying text infra.
2" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-6 (1966) provides that: "The justice shall in plain
terms inform the defendant of the nature of the complaint against him, of his right
to counsel, and, if the offense is to be presented for indictment, of his right to have
a preliminary examination."
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at a hearing without the assistance of counsel, or that he had been
denied his right to a hearing - either choice necessitating reversal.
The court chose the former option. Justice Sprouse, writing for a
unanimous court, held that, although a preliminary hearing is not
a constitutional right, Coleman v. Alabama mandates the assistance of counsel if a hearing is given. Assuming a hearing was
granted in this case, the court further noted that:
[Ilt is difficult to conceive of more appropriate circumstances
for requiring the assistance of counsel. The defendant had been
beaten by the arresting officers. . . The manner in which the
defendant resisted arrest could have indicated to trained counsel the presence of psychiatric problems,
and the question of
22
excessive bail could have been resolved.

8

Yet the court then found, relying solely on a decision by the Circuit
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 29 that as the defendant was
adequately represented at his trial, any need for counsel at the
preliminary hearing was fulfilled by this subsequent representation.20
While an extensive analysis of the court's reasoning in
Spaulding is beyond the scope of this survey, two considerations
deserve comment. The court decided that West Virginia's preliminary hearing requirements are a "critical stage" in the prosecution.2?' This is clearly seen by analyzing chapter sixty-two, article
one, section eight of the West Virginia Code 2 and comparing'it to
2'
12

212 S.E.2d at 625.
Schnepp v. Hocker, 429 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1970).

"' 212 S.E.2d at 625.
231

Id.

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-1-8 (1966) provides that:
If the offense is to be presented for indictment, the preliminary
examination shall be conducted by a justice of the county in which the
offense was committed within a reasonable time after the defendant is
arrested, unless the defendant waives examination. The defendant shall
not be called upon to plead. Witnesses shall be examined and evidence
introduced for the State under the rules of evidence prevailing in criminal
trials generally. The defendant or his attorney may cross-examine witnesses against him and may introduce evidence in his own behalf. ..
If the defendant waives preliminary examination or if, after hearing, it
appears from the evidence that there is probable cause to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the
justice shall forthwith hold him to answer in the court having jurisdiction
to try criminal cases. If the evidence does not establish probable cause,
the defendant shall be discharged.
AlA. COmf tit. 15 §§ 133-40 (1959) provides for virtually the same type of preliminary examination as that afforded the defendant under West Virginia law.
222
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comparable statutes ruled upon in Coleman v. Alabama. Both
West Virginia and Alabama grant the defendant the right of crossexamination at his preliminary hearing. The United States Supreme Court in Coleman pointed out that through crossexamination, the defendant, if assisted by counsel, could perhaps
establish a lack of probable cause forcing the prosecution to terminate custody, gather evidence to later impeach an inconsistent
witness, begin to develop a defense once the prosecution's case is
presented, serve the function of having bail set at a reasonable
level, as well as deciding whether the defendant is in need of psychiatric care.m Since West Virginia provides for the same features
as those required in Alabama preliminary hearings, a critical stage
in the prosecution is present and counsel is required to assist the
defendant.
Since the preliminary hearing was a "critical stage" in the
prosecution of Spaulding, the denial of his right to counsel was
clearly prejudicial error. Coleman suggested that if the possibility
of prejudice from a denial of counsel was clear from the record, or
if the record was unclear as to possible error, the proper decision
would be to remand to the lower court for a determination of the
extent to which the defendant was detrimentally affected.' 3 On
remand, the State would have to demonstrate "beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the
verdict obtained."" 5 The West Virginia court held that the subsequent trial at which Spaulding was represented by counsel had
obviated any possible constitutional error. This assertion, however,
is erroneous.
As precedent for the above contention the court cited Schnepp
v. Hocker.26 In Schnepp, even though the Nevada preliminary
hearing statute in question was deemed critical, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was confident in stating, based on a
review of the record, "beyond a reasonable doubt

. . .

the denial

of the assistance of counsel at Schnepp's preliminary hearing was
harmless error."' 7 But as the Schnepp court noted, only after a
clear determination of harmless error from the record can the decim

399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).

399 U.S. at 11.
Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). Chapman and Fahy v.
Connecticut, 375 U.S. 85 (1963) are the foundation cases of the harmless constitutional error rulings.
-n429 F.2d 1096 (9th Cir. 1970).
217 Id. at 1101.
233
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sion to remand be halted.ns In Spaulding,the West Virginia court
could not state whether or not a preliminary hearing had in fact
ever been held.O Clearly then, it was impossible for the Supreme
Court of Appeals to determine "that the error complained of did
not contribute to the verdict obtained."
The possibility of prejudice to Roy Spaulding was acute.
Without the assistance of counsel or even a transcript of the proceedings to inform his counsel of the evidence introduced, Spaulding certainly could not have "discovered" the state's case and prepared an adequate defense. A subsequent trial after a defective
preliminary hearing is harmless error only if the record shows that
the defendant was not possibly prejudiced. Accordingly, the proper
ruling in Spauldingshould have been a remand to the circuit court
for further investigation into the facts surrounding the pretrial
proceedings. Any other ruling acts as an open invitation to the
magistrates of West Virginia to not only deny counsel at preliminary hearings, but to avoid the hearings altogether. Although the
court did remand to clarify the use of the alleged forged confession, 240 should Roy Spaulding appear before the court again, he
should not be denied the opportunity to once again raise the issue
of his preliminary hearing.
VII.

PROSECUTOR'S MISSTATEMENT

Ralph Starr was indicted by a Harrison County grand jury for
being an accessory before the fact to the crime of robbery by force.
After the jury received its instructions, the prosecutor stated in his
final argument that:
We don't have to show that Ralph Starr knew what he was
doing, because that is not a part of the indictment ....

We

have to show what the facts are. We don't have to show by our
evidence that Starr knew what he was doing. We have to show
what Starr did, what the evidence was and the result of that
241

Defense counsel objected to this explanation, but his motion was
ignored by the judge. On appeal of his conviction to the Supreme
Court of Appeals, Starr challenged as reversible error the
2u

Id.

21 212 S.E.2d at 624-25.

See note 264 and accompanying text infra.
M1State v. Starr, 216 S.E.2d 242, 245 (W. Va. 1975).

2I
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prosecutor's obvious misstatement of the intent element required
for conviction.24
The question before the court in State v. Starr was acknowledged to be one of first impression in West Virginia. The court
therefore adopted the general standard imposed by other jurisdictions that, although a prosecutor's misstatement of the law in his
closing argument is unquestionably improper, it is not reversible
error unless the defendant can demonstrate a possibility or prejudice . 3 An assertion by the state contradicting the law on an essential element of the crime would definitely seem prejudicial. Nevertheless, the Attorney General argued that the prosecutor's statement that intent need not be proven was merely an attempt to
inform the jury that they were permitted to infer knowledge from
the proven actions of the defendant. While such inferences are of
course permissible, the court pointed out that the prosecutor had
not qualified his statements in any manner, thereby possibly
confusing the jurors as to the proper interpretation of the law. The
proper method of attack for the prosecutor would have been first,
to admit that intent was a required element of the crime, and then
to state that intent could be based on reasonable inferences drawn
from the facts.
The state's final contention, that the prosecutor's error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt as the jury had previously
been instructed as to the proper law, was summarily dismissed by
the court. As Chief Justice Haden stated in writing for a unanimous court, it would be difficult to conceive of a more harmful
error than telling the jury that the defendant could be convicted
without a showing that he had intended to commit the charged
crime. 44 Only if the trial court had responded to defense counsel's
objection and corrected the prosecutor's misstatement when made,
would there have existed the possibility that the error was truly
harmless.
Id. The court stated that:
It is indisputable that knowledge is an essential element of the crime
charged. The element of knowledge is implicit in every circumstance
defining the crime: "An accessory before the fact is a person who being
absent at the time and place of the crime, procures, counsels, commands,
incites, assists, or abets another person to commit the crime ......
State ex rel. Brown v. Thompson, 149 W. Va. 649, 142 S.E.2d 711 (1965).
211

2

Id. at 246.

211

Id.
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IX.

SPEEDY TRIAL

The peititioner in State ex rel. Stines v. Locke 245 sought a writ
of prohibition from the Supreme Court of Appeals forbidding the
Raleigh County Circuit Court from trying him for the crime of
robbery. Stines asserted that he had been denied his right to a
speedy trial since he had been in custody for four terms of court
after his indictment, and was therefore "forever discharged from
prosecution. '21 6 Indicated during the January 1973 term of court,
Stines was extradicted to Michigan shortly thereafter where he was
convicted and sentenced to prison. In March of 1974 he was returned to Raleigh County where trial was finally set to commence
during the April term of 1975. Stines then sought the writ that was
the issue of this case.
The right of a defendant to a speedy trial is provided for in
both the West Virginia and United States Constitutions.2 11 A
speedy trial is defined by statute in West Virginia as one given
before the passage of three terms of court after the term of indictment.2 41 To facilitate the three-term rule, the Legislature in 1971
enacted the Agreement on Detainers,4 5 described by the court to
be "a two-pronged instrument, designed to implement the speedy
trial concept by either the accused or the state. '2 0 The Agreement,
205220 S.E.2d 443 (W. Va. 1975).
This terminology is found in W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-21 (1966) which
provides in pertinent part that:
Every person charged by presentment or indictment with a felony or
misdemeanor, and remanded to a court of competent jurisdiction for
trial, shall be forever discharged from prosecution for the offense, if there
be three regular terms of such court, after the presentment is made or the
indictment is found against him, without a trial ....
2,7 U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides that: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial ....
" W. VA. CONST.
art. III, § 14 provides that: "Trials of crimes, and misdemeanors, unless herein
otherwise provided, shall be by a jury of twelve men, public, without unreasonable
2

delay ...

"

2,0 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-3-21 (1966). As this statute was described in State
ex rel. Smith v. DeBerry, 146 W. Va. 534, 538, 120 S.E.2d 504, 506 (1961):
[T]he purpose of the pertinent statute is to assure a defendant a
speedy trial. It is the legislative adoption or declaration of what, ordinarily, at least, constitutes a speedy trial within the meaning of Article III,
Section 14 of the State Constitution, and of the Sixth Amendment to the
Federal Constitution, and, of course, for the purpose intended should be
liberally construed.
213 W. VA.CODE ANN. § 62-14-1 to -7 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
220 S.E.2d at 446.
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a reciprocal pact between subscribing states, allows a prisoner who
learns of a charge against him in another state to request his transportation to that state to defend against the charge." ' Also, any
member state can request the presence of a prisoner from another
member state in order to try him on a waiting indictment.- 2
The specific issue confronting the court in Stines was whether
the state must be charged with the time the prisoner spent while
in custody in Michigan. The court first noted that the Agreement
on Detainers provides a ready tool for West Virginia prosecutors
to fulfill the defendant's right to a speedy trial. Since the Raleigh
County Circuit Court made no attempt to use the Agreement to
regain custody of Stines while he was incarcerated in Michigan,
that time was held to count against his prosecutors. With the
addition of the time spent in Michigan, the defendant had been
in custody and available to the Raleigh County Circuit Court in
excess of the statutory limit and was thus entitled to his writ of
prohibition.
In deciding Stines the Court distinguished State ex rel. Smith
v. DeBerry.31 The petitioner in Smith had been imprisoned in
Tyler County under indictment. The prosecutor of Pleasants
County requested but was denied custody of the prisoner to try him
on a separate indictment. Smith was denied a writ to prohibit the
Pleasants County Court from trying him because the request for
his presence was held to toll the running of the three-term rule.
From the court's interpretation of the Agreement on Detainers in
Stines, it is clear that, should the prosecution fail to take into
account the three-term provision, it must have compelling reasons
to overcome the neglected defendant's right to a speedy trial.
X.

VOLUNTARINESS OF INCRIMINATING STATEMENTS

Although it has been settled since the United States Supreme
Court's 1964 ruling in Jackson v.Denno ' that a criminal defendant has "a constitutional right at some stage in the proceedings to object to the use of his confession and to have a fair hearing and a reliable determination of the issue of voluntariness,25 the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals in 1975 was compelled to
2' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-14-1, Art. I (Cum. Supp. 1975).
2'2 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 62-14-1, Art. IV (Cum.
Supp. 1975).
'

146 W. Va. 534, 120 S.E.2d 504 (1961).
378 U.S. 368 (1964).
Id. at 376.
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reverse three convictions for failure to abide by the Jackson
mandate.
The interest at stake in determining the voluntariness of a
confession before it can be considered as evidence by the jury is the
fifth amendment's guarantee that no person may be compelled to
testify against himself.G In Jackson, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York procedure which allowed the jury to
determine the admissibility of a confession. While the Court acknowledged that it is generally the jury's responsibility to determine the truth from conflicting evidence, it felt the truth could
better be found if the issues were not clouded by the possibility of
police coercion. Hence, before the prosecution may inform the jury
of incriminating statements made by the defendant, the trial judge
must determine, out of the presence of the jury, whether the
confession was freely given. As a facet of this determination, a legal
presumption exists that a confession is coerced if given by a defendant before he is advised that he need not do so.5 The state
may overcome this presumption with evidence that the confession
was voluntarily given.In its initial recognition of Jackson, the West Virginia court
set forth in State v. Fortner-"the procedures to be followed by the
state's criminal courts prior to the introduction of confessions:
It is the mandatory duty of a trial court, whether requested or
not, to hear the evidence and determine in the first instance,
out of the presence of the jury, the voluntariness of an oral or
written confession by an accused person prior to admitting the
same into evidence, and the
failure to observe this procedure
2
constitutes reversible error. 11
Although the standards announced in Fortner are clear, in
Spaulding v. Warden, West Virginia Penitentiary,'"State v.
Smith6 2 and State v. Starr,13 the Supreme Court of Appeals dealt

2" U.S. CoNsT. amend. V provides in part that: "No person . . . shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ......
'7 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
211 Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972); State v. Plantz, 180 S.E.2d 614 (W.
Va. 1971).
21 150 W. Va. 571, 148 S.E.2d 669 (1966).
211 Id. (syl. pt. 1).
211 212 S.E.2d 619 (W. Va. 1975).
2-2212 S.E.2d 759 (W. Va. 1975).
2- 216 S.E.2d 242 (W. Va. 1975).
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with three different problems arising in the determination of the
admissibility of incriminating statements made by defendants.
Spaulding is the best example of the necessity of the JacksonFortnerrule. Defense counsel obtained the following response from
the defendant to the question of why he signed a confession on the
day following his arrest:
Well I was punched around, roughed around and a man
asked me if I didn't want to sign a confession. Well I didn't want
to sign one, but I assumed that I was going to get forced to sign
one. After I got smacked a couple of times I signed it .... 2
Although Spaulding's attorney did not request a pretrial determination of the voluntariness of the confession and raised no specific
objection to its use at trial, Fortnerspecifically dictates that a trial
court must, on its own motion, examine all confessions prior to
their introduction into evidence." The Supreme Court of Appeals,
therefore, granted Spaulding a writ of habeas corpus and remanded the case for investigation into the facts surrounding the
confession.
State v. Smith presented a slightly more complex problem
than that discussed in Spaulding.The confession in Spaulding was
a written document prepared by the police and signed by the defendant. In Smith, however, the state also attempted to use statements made by the defendant to the arresting officer. While no
particular statement was tantamount to a confession, a recitation
of the conversation between the officer and the defendant to the
jury offered little support to the defendant's claim of innocence.
The prosecution attempted to characterize the statements of the
defendant as admissions rather than as a confession so that the
strict standards of Jackson and Fortner would be inapplicable.
The court chose, however, to ignore this emphasis on phrasing
rather than substance and concluded that the defendant's statements were clearly as incriminating as a confession. Hence, their
legitimacy as evidence should have been determined at a special
hearing. This conclusion was buttressed by the court's reading of
Miranda v. Arizona, 6 which stands for the proposition that emphasis should not be placed on the distinctions between confessions and admissions in determining the admissibility of a state2G

212 S.E.2d at 623.

2S5See

note 260 and accompanying text supra.

21 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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ment, but rather on how the statement was obtained. Statements
seemingly freely given can be excluded from trial if they resulted
from a hostile atmosphere or undue influence.26 Smith, then, guarantees a defendant the right to challenge the evidentiary use of any
statement he might have made on the grounds that it was involuntarily given.
Finally, in State v. Starr, the court was asked to decide the
burden of proof the state must demonstrate at the in camera hearing before evidence of a confession or incriminating statements will
be allowed to be considered by the jury. 28 In Starr, as opposed to
Spaulding and Smith, a pretrial in camera hearing was given to
determine the voluntariness of statements made by the accused.
Prior to the use of these statements the trial court found that
"there had been a prima facie showing of voluntariness of the
statement made by the defendant .... "2 Specifically, the issue
in Starr was whether a "prima facie" showing of voluntariness was
sufficient to defeat the presumption that the defendant was forced
to incriminate himself. The question was easily answered by combining the ruling in State v. Smith, that distinctions should not
be made between confessions and admissions as long as they tend
to incriminate, and a 1971 decision, State v. Plantz.70 Plantz held
that the state must, at the in camera hearing, demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that the confession sought to be
27Id.

2 Also of interest in Starr is the manner in which the issue was presented to
the court. At the time the defendant filed his appellate brief, the trial record
contained only the closing arguments and instructions. After the brief was received,
the state was permitted to add to the record the rest of the proceedings - including
references to the introduction of evidence. Defense counsel then raised as an additional contention in a reply brief the trial court's misadministration of the required
in camera hearing in determining the voluntariness of certain statements made by
the defendant and later used at trial. Over objection by the state, the court, pursuant to Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals, Rule VI, section two,
considered this argument on appeal. Rule VI, section two permits the court to
recognize and decide "plain error not [originally] assigned or specified.
See State v. Thomas, 203 S.E.2d 445 (W. Va. 1974) wherein the court discussed
the recognition of plain error:
However characterized, all courts when confronted with a situation
involving the fundamental personal rights of an individual, have considered unassigned errors, if meritorius and prejudicial, as jurisdictional, or
have noticed them as "plain error." In either event, the rule is fashioned
and applied to meet the ends of justice or to pervent the invasion of or
denial of fundamental rights.
203 S.E.2d at 457.
'

216 S.E.2d at 248-49.

° 180 S.E.2d 614 (W. Va. 1971).
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admitted was voluntarily given. One year later, in Lego v.
Twomey,2"' the United States Supreme Court substantiated the
preponderance standard as the constitutionally correct formula.
Although the Starr court felt the trial court's reliance on a prima
facie showing of voluntariness was probably only inadvertent error,
it concluded that the Plantz-Lego rulings, which specifically require proof by a preponderance of the evidence, must control.
Spaulding, Smith and Starr have gone a long way to clarify
the use of incriminating statements at trial. Of particular significance in this trilogy is the court's realistic recognition that no
distinction should be drawn between a confession and isolated
incriminating statements where the evidence was elicited by the
possibility of coercive police practices.

-1 404 U.S. 477 (1972).
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DOMESTIC RELATIONS

2

This section discusses the various topics classified under the
broad heading of domestic relations. In 1975 the Supreme Court
of Appeals decided four major cases, two in the area of child custody and two in the area of child support.
I.

CHILD CUSTODY

A. Awarding Custody
In Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 3 the court made a distinction
between a change of child custody, and the original award of child
custody after temporary custody had previously been granted one
parent pending a final determination on custody. The mother in
Funkhouser had sued for divorce, and at a preliminary hearing the
father was granted temporary custody of the child because the
mother's mental ability and capacity were challenged. 24 The court
awarded the father temporary custody pending mental examination of the mother, which subsequently revealed that she was mentally normal. The mother thereafter applied for custody of the
child at the final hearing on the divorce. In denying the mother's
request, the trial court applied the standard used in awarding a
change of custody, and held that the mother had not met the
burden of showing that a change of custody would materially promote the moral and physical welfare of the child. 5
The Supreme Court of Appeals reversed on the basis that this
was not a change of custody case, but rather was an original determination of custody, notwithstanding the father's prior temporary
custody of the child. The court held that the application of the
standard for a change of custody27 6to a case where final custody is
first awarded, is reversible error.

272The following case involved issues in the field of domestic relations but was
not reported in this section: Young v. Young, 212 S.E.2d 310 (W. Va. 1975) (indigent party).
, 216 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1975).
2
The mother had been involved in a car accident, had been incapacitated for
six months, and had been through a long period of recuperation. This prompted the
trial court to direct an examination of the mother in response to her claim for child
custody.
2I In Holstein v. Holstein, 152 W. Va. 119, 160 S.E.2d 177 (1968), the court
held that a mere change of circumstances is not sufficient ground to change an
award of child custody. The burden is on the petitioning parent to show that a
change of custody would materially promote the welfare of the child. Id. at 122, 160
S.E.2d at 180.
271 216 S.E.2d at 574.
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In another portion of the opinion the court reaffirmed its position that "with reference to the custody of a very young child, the
law favors the mother if she is a fit person, other things being
equal.""'
B. Illegitimate Children
In Hammack v. Wise,28 the issue was whether the maternal
grandmother, whose daughter had died in childbirth, or the putative father of the illegitimate child had the legal right to the child's
custody. The court held that even though the child was born out
of wedlock, the treatment of the father of an illegitimate child is
the same as if the child had been legitimate 279 and "the right of a
parent to have custody of his or her child, while not absolute, will
not be taken away unless the parent has committed an act or is
guilty of an omission which proves his or her unfitness."""0 Therefore, as between the maternal grandmother and the putative father
of an illegitimate child, the court found the father is entitled to
custody where there was no showing of unfitness.
II.- CHILD SUPPORT

A.

Change in the Age of Majority

Dimintroff v. Dimintrofpl involved the effect of the reduction
in the age of majority on child support provisions of divorce decrees. In the instant case, a divorce decree awarded the mother
custody of her two minor children, and ordered the father to pay
fifty dollars per month child support per child under the following
terms:
[U]ntil the further order of this Court, and so long as each
child is under the age of 21 years, unmarried and not emancipated . . . said monthly payment as to each child is to cease
and discontinue when that child becomes 21 years of age, is
married, or during the period said child is in active military
service, and then without requirement of further order of this
Court . 2
21 Id. at 573; accord, Settle v. Settle, 117 W. Va. 476, 185 S.E. 859 (1936);
Hughes v. Hughes, 113 W. Va. 698, 169 S.E. 403 (1933).
' 211 S.E.2d 118 (W. Va. 1975).
279Id. at 120, citing Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
Id. at 121, citing State ex rel. Acton v. Flowers, 154 W. Va. 209, 175 S.E.2d
742 (1970).
" 218 S.E.2d 743 (W. Va. 1975).
Id. at 744.
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On June 9, 1972, the legislature changed the age of majority from
21 to 18 years of age.m However, that change included a clause
designed to save pre-existing obligations which were dependent on
age requirements.2 4
On October 6, 1972, one of the children reached 18 years of age
and the father stopped his payment of child support for that child.
The mother initiated contempt proceedings in the Domestic Relations Court of Kanawha County, but the court upheld the discontinuation of child support payments on the ground that the child,
"having reached majority, was an adult and was emancipated and
that the [father] was no longer liable for her support and maintenance." 1 The Circuit Court of Kanawha County reversed, being
of the opinion that the savings clause in the statue preserved the
child support obligations under the divorce decree. The Supreme
Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court ruling. The court recognized the "substantial diversity of opinion"" 6 on the effect of a
statutory change of the age of majority on support obligations, but
held that the savings clause in the West Virginia statute prevents
any modification of the instant child support decree if based solely
on the grounds of a change in the majority age.
Notably, subsequent to the decision by the Domestic Relations Court, the West Virginia Legislature amended the statute
relating to the age of majority as follows:
Provided further, that any order or mandate providing for
payment of child support for any person up to the age of twentyone years contained in any decree or order of divorce or separate
maintenance [agreement] . . . which decree or order was entered prior to June nine, one thousand nine hundred seventytwo, may by order of the court be terminated as to such person
upon such person attaining the age of eighteen years.- 7
The court in Dimintroff held this provision inapplicable since it
became effective after the ruling of the Domestic Relations Court.
The application of this provision to similar cases could create a
different result. Nevertheless, the court interpreted this provision
8
holding that the law was permissive, not
in Corbin v. Corbin~
'

W. VA. CODE ANN.

§

2-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).

24

Id.

21

Dimintroff v. Dimintroff, 218 S.E.2d 743, 744 (W. Va. 1975).
218 S.E.2d at 745.

2"

W. VA. CODE ANN. § 2-3-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).

206 S.E.2d 898 (W. Va. 1974).
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mandatory, and that the matter rested within the sound discretion
of the trial court. 9
B. Retention of Jurisdictionby the Court
In Trembly v.Whiston, 290 the Supreme Court of Appeals was
asked to decide whether the circuit court retained jurisdiction to
alter a provision for child support contained in the property settlement agreement and as adopted in the divorce decree. The relator
in Trembly was originally directed to pay $200 per month child
support and to "aid and assist the said infant child in paying her
tuition, books and other necessary expenses

'2

' at an institution of

higher learning. The relator made the required monthly payments
but, in 1975, his former wife petitioned the circuit court to require
the relator to pay for tuition, books and other necessary expenses
for the child's attendance at a college. The court granted the petitioner's request and ordered the relator to pay the sum of $996.50
per semester for his daughter's education, in addition to $199.50
for her college testing and application fees. Furthermore, the relator was to continue to pay the original grant of $200 per month.
The relator failed to make the additional payments and was sentenced to jail for contempt, and subsequently brought a proceeding
in habeaus corpus.
The Supreme Court of Appeals stated that notwithstanding
the arrangement of the parties in the property settlement agreement and ratification thereof by the court in a divorce decree, the
circuit court retained jurisdiction to modify the order for support
and maintenance of the minor child. 22 The' court further noted
that in matters of child support, the judgment of the trial court will
not be disturbed without a showing of abuse of discretion. 211 The
relator was able to prove that his monthly income only exceeded
Id. at 907.
-0 220 S.E.2d 690 (W. Va. 1975).
212Id. at 692.
2"

W. VA. Cone ANN. § 48-2-15 (Cum.Supp. 1975) provides:
[And] upon ordering the annulment of a marriage, or a divorce, the
court may make such further order as it shall deem expedient, concerning
the care, custody, education and maintenance of the minor children
; and the court may, also from time to time afterwards, on the
verified petition of either of the parties . . . revise or alter such order
concerning the care, custody, education and maintenance of the children

'2

23 See Bond v. Bond, 144 W. Va. 478, 109 S.E.2d 16 (1959); Witt v. Witt, 141
W. Va. 43, 87 S.E.2d 524 (1955).
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his monthly expenses by $190.00, and, that to meet the additional
obligation imposed by the court, he would have to have a monthly
excess of $365.00. Relying on these facts, the Supreme Court of
Appeals found that the trial court had abused its discretion and
therefore discharged the prisoner. 94

" "The remedy of imprisonment for failure to pay child support should not
be enforced except where it appears that the defendant is contumacious." 220
S.E.2d at 695, citing State ex rel. Varner v. Janco, 191 S.E.2d 504 (W. Va. 1972)
and Ex Parte Beavers, 80 W. Va. 34, 91 S.E. 1076 (1917).
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ELECTIONS
In 1975, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals resolved
two new issues dealing with elections: (1) what voters are entitled
to assistance by election officials when casting ballots, and (2)
whether otherwise legal votes are voided when election officials
assist persons not qualified for such
assistance. Both of these issues
295
were decided in Brooks v. Crum.
Who may receive assistance by election officials when casting
votes and under what conditions they may receive assistance are
controlled by statute. There are separate statutes dealing with
votes cast by written ballots 96 and votes cast by voting machines.2 97
The court has held the requirements contained in the statute dealing with written ballots to be mandatory and thus, its provisions
could not be rendered ineffective by the ignorance, inadvertence
or actual fraud of election officials. 98 In Brooks, ballots were cast
by voting machines, and the court held the requirements of the
voting machine statute to be mandatory. 299 Under both statutes
voters may not be given assistance unless they are listed as illiterate on the face of the voters' registration. No discretion is given
election officials where there is no recording of illiteracy and where
there is no obvious physical disability which would prevent the
voter from operating the voting machine; the election officials are
without authority to enter the voting machine with the voter or to
assist the voter in casting his vote.
In Brooks the election officials stated that their assistance did
not affect the voters. The court said that the plaintiff did not have
to overcome the burden of this testimony because the conditions
in the statute were mandatory, and, thus, the act of assistance by
itself was unlawful. 30 The court held that a vote cast by a physi22

216 S.E.2d 220 (W. Va. 1975). The case also restated prior law on certain

election violations. Where it clearly appears in an election contest that persons were
allowed to vote after seven-thirty o'clock in the evening, prescribed by W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 3-1-31 (1971 Replacement Volume) as the time the polls will be closed, such
votes shall be illegal and void. Terry v, Sencindiver, 153 W. Va. 651, 171 S.E.2d
480 (1969). Where illegal votes have been commingled with valid votes in a precinct
making it impossible to purge such illegal votes, the entire vote of such precinct
must be rejected if sufficient illegal votes were cast to affect the result of the
election. Id.
2" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3-1-34 (1971 Replacement Volume).
217Id. § 3-4-21 (1971 Replacement Volume).
2 State ex rel. Dotson v. VanMeter, 151 W. Va. 56, 150 S.E.2d 604 (1966).
22 216 S.E.2d at 225.
30 216 S.E.2d at 228.
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cally able voter who has obtained assistance in casting his ballot
without first qualifying under the statute is void. The court also
held that "mere unfamiliarity with the use of voting machine procedures is not a physical disability which invokes a statutory right
in the election official to render assistance to the voter." 301
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In FirstNational Bank of Roncerverte v. Bell, " ' the administrator of a decedent's estate sought to recover assets in the possession of the decedent's relatives who claimed the assets as donees
of a causa mortis gift. The plaintiff propounded interrogatories to
the defendants concerning the alleged gift, and based upon the
defendants' answers, moved for summary judgment on the ground
that any subsequent testimony by the defendants would be incompetent under the West Virginia Dead Man's Statute.' The motion
for summary judgment was denied, and an exception was granted.
During trial, the defendants testified as to their transactions
with the decedent without objection by the plaintiff. On appeal
from a judgment for the defendant, the plaintiff asserted that the
denial of its motion for summary judgment was reversible error
since the defense was based on incompetent evidence.
Citing a previous case," 5 the court held that the settled rule
was that incompetency of a witness under the "dead man's statute" must be raised in the trial court by objection before an appellate court may consider the question. The court also cited another
decision that held that an objection to the competency of a witness
must be made and the point saved before the jury retires."" The
court concluded that even though tested by a summary judgment
motion, the admissibility of evidence under the "dead man's statute" is to be determined when offered at trial.

12 Case not reported: State v. Spadafore, 220 S.E.2d 655 (W. Va. 1975) (prior
out of court statement).
215 S.E.2d 642 (W. Va. 1975).
30 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-3-1 (1966).
3" Willhide v. Biggs, 118 W. Va. 160, 188 S.E. 876, syl. pt. 3 (1936).
3" Cunningham v. Porterfield, 2 W. Va. 447 (1868).
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7

Several important cases were decided in the area of local government. They dealt with a variety of issues involving municipal
contracts, municipal labor relations, municipal notice requirements, school districts, and zoning variances.
I.

MUNICIPALITIES

A.

Contracts

In Pioneer Co. v. Hutchison,30 Pioneer was the low bidder on

a sewer project in Charleston. A municipal ordinance provided
that the city council could reject "any and all bids," but the contract had to be awarded to the "lowest responsible bidder.

'3
09

The

city awarded the contract to the second lowest bidder because
Pioneer was -involved in a lawsuit which possibly could result in a
change in management. The trial court reversed city council's
finding that Pioneer was not "responsible." The Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia stated that the trial court had no authority to substitute its judgment for that of the city council. It was
the function of the council and not the trial court to decide whether
or not Pioneer was "responsible." The determination of responsibility involves the question of whether the contract would be completed in an efficient manner and is not limited to a determination
of financial and moral responsibility.
B. Labor Relations
Kucera v. City of Wheeling 10 held that a release of overtime
pay by an employee violates the public policy of the state. The City
of Wheeling had previously refused to pay firemen overtime compensation pursuant to the minimum wage law,3 ' claiming the city
was an agency of the state and therefore exempt from the wage law
statute.12 In the earlier case of Kucera v. City of Wheeling,31 3 a
1969 case, the court held that the City of Wheeling was not an
agency of the state, and therefore was subject to the minimum
'7 A case not reported was: Hinkle v. Bauer Lumber & Home Bldg. Center,
Inc., 211 8.E.2d 705 (W. Va. 1975) (zoning).
220 S.E.2d 894 (W. Va. 1975).
220 S.E.2d at 901.
311 215 S.E.2d 216 (W. Va. 1975).
3"'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5C-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
12' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5C-1(f)(12) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
1'3 153 W. Va. 531, 170 S.E.2d 217 (1969).
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wage lavy. During the interim of the case, however, the City of
Wheeling had granted a pay raise to all employees but withheld
the increase from the firemen pending the outcome. After the ruling that the firemen were covered by the minimum wage law, the
city presented to them a release agreement whereby they would
receive their back pay, without overtime compensation, for the
period commencing July 1, 1969, and ending November 1, 1969.
After signing the release, the firemen contended that it was null
and void. The court, in overruling the circuit court, held that such
a release is indeed null and void as being against public policy as
314
provided by statute.
C. Notice
Simmons v. City of Bluefield3 5 reaffirmed the position that
substantial compliance with the West Virginia requirement that
notice be given a municipality before bringing a negligence action
against it3"6 is sufficient, if the city is thereby afforded a complete
and timely opportunity to explore the circumstances and formulate its defense.

II.

SCHOOL DiSmims
'

Evans v. Hutchison" involved an action to remove certain
board of education members and one member-elect from office for
alleged official misconduct. Defining official misconduct as "any
unlawful behavior 'in relation to' the duties of the office, ' ' 3'1 the
court held that using the county school bus garage to paint privately owned motor vehicles was official misconduct, and also in
violation of the permissible extra-educational uses of school board
31
facilities".
s, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 21-5C-8a (Cum. Supp. 1975) reads:
Any employer who pays an employee less than the applicable wage
rate to which such employee is entitled under or by virtue of this article
shall be liable to such employee for the unpaid wages: an agreement by
an employee to work for less than the applicable wage rate is hereby
declared by the legislature of West Virginia to be against public policy
and unenforceable (emphasis added).
3,1 No. 13557 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App., filed Nov. 18, 1975).
31"W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-12-20 (1976 Replacement Volume).
317214 S.E.2d 453 (W. Va. 1975).
3'1Id. at 459. Accord, Kesling v. Moore, 102 W. Va. 251, 135 S.E. 246 (1926).
31'W. VA. CODE ANN. § 18-5-19 (1971 Replacement Volume).
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III. ZONING VARIANCES
Harding v. City of Morgantown,2 0 overruled the case of
Miernyk v. Board of Zoning Appeals,32 ' which had held that a
variance and a conditional use were synonymous. The court in
Harding recognized that a conditional use is another term for a
"special exception," as set forth indirectly by statute.2 2 "A special
exception or conditional use, unlike a variance, does not involve
the varying of the ordinance, but rather compliance with it
....

"32

This distinction is of vital importance since more strin-

gent standards are needed to satisfy a variance finding than a
32 4
conditional use finding.
Variances were also at issue in Wolfe v. Forbes.3 25 The case
involved the Board of Zoning Appeals of the City of Moundsville
and its attempt to grant a use variance from the terms of the city's
zoning ordinance. The board granted a variance for a use prohibited under the city zoning ordinance, but the court reversed, stating that the board did not have the authority .to issue a variance
in a prohibited area unless that variance fell directly under a situation approved by the Moundsville City Council in its zoning ordinance.32 1 The Moundsville City Council adopted the statutory language of the West Virginia Code relating to variances.327 However,
neither the West Virginia Code nor the Moundsville city ordinance

320 219

S.E.2d 324 (W. Va. 1975).

321 155 W. Va. 143, 181 S.E.2d 681 (1971).
322 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24-55(3), (4) (1976 Replacement Volume) gives

boards of zoning appeals separate authority to:

(3) Hear and decide special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance
upon which the board is required to act under the ordinance; and
(4) Authorize upon appeal in specific cases such variance from the
terms of the ordinance as will not be contrary to the public interest,
where, owing to special conditions, a literal enforcement of the provisions
of the ordinance will result in unnecessary hardship, and so that the spirit
of the ordinance shall be observed and substantial justice done.
I" Syl. pt. 1, 219 S.E.2d at 325.
324 Id. at 329.
3 217 S.E.2d 899 (W. Va. 1975).
3' Moundsville City Council had set out twelve situations under which a variance could be authorized by the board. In Wolfe, operating a rest home in a residential section was not included in any of the twelve situations.
'" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 8-24-55(4) (1976 Replacement Volume). For statutory
language see note 322 supra.
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defines the term "variance,

' '3

1

necessitating the court's determin-

ing its meaning by construing the ordinance. By considering the
limited authority of the board in light of the instances in which a
variance could be permitted, 329 the court held that granting a variance such as that requested would in effect be allowing the board
to amend the ordinance enacted by the city. The court cited with
approval the rationale of a North Carolina case that "no variance
is lawful0 which does percisely what a change of map would accomplish."

3

217 S.E.2d at 905.
Id. at 904.
3
Id. at 906, citing Lee v. Board of Adjustment, 226 NC. 107, 112, 37 S.E.2d
128, 133 (1946).
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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 3 1'
The Supreme Court of Appeals established several important
procedural points during 1975. Most of the cases dealt with application of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure or interpretation of statutory provisions.
I.

APPEALS

Parkway Fuel Service, Inc. v. Pauley32 illustrated that the

court speaks only through the record, and, if the record contains
no more than a conclusory statement that arguments of counsel
were heard by the trial court, then on appeal the case will be
reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Simmons v. City of Bluefield33 dealt with reservations of decisions on motions. The court outlined the steps necessary under rule
59 to move for judgment in accordance with the original motion
within ten days of judgment being entered, after a motion for a
directed verdict had been made and denied. Although "a motion
for judgment notwithstanding the verdict is not a condition pre' the appellee may not be
cedent to an appeal from a final order,"334
entitled to an order directing judgment in its favor if a motion to
set aside the judgment and have judgment entered in accordance
with the original motion was not made at trial level within ten
days.
An important point concerning rule 59(e) was touched on in
Kentucky Fried Chicken of Morgantown v. Sellaro.35 The case

involved construction of a lease agreement and, specifically, which
party was to bear the costs of grading and paving the leased premises. The judgment at the trial disposed of multiple claims, and
appellants timely requested a new trial on the issue of damages.
The request was denied, and on appeal the appellees counterassigned error on issues other than damages, but the appellants
contended that the counter-assignments should be dismissed be",Cases not reported having procedural issues: State v. Bosley, 218 S.E.2d 894
(W. Va. 1975) (error in the record); Russell Transfer, Inc. v. Moore, 212 S.E.2d 433
(W. Va. 1975) (mandamus); West Virginia Human Rights Comm'n v. Tenpin
Lounge, Inc., 211 S.E.2d 349 (W. Va. 1975) (right to jury trial); and Blevins v. May,
212 S.E.2d 85 (W. Va. 1975) (making the trial record).
220 S.E.2d 439 (W. Va. 1975).

3

No. 13557 (W. Va. Sup. Ct. App., filed Nov. 18, 1975).
'

Id. at 9.

214 S.E.2d 823 (W. Va. 1975).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976

69

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 8
[Vol. 78

WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

cause they were not seasonably asserted. The court held that since
neither of the parties had filed a timely post-trial motion or appealed the judgment from the trial court concerning the counterassigned errors, and eight months had passed from the entry of the
final judgment disposing of such claims, then judgment on those
claims was final and unappealable.1
II.

DIRECTED VERDICTS

Stanley37

Kingdon v.
irivolved an action arising out of an automobile accident in which the appellee received multiple injuries.
A verdict was rendered for the appellee, but the trial court set aside
the verdict on the motion of the appellee for a new trial citing its
failure to direct a verdict for the appellee on the issue of liability.
The appellee requested a new trial because he felt that a compromise verdict had been rendered by the jury on the issue of damages. Reinstating the jury verdict, the Supreme Court of Appeals
ruled that where evidence supported the verdict, and the issues
had been submitted under proper instructions by the trial court,
the verdict should not be set aside for failure of the trial court to
direct a verdict for the party the jury verdict favored.
III.

MANDAMUS

State ex rel. Blankenship v. McHugh,3 1involved the question
of whether a circuit court could entertain a mandamus provision
subsequent to the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals having
denied an identical petition. The court noted that it had earlier
refused a mandamus petition in which Senator Judith A. Herndon
questioned the constitutionality of certain revenue measures. Senator Herndon then brought an identical petition in the Circuit
Court of Kanawha County, again seeking relief in mandamus. The
Constitution of West Virginia grants original and concurrent jurisdiction in mandamus and prohibition to the Supreme Court of
Appeals and all circuit courts. 39 However, Rule XVIII of the Rules
of Practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia34
See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 58-5-4 (Cure. Supp. 1975); W. VA. R. Civ. P. 72.
215 S.E.2d 462 (W. Va. 1975).
217 S.E.2d 49 (W. Va. 1975).
W. VA. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.
W. VA. R. PRAc. Sup. CT. OF App. XVIII (1974).
Rule XVIII provides in part:
Original jurisdiction in this court should not be invoked if adequate
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provides that its original jurisdiction in mandamus actions should
not be invoked if a court having concurrent jurisdiction can provide adequate relief. Further, if the Supreme Court of Appeals of
West Virginia decides to refuse to issue a writ without prejudice,
it must be so noted on the face of the petition. "4 ' This is called a
"Rule XVI" notation. The question raised by the circuit court
was whether the mandamus provision of the West Virginia Code "4
merely defines the nature of extraordinary remedies in accordance
with the state constitution or deprives the circuit courts of their
constitutional jurisdiction. Citing Boggess v. Buxton,34 3 which established legislative authority to enlarge mandamus subject matter, the court held that the mandamus provisions 344 deal only with
procedural aspects and both are constitutional. Therefore, the
court concluded that a refusal to issue a writ of mandamus, combined with the absence of a "Rule XVIII" notation, constitutes a
decision on the merits, and a circuit court is without authority to
consider the same petition.

IV.

PRE-TRAL CONFERENCES

At issue in Roark v. Dempsey345 was whether a trial court's
direction for the parties to exchange witness lists ten days in adrelief appears to be available in a court of concurrent jurisdiction. If the
application might have been lawfully made to a lower court in the first
instance, the petition, in addition to the matters required by law to
support the application, shall also set forth the circumstances which in
the opinion of the applicant render it proper that the writ or rule should
issue originally from this court and not from such lower court. If the court
finds such circumstances insufficient, the court may on that ground refuse to issue the writ or rule prayed for without prejudice to the presentation thereof to a proper court having jurisdiction. Such refusal, without
prejudice, to issue the writ or rule for this reason shall be noted upon the
face of the petition.
For analysis see Sullivan, An ExtraordinaryRule: Rule XVIII, Rules of Practice in the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia,77 W. VA. L. REv. 1 (1974).

~"Id.
31

W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-2, -5 (1966).

§ 53-1-5 reads in part as follows:
The court or judge to whom the petition in mandamus or prohibition
is presented shall, if the petition makes a prima facie case, issue a rule
against the defendant to show cause why the writ prayed for should not
be awarded.
311 67 W. Va. 679, 69 S.E. 367 (1910).
"'1W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-2, -5 (1966).
315

217 S.E.2d 913 (W. Va. 1975).
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vance of trial is conclusive on what witnesses may actually be
introduced at trial. A pre-trial conference had been conducted in
which the trial court made such a direction and which was agreed
upon by the parties. The trial court did not, however, enter a pretrial order pursuant to rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil
Procedure. A federal case directly on point34 stated that where
witness lists had been exchanged pursuant to a pre-trial proceeding and no pre-trial order was entered as required by rule 16 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then. such an exchange of witnesses does not limit the number of witnesses who may testify at
trial. The West Virginia court did not choose to adopt this broad
a rule, however, stating that it would unduly restrict the discretion
of the trial court. Instead, the court held that the trial court may
exclude a witness offered for testimony who was not on the list of
trial witnesses exchanged by counsel, but the exclusion would constitute reversible error if it created an undue hardship or restricted
the development of facts for the jury. The court concluded that
where an eyewitness to an accident was not discovered until the
day of trial, it was abuse of discretion and reversible error for the
trial court to disallow that witness' testimony when a continuance
would have justly answered the defendant's claim of surprise.
V.

PROCESS AND SERVICE

Stevens v. Saunders347 reaffirmed the principle that the signing of a summons by the clerk does not, in itself, constitute an
issuance. Process is not issued until the summons is sent from the
clerk's office under his authority and direction for the purpose of
service. "45 Stevens involved a personal injury action arising from an
automobile accident involving a non-resident defendant. Plaintiff
filed a complaint two days before the expiration of the statute of
limitations,345 but failed to execute the statutorily required cost
bond "05 until two days after the statute of limitations had run, due
to the clerk's failure to obtain or prepare a bond form. In determinI" Jones v. Union Auto. Indem. Ass'n of Bloomington, Ill., 287 F.2d 27 (10th
Cir. 1961).
3" 220 S.E.2d 887 (W. Va. 1975).
"' Accord, McIntosh v. Standard Oil Co., 121 Neb. 92, 236 NW. 152 (1956);
Deboer v. Fattor, 72 Nev. 316, 304 P.2d 958 (1956); Snell v. Knowles, 87 S.W.2d
871 (Tex. Civ. App. 1935); Nicholas Land Co. v. Croader, 127 W. Va. 216, 32 S.E.2d
563 (1944).
3, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-2-12 (1966).
"0 W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-31(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975) requires that a cost bond
of one hundred dollars be executed with the clerk by the party bringing the action.
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ing whether the statute of limitations was tolled by proper filing
of the complaint and issuance of a summons, the court construed
"2
rule 3 51 in conjunction with the non-resident motorist statute, 3
which requires a bond of one hundred dollars to be executed with
the clerk at the time of filing and before a summons is issued. The
court concluded that a summons could not have been issued from
the clerk's office until bond was executed, and thus, the two-year
statute of limitations barred the action. In addition, rule 4(a) '3 did
not change the general rule defining what acts constitute an issuance, but merely recognized that someone other than the sheriff
could permissibly serve process. Lastly, the court reiterated the
rule "that the plaintiff or his attorney bears the responsibility to
see that an action is properly instituted and that bonds are pro' '3
perly filed."1

VI. RULE 12
A.

Dismissal of Actions

The Supreme Court of Appeals in Sprouse v. Clay Communications, Inc.," ' decided that a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of an
action for failure to state a claim is a final appealable judgment
on the merits and serves as res judicata. Confusion had previously
reigned in this area with the court having never dealt directly with
the issue.
In the 1961 case of Petros v. Kellas, the court observed that a
judgment of dismissal of an action under rule 12(b)(6) is reviewable only upon appropriate appellate process. '6 By making the
dismissal under rule 12 (b)(6) a final appealable order not subject
"' W. VA. R. Civ. P. 3 reads as follows: "A civil action is commenced by filing
a complaint with the court and the issuance of a summons or the entry of an order
of publication."
5' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 56-3-31(a) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
3 W. VA. R. Civ. P. 4(a) reads in part as follows:
Summons: Issuance: Upon the filing of the complaint, the clerk shall
forthwith issue a summons and deliver it for service to the sheriff or as
otherwise directed by the plaintiff.
The plaintiff in Stevens contended that this passage describes separate acts of
issuance of summons and delivery for service. He therefore argued by implication
that the summons was properly issued when the bond had been executed. The court
rejected this proposition.
M' 220 S.E.2d at 892.

211 S.E.2d 674 (W. Va. 1975). This case is also discussed in the Constitutional Law section of this survey.
"1 146 W. Va. 619, 635, 122 S.E.2d 177, 186 (1961).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1976

73

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 78, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 8
[Vol. 78
VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW
WEST
to review upon certificate, and later stating that a motion dismissal under rule 12(b)(6) is not a dismissal with prejudice, 35 the
court created confusion and uncertainty in the area. Although a
final appealable order, it must logically have been assumed that
since the dismissal under rule 12(b) (6) was without prejudice, another action could have been started at the trial court level. However, this result would have been in direct conflict with rule 41(b)
dealing with involuntary dismissals stating that "a dismissal
-under this subdivision and any dismissal not provided for in this
rule, other than a dismissal for lack of jurisdiction or for improper
venue, operates as an adjudication upon the merits." Because of
rule 41(b), the court in Sprouse realized that a 12(b)(6) dismissal
of an action could not be a dismissal without prejudice unless so
noted by the trial court. Therefore the court adopted the view that
a rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is a determination on the merits and with
prejudice.
B.

Jurisdiction

Another important aspect of rule 12 was decided in Teachout
v. Larry Sherman's Bakery, Inc.358 In Teachout, an order of publication was used in an attempt to obtain jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. The defendant filed a motion to have the action against him dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. He later entered
into a stipulation extending the time period in which to answer the
complaint. The Supreme Court of Appeals held that the trial court
did not have jurisdiction over him merely because of the stipulation and dismissed the complaint. Rule 12(b) provides that "no
defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more
other defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion."
This provision had not previously been considered by the court in
relation to whether having once raised timely objection to the jurisdiction of the trial court, the defendant may then take part in the
trial without waiving his objection." 9 A federal case construing
F.R.C.P. 12 held that the distinction between special and general appearances was abolished and a defendant could thus appear
in court raising jurisdictional objections as well as answering the
"I United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Eades, 150 W. Va. 238, 247, 144
S.E.2d 703, 710 (1965).
216 S.E.2d 889 (W. Va. 1975).
1' Id. at 892.
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complaint.3 0 Citing this federal case, .the court held that a defendant may now raise jurisdictional objections by motion or in his
answer as provided by rule 12(b), and such objection is not waived
even to the extent that he participates in the trial and defends on
the merits. This ruling abolishes any distinction as to special and
general appearances that may previously have existed in relation
to jurisdictional objections.
VII.

RULE

14

IMPLEADER

Bluefield Sash & Door Co. v. Corte Construction Co. 3 11 involved construction of rule 14(a), which deals with the issue of
when a defendant may bring in a third party who may be liable to
him for all or part of the plaintiff's claim. The court reiterated the
proposition that impleader is not mandatory under rule 14(a) but
is within the sound discretion of the trial court to allow. ' In
Bluefield Sash & Door, the Supreme Court of Appeal; held that
the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing a claim
making a certain person a third party defendant, when such impleading would result in confusion of issues and cause undue implication of the litigation involving separate and distinct issues. An
interesting sidenote in this case was a point made by the majority
that under rule 14(a) "[a] joint tort-feasor cannot implead a third
party defendant who is a joint tortfeasor."3 3 The court cites several
cases in support of this conclusion, and also W. VA. CODE ANN. §
55-7-13 (1966), under which there is no right of contribution between joint tort-feasors in the absence of a joint judgment. Chief
Justice Haden, in a concurring opinion,364 disagreed with the proposition that one joint tort-feasor cannot implead another joint tortfeasor, citing as authority the case of Goldring v. Ashland Oil &
Refining Co., 356which allowed a cross claim against an alleged joint
tort-feasor because of the West Virginia common law right of indemnity between joint tort-feasors. How far indemnity principles
would extend in allowing the impleading of a joint tort-feasor is not
clear. The majority relies on W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-13 (1966),
denying contribution from one joint tort-feasor to another in ab"o Orange Theatre Corp. v. Rayherstz Amusement Corp., 139 F.2d 871 (3d Cir.
1944).
1) 216 S.E.2d 216 (W.
Va. 1975).
-82Id. at 218.
3 Id.

:" 216 S.E.2d at 219.
59 F.R.D. 487 (N.D.W. Va. 1973).
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sence of a joint judgment, in reaching its conclusion that one joint
tort-feasor cannot impead another joint tort-feasor under rule
14(a).316 That conclusion is misleading if indemnity, and not contribution, is the basis of joining the joint tort-feasor.
VIII.

VENUE

7

In Phares v. Ritchie," the court held that in actions brought
against state officials, proper venue lay only in the Circuit Court
of Kanawha County. An action was brought in Randolph County
to compel the Commissioner of Highways to maintain a public
road. The Randolph County Circuit Court held that venue was
proper in that county, relying on W. VA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-2(b)
(1974), which deals with mandamus actions to require condemnation proceedings. Since this case involved an action to compel road
maintenance and not condemnation proceedings, venue was proper only in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.

"

For an analygis of Rule 14(a) see

LUGAR & SILVESTEIN, W. VA.

RULES 125

(1960).
-7

219 S.E.2d 698 (W. Va. 1975).
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I.

CLAIMS AGAINST ESTATES

Chapter forty-four, article two, section five of the West Virginia Code provides in part:
Every claim against the estate of a decedent shall be itemized, accompanied by proper vouchers, and verified by the affidavit of the creditor . . .. . The vouchers for a judgment or
decree shall be an abstract thereof. . . . (emphasis added)

In In re Estate of Hardin,"9 the issue was whether a copy of
a Florida divorce decree, certified by the clerk of that court, constituted a proper voucher upon which a claim against decedent's
estate could be based.
The decedent died in West Virginia and appellant, decedent's
former wife, filed a claim against the estate for alimony and child
support due her, based on a Florida divorce decree. The adminisit thereafter became the burden of
tratrix denied the claim, 370 and
37
'
claim.
her
prove
to
appellant
As a purported voucher for her claim, appellant filed a copy
of the Florida divorce decree, certified by the Clerk of the Circuit
Court of the Eleventh Judicial Circuit of Florida. The claim was
denied by the commissioner of accounts, whose decision was affirmed by the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, on the basis of
chapter fifty-seven, article one, section twelve of the West Virginia
Code which provides in part:
The records of the judicial proceedings of any court of.
any state

. . . shall

be proved or admitted in any court in this

State, by the attestation of the clerk, and the seal of the court
annexed, if there be a seal, together with a certificate of the
judge, chief justice, or presiding magistrate, that the said attestation is in due form.
31 The following property cases were not included in this section: Wheeling
Dollar Savings & Trust Co. v. Leedy, 216 S.E.2d 560 (W. Va. 1975) (future interests); Women's Club v. James, 213S.E.2d 469 (W. Va. 1975) (wills).
212 S.E.2d 750 (W. Va. 1975).
3" The basis of the administratrix's denial was W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-6
(1966), which provides:
Every claim . . . shall be taken as proven and shall be allowed,
unless before the commissioner shall make his report of claims the personal representative . . . shall file before the commissioner a counter
affidavit, denying the claim in whole or in part. . ..
311212 S.E.2d at 752-53.
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The Supreme Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of appellant's claim holding that a copy of a divorce decree of a foreign
court, certified only by the clerk of that court, does not meet the
requirements for authentication under the quoted code section,
and therefore is not a proper voucher of a claim against an estate.
If defectively attested, records of a foreign court will not prevail as
evidence in West Virginia," and the failure of the judge of a foreign court to certify the clerk's attestation creates a defective attestation. 73

II. DEEDS
A.

Maintenance and Support Agreement as Consideration

The Supreme Court of Appeals in Farrarv. Young" 4 considered the sufficiency of consideration in a deed where maintenance
and support of the grantor was the consideration. After ruling that
there was not a failure of consideration in the present case, the
court noted two important principles involving deeds which are
given in exchange for maintenance and support. The court reaffirmed the general rule that "[miere inadequacy of consideration
is not in itself sufficient to justify a court of equity in setting aside
a deed"3 5 and qualified that rule by noting that "courts of equity
tend to afford the grantor relief when the consideration for the
grantor and the
conveyance is maintenance and support of the3 76
grantee fails or refuses to furnish such support.
Upon a failure of consideration in a maintenance and support
deed, the question arises whether the heirs or devisees of a deceased grantor have a right of cancellation. On this point the court
held that the intention of the parties control, and if the language
of the deed states an intent to create a personal obligation, as it
did in Farrar,the language will be so construed, and the right of
37
cancellation will not be transferred to the heirs or devisees.
37

Id. at 753.

373Id.
37, 216 S.E.2d 575 (W. Va. 1975).

315Id. at 579, quoting Jarrett v. Jarrett, 11 W. Va. 584 (1877); see Oates v.
Oates, 127 W. Va. 469, 33 S.E.2d 457 (1945); McCary v. Monongahela Valley
Traction Co., 97 W. Va. 306, 125 S.E. 92 (1924).
"1 216 S.E.2d at 579, citing Cales v. Ford, 126 W. Va. 158, 28 S.E.2d 429 (1943);
Chambers v. Roper, 119 W. Va. 338, 193 S.E. 570 (1937).
"1 216 S.E.2d at 580, citing Krahn v. Goodrich, 164 Wis. 600, 160 N.W. 1072
(1917).
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B.

Multiple Grantors

37
In Parrishv. Pancake,
the threshold issue was what interests
shall pass, if any, when less than all multiple grantors sign a deed.
Parrishinvolved a situation where a husband and wife purported
to convey an easement, and although both were named as grantors
in the granting clause, only the husband signed the deed. Thereafter, the grantors, and others, instituted an action to have the
deed declared void.

To decide the validity of the deed, the court dealt with two
apparently conflicting holdings. In Adams v. Medsker79 a deed was
prepared purporting to convey all the undivided interests of a
group of heirs. However, one of the heirs who signed the deed was
not mentioned in the granting clause, and one of the heirs who was
mentioned in the granting clause refused to sign the deed. The
court held that this deed was effective to pass only the interests of
those whose names were in the granting clause and who also signed
the deed."' The deed did not pass the interests of those who failed
to meet both of these requirements. However, in the case of
Bennett v. Neff,38' the parties entered into an agreement to convey
their seven undivided interests in a tract of land to a third party,
who in turn was to reconvey the land in seven separate and equal
portions. Seven deeds were prepared, but only five were signed,
two of the parties refusing to sign. The court in Bennett held that
none of the deeds passed any interest since all deeds were not
382
signed.
The court in Parrishresolved these apparently contradictory
cases by finding that it was the intent of the individuals in Adams
to convey their own undivided interests, whether or not the other
grantors so conveyed. However, the court decided that in Bennett,
the intent of the individual grantors was not to convey their own
interests unless all conveyed. Therefore, in the absence of any
express language in the deed to the contrary, the court will look to
the intent of the grantors in deciding what interests shall pass, if
any, when less than all multiple grantors sign a deed.
215 S.E.2d 659 (W. Va. 1975).
:' 25 W. Va. 127 (1884).
Id. at 130-31.
130 W. Va. 121, 42 S.E.2d 793 (1947).
Id. at 138-39, 42 S.E.2d at 802-03.
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III.
A.

GIFTs
Delivery

33

Tomkies v. Tomkies involved the factual issue of what
constitutes a valid delivery of an inter vivos gift. The court defined
an inter vivos gift as follows:
To constitute . . . [an inter vivos] gift the donor must be
divested of, and the donee invested with the right of property
in the subject of the gift; it must be absolute, irrevocable; without any reference to its taking effect at some future period. The
donor must deliver the property and part with all present and
future dominion over it.34
In the instant case the donor of stock retained possession and
record ownership of the stock, voted the stock, received the dividends from the stock, and served on a board of directors as a holder
of the stock. The court, from these facts, concluded that the purported gift did not meet the3 delivery requirements necessary to
constitute an inter vivos gift. n
B.

Joint Bank Accounts

The Supreme Court of Appeals in Wilkes v. Summerfield'
reaffirmed the proposition that the donor depositor of a joint and
survivorship bank account is conclusively presumed to have intended a causa mortis gift of the proceeds remaining in the account
after his death to the surviving joint tennant.3 17 However, the court
noted that deposits made by an agent of the donor after the donor's
38
death would not be a part of the gift. 1
IV.

LEASES

In Moore v. Johnson Service Co. 8 the court interpreted am215 S.E.2d 652 (W. Va. 1975).
Id. at 656, quoting Dickeschied v. Bank, 28 W. Va. 340, 359 (1886).
This case basically revolved around a factual determination by the court,
the law being settled.
212 S.E.2d 316 (W. Va. 1975).
See Dorsey v. Short, 205 S.E.2d 687 (W. Va. 1974).
3" In Wilkes the survivor in the joint account was the agent of the donor and
possessed blank checks signed by the donor. The day before the donor's death the
agent prepared one of the checks for deposit, but did not deposit it until after the
donor's death. The court did not include this deposit as a part of the account for
gift purposes. 212 S.E.2d at 317.
1 219 S.E.2d 315 (W. Va. 1975).
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biguous language in a lease. After resolving the ambiguity and
affirming the trial court as to this aspect of the case, the court
considered a provision in the lease which provided for recovery of
reasonable attorney fees for the successful party in an action to
enforce the lease or recover for breach.3 9
The trial court had refused to enforce the attorney fee provision based on the authority of a 1914 case, Raleigh County Bank
v. Poteet,39 ' in which the court had invalidated a stipulated attorney fee provision in a negotiable instrument for the following reasons: 1) lack of consideration; 2) usury; 3) oppression; 4) statutory
preemption; and 5) encouragement of litigation.
The court in Moore dismissed the validity of lack of consideration, usury and oppression, as bars to enforcement of the clause,
holding these items applied only to negotiable instruments and not
to mutually-agreed-to and freely-bargained-for leases. 92 The court
dismissed the element of encouragement of litigation as not valid.
The prior holding in Poteet, that stipulated attorney fees were
preempted by statute, presented a more difficult problem to the
Moore court. In Poteet the court had held that chapter fifty-nine,
article two, section fourteen of the code disallowed stipulated attorney fees in excess of ten dollars. Although Moore did not explicitly overrule Poteet or give reasons why the statute was applicable
in Poteet and not in Moore, the court did hold that public policy
today3 3 favors mutual convenants in leases for the recovery of reasonable attorney fees and expense of litigation. Because the court
found public policy supporting the attorney fees provision, recovery was allowed in the instant case. 394
M "In the lease contract, the parties mutually agreed the successful party in
an action to enforce the lease or to recover for a breach of the lease should recover
from the unsuccessful party, in addition to other appropriate relief, 'the reasonable
expense and attorneys' fees as a part of the judgment." 219 S.E.2d at 322.
" ' 74 W. Va. 511, 82 S.E. 322 (1914).
312219 S.E.2d at 322.

3 See Annot., 77 A.L.R.2d 735 (1961).
"I It should be noted that the exact holding of the court was limited to stipulated attorney fees in leases. The court stated:
A mutual covenant contained in a commercial lease agreement, providing for the recovery of reasonable attorneys' fees and expense of litigation, available to either party who successfully recovers for breach of the
lease contract or enforces its provisions, is valid and enforceable in the
courts of this State.
219 S.E.2d at 324.
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V.

LIENS

Fruehaufv. HuntingtonMoving and Storage39 raised the issue
of whether a perfected security interest in specific property has
priority over a subsequent repairman's lien, created by statute or
by rule of law, on the same property. Plaintiff sold a trailer to a
third party, the transaction occurring in Virginia. To secure payments on the property, plaintiff followed the proper procedure to
perfect a security interest in the trailer. Thereafter, the third party
took the trailer to defendant in West Virginia for repairs and improvements, but never returned to reacquire the trailer or pay the
bill.39 When the third party defaulted in his payments to plaintiff,
plaintiff sued defendant for possession of the trailer or, in the
alternative, a judgment for its value plus interest and costs. Defendant answered that he had obtained a statutory lien on the trailer
by reason of repairs, and that his lien was paramount to plaintiff's
security interest.
Noting that plaintiff's security interest was valid39 and that
West Virginia would recognize it, 9 the Supreme Court of Appeals
turned to a section in the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted
in West Virginia, which controlled the priority of liens in this case.
The statute provided that the defendant, a person who, in the
ordinary course of business, furnished services with respect to the
goods, possessed a lien upon the goods in his possession (the
trailer). Such lien, according to the statute had priority over a
perfected security interest unless the lien was statutory and the
statute expressly provided otherwise.399
The issue of whether the defendant's lien took priority over the
plaintiff's security interest was therefore dependent on the express
language of the statute creating and defining the repairman's
lien. °0 The court found that the article which creates and explains
the lien, and its remedies,"0 ' expressly makes the repairman's lien
3" 217 S.E.2d 907 (W. Va. 1975).
The charges claimed by defendant totalled $3,719.55. 217 S.E.2d at 909.
3" See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-103(4) (1966). This section was rewritten in
1974, but the validity of the instant security interest would not be affected.
2" See Ashland Finance Co. v. Dudley, 98 W. Va. 255, 127 S.E. 33 (1925).
3" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-9-310 (1966).
11 Id. § 38-11-1 et seq. (1966).
I" The court stressed that statutes relating to the same subject matter must
be read and applied together to assure recognition of the legislative intent. State
ex reL. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Miller, 153 W. Va. 414, 168 S.E.2d 820 (1969);
State ex reL. Slatton v. Boles, 147 W. Va. 674, 130 S.E.2d 192 (1963).
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subordinate to a properly filed security interest. 2
In addition to the statutory lien which defendant relied upon,
West Virginia has recognized a repairman's lien created at common law." 3 The nature of that lien was the right of the repairman
to retain possession of the property;" 4 however, only a right of
possession was created and a sale of the property was wrongful. 0 5
Had the lien which defendant relied upon been this common law
lien, then section 9-310 of the UCC would not have altered the
superiority of defendant's repairman's lien because the priority
provision excepted only statutory liens.0 '
In determining whether the common law lien or the statutory
lien should apply, the general rule is that:
[A] lien provided for by a statute which is merely declaratory of the common law must be interpreted in conformity with
its principles, but where the legislature has enlarged and defined a common-law lien, its definition supersedes the definition of the courts, and thereafter the exercise of the powers of
the courts with respect to such lien must be consistent with the
legislative definition.4 0 7
The court went on to acknowledge the broadening of the
common law lien by the legislature through the addition of various
remedies, and held that such an enlargement bound the court to
follow the statutory definition. Therefore, the repairman's lien was
brought within the purview of section 9-310 and by express statutory language was made subordinate to plaintiff's security interest.
§ 38-11-2 (1966) expressly provides:
Any lienor shall take such rights as a purchaser of the property
deposited with him would take, and shall take subject to other titles, liens
or charges in the same manner that a purchaser would take (emphasis
added).
I0 Keystone Manufacturing Co. v. Close, 81 W. Va. 205, 94 S.E. 132 (1917).
19,Burrough v. Ely, 54 W. Va. 118, 46 S.E. 371 (1903).
403Id.
According to the provisions of § 46-9-310, a repairman's lien is superior to a
security interest unless the statute creating the lien expressly provides otherwise.
If the lien in this case were found to be created at common law, then § 46-9-310
would not alter its superiority. 217 S.E.2d at 910.
407 Id. at 911, quoting 51 AM. JUR. 2d Liens § 38 (1970).
402

W. VA. CODE ANN.
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VI.

TAXATION

A. Estate Taxes and Inheritance Taxes
In Dilmore v. Heflin,0 5 the court recognized that the laws of
West Virginia now provide that both the federal estate tax and the
West Virginia inheritance and transfer tax be prorated among the
persons to whom property is to be transferred from the decedent's
estate." 9 However, this procedure may be abrogated by the clearly
expressed intent of the testator in his will." '
In the present case, the court found that the testator executed
two types of gifts, those to named individuals, called nonresiduary legatees, and those to the residuary legatees. The court
concluded that it was the testator's intent to relieve the nonresiduary legatees of any tax liability, but the testator did not
clearly state who should pay the taxes. In this situation the court
held that "where legacies are bequeathed tax-free, and no special
fund is created by the testamentary instrument to satisfy the burden of taxation, the taxes are payable from the residuary estate, if
sufficient, as the only other available fund for that purpose." ' t '
B.

Sale of Land for the School Fund-Notice

The issues in Pearson v. Dodd ' 2 revolved around a sale of land
for the school fund. The facts revealed that plaintiff acquired the
property in question in 1937, but did not enter her name upon the
land books. Nevertheless, the property remained on the books in
her grantor's name and the taxes were paid each year until 1961.
In 1961 the taxes went unpaid and the property was sold to the
state for delinquency. Thereafter, the process for the eventual sale
of forfeited and delinquent lands"3 was followed, and defendant
218 S.E.2d 888 (W. Va. 1975).
409

Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958) held that, in the

absence of any intent expressed by the testator, the federal estate tax was payable
out of the residuary estate and that the West Virginia inheritance and transfer tax
was payable out of each particular share or interest bequeathed or devised. The
legislature changed the rule relating to the federal estate tax by providing that it
too should be paid out of each particular share or interest bequeathed or devised.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 44-2-16a (1966).
"I See Cuppett v. Neilly, 143 W. Va. 845, 105 S.E.2d 548 (1958); W. VA. CODE
ANN. §44-2-16a (1966).
"1 218 S.E.2d at 894.
221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975).
," See W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-1 et seq. (1974 Replacement Volume).
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acquired a tax deed to the property from the deputy commissioner
of forfeited and delinquent lands."4 The only notice given plaintiff
of the sale of the land to defendant was by publication on April 16
and 23. The published notice of sale erroneously described the
property, misstated the size thereof, and ran in the name of plaintiff's grantor as the owner.
The first issue the court discussed was whether the property
passed to the state by forfeiture for non-entry or by delinquency
due to nonpayment of taxes. The court defined delinquent lands
as those upon which the owner fails to pay taxes causing the land
to be listed as delinquent and sold to the state or to individuals at
public sale.415 However, lands become forfeited when the owners
fail to enter them for taxation on the land books of the proper
counties and no taxes are paid on them for five consecutive years.41
Thus, there is a difference between delinquent and forfeited lands,
the former meaning that the owner has failed to pay taxes due on
his land, and in consequence, the land has been returned delinquent, is subject to the state's lien for taxes, and is liable to be sold
therefore. But, by forfeiture, the former owner is entirely divested
of all his interest in the land and the title thereto becomes absolutely vested in the state. By reason of delinquency the state may
sell the property under her lien for taxes, while a forfeiture vests
absolute title to the state. 17
The law greatly disfavors forfeiture as being "a harsh, even a
"IIn the handling of lands delinquent for the failure to pay taxes, there may
actually be two sales, as there was in this case. At the first sale, referred to as the
sheriff's sale, the sheriff may sell the land to the highest bidder whose bid will at
least pay all the taxes and other costs, or if no such bid is given, the sheriff will
purchase the property in the name of the state, as was the case here. W. VA. CODE
ANN. §§ 11A-3-4, -6 (1974 Replacement Volume). If the state purchases the land,
the owner has 18 months within which to redeem from the state. Id. § 11A-3-8. After
that period has expired, the land will be certified by the state to the deputy commissioner of forfeited and delinquent lands for a second sale under the auspices of
the circuit court. Id. § 11A-4-24. This second sale, referred to as the circuit court
sale, is the sale under scrutiny in this case, and is the sale to which the statute
quoted in the text applies.
"'See Note, Taxation and Land Titles Under Article XIII of the West Virginia
Constitution, 65 W. VA. L. REV. 263, 268-69 (1963); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-3-4
(1974 Replacement Volume).
I" Pearson v. Dodd, 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (W. Va. 1975), quoting note, Taxation
and Land Titles Under Article XIII of the West Virginia Constitution, supra note
415.

17221 S.E.2d at 176, citing Waggoner v. Wolfe, 28 W. Va. 820, 1 S.E. 25 (1886).
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dreadful remedy"" ' and presumes no forfeiture unless the state
rebuts the presumption." 9 In Pearson the taxes were paid on the
land until 1961, though the land was listed in the wrong name. The
court held that such a situation does not create a forfeiture since
the law disfavors forfeiture,"' and since the legislature has made
clear its intent that forfeiture be avoided wherever possible.''
Therefore, there was no forfeiture and the title to the land remained in the plaintiff until the property was sold, as delinquent,
to the state in 1962.
The second issue was whether the errors, which' occurred
during the sale to defendant voided the tax deed. The defects
complained of included: 1) the published notice of sale contained
the wrong name for the owner; 2 2) the notice described the land
improperly; 2 3 3) the notice listed the size of the property
incorrectly;2 4 and 4) only ten days' notice of the sale were given
instead of the fifteen days' notice required by statute.2 ",
The court noted that, by statute,42 no irregularity, error or
mistake, in respect to any step in the procedure leading up to and
including confirmation of the sale or delivery of the deed, invalidates the title acquired by such sale if the mistake is nonjurisdictional 27 The court found the mistakes in this particular case to be
nonjurisdictional and held the deed to be valid. The curative
statutes,412 rendered the first three mistakes harmless. 29 As to the
4, State v. Cheney, 45 W. Va. 478, 480, 31 S.E. 920 (1898).
"' State v. Hines-Bailey Corp., 103 W. Va. 180, 136 S.E. 780 (1927); State v.
Bear Mountain Coal Co., 99 W. Va. 183, 128 S.E. 84 (1925).
42o Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 62 S.E. 410 (1908).
42,The legislature has said that, "no entry shall result in forfeiture 'provided
the identity of the land intended by such entry can be ascertained.' This is true
despite errors in 'the way in which the name of the owner, the area, the lot or tract
number or reference, the local description, the statement of the interest or estate
or other particulars are stated.'" 221 S.E.2d at 177, quoting W. VA, CODE ANN. §
11A-4-39a (1974 Replacement Volume).
"I The name in the notice was that of H. C. Pearson, Jr., plaintiff's grantor
and record owner of the land. 221 S.E.2d 171, 175 (W. Va. 1975).
'2 The land was described by size and the amount of interest held, the latter
being incorrectly stated as a one-eighth interest, when in fact it was one-fourth. Id.
at 174.
' See note 423 supra.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-23 (1974 Replacement Volume) (requiring fifteen
days' notice).
42 Id. § 11A-4-33.
Shaffer v. Mareve Oil Corp., 204 S.E.2d 404, 408-09, (W. Va. 1974).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-33 (1974 Replacement Volume).
4" "A misnomer of the former owner did not void the tax sale in Jarrett v.
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failure to give notice for the proper length of time, the court found
that the primary purpose of the notice requirement was to
encourage attendance and bidding at the sale, and not to give
notice to the former owner. 30 Therefore, none of the errors which
occurred in the procedures surrounding the sale voided the tax
deed.
43
The third issue in Pearson
' was whether the notice provisions, relating to the circuit court's sale of delinquent land,432 requiring publication alone, were deficient under the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The notice statute was attacked as unconstitutional in State v. Simmons,433 but the court
in that case upheld the statute declaring it not to be violative of
the fourteenth amendment. Nevertheless, plaintiff asserted that a
1950 United States Supreme Court case, Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co. ,"' when read in conjunction with two other recent
Supreme Court cases,435 requires overruling of the holding in
Simmons.

Mullane held that an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process, in any proceeding which was to be accorded
finality, included notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to appraise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." ' The Mullane Court generally criticized notice by publication and specifically condemned such notice where the names and
Kimbrogh, 87 W. Va. 643, 105 S.E. 918 (1921) . . . a misdescription of a lot was
held to be cured in Mathdny v. Jackson, 83 W. Va. 553, 98 S.E. 620 (1919), and a
misdescription of the amount of land has been said to be cured in Leach v. Weaver,
89 W. Va. 49, 108 S.E. 494 (1921) . . . . 221 S.E.2d at 178.
'" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-23 (1974 Replacement Volume) is the section
providing the notice and is prefaced by the following phrase: "In order to encourage
attendance and bidding at the sale ...
"
,31 221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975).
,5, W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-12 (1974 Replacement Volume) provides:
Upon the institution of a suit as provided. . . the clerk of the circuit
court shall enter an order of publication, without the filing of any affidavit by the deputy commissioner as required in other cases. Such order of
publication. . . shall require all the named defendants, and all unknown
parties who are or may be interested in any of the lands included in the
suit to appear. . ..

"n 135 W. Va. 196, 64 S.E.2d 503 (1951).
431339 U.S. 306 (1950).
""Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972); Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.,
395 U.S. 337 (1969).
"1 339 U.S. at 314.
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addresses of interested parties are known or easily ascertainable.

7

The Supreme Court of Appeals noted, however, that before
the tests laid down in Mullane come into play, the parties complaining must have some property interest to be protected. The
court noted that on this subject the Supreme Court had said that
the fourteenth amendment's protection of property had never been
interpreted to safeguard only the rights of undisputed ownership,
but rather, it had been read broadly to extend protection to any
significant property interest, including statutory entitlements. '
The basic question, then, is whether the plaintiff in the instant
case had a "significant property interest." Plaintiff claimed that
the provision providing for redemption at the circuit court sale '
created a significant property interest in him as the former owner,
and that, therefore, notice by publication did not meet the standards established by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court of Appeals rejected plaintiff's argument
on several grounds. First, the court cited the specific statutory
language which provides only the opportunity to petition for the
privilege of redemption44 and leaves the matter in the discretion
"
of the trial court.44
' Second, the state's title to the property after
" Pearson v. Dodd, 221 S.E.2d 171 (W. Va. 1975), citing Mullane v. Central
Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
4 Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 87 (1972).
'3' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-18 (1974 Replacement Volume) provides in pertinent part:
The former owner of any forfeited or delinquent land, or any other
person who was entitled to redeem such land under the provisions of
[11A-3-8] may file his petition in such suit with the circuit court ...
at any time before confirmation of sale thereof requesting permission to
redeem such land to the extent that title thereto remains in the State.
It should be noted that this statute relating to redemption just prior to the
circuit court sale is not the same statute which provides for redemption within
eighteen months after the purchase of the land by the state at the sheriff's sale.
See note 441 infra.
"' The statute says that "[tihe court ...

may, by proper decree, permit the

petitioner to redeem ....
" W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-18 (1974 Replacement
Volume).
I" The court traced the long history of confusion between § 11A-3-8, which
provides for redemption within eighteen months of the state's purchase at the
sheriff's sale, and § 11A-4-18, which provides for an opportunity to redeem before
the circuit court sale. The cases had not clearly distinguished the nature of these
two statutes, sometimes holding that the statutes creates a right to redeem, Work
v. Rogerson, 149 W. Va. 493, 142 S.E.2d 188 (1965), or a privilege to redeem,
Beckley v. Hatcher, 136 W. Va. 169, 174, 67 S.E.2d 20, 24 (1951), or both rights
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purchase at the sheriff's sale442 weighed against the plaintiff's position. Third, the legislative intent clearly indicated that the opportunity to redeem is "extended. . . by the legislature as an act of
grace" and that the legislature intended that "there be no constitutional requirement that the former owner be personally served
by process." 44
Therefore, the court was of the opinion that a former owner of
property to be sold for the benefit of the school fund does not
possess a significant property interest which gives rise to the notice
standards prescribed by the United States Supreme Court in
Mullane, and that notice by publication is sufficient notice of the
sale to meet constitutional standards.

VII. WILLS
A.

Acceptance of Benefits

Regarding acceptance444 of benefits under a will, the general
rule in West Virginia is that one who accepts a benefit must adopt
the whole contents of the will, conforming to all its provisions and
renouncing every right inconsistent with the will." 5 In Tennant v.
and privileges, State v. Simmons, 135 W. Va. 196, 64 S.E.2d 502 (1951). The court
resolved this issue in the instant case by holding:
It is our belief, and we so hold that [under § 11A-3-8, relating to
redemption within 18 months of the sheriff's sale] a former owner possesses a statutory entitlement, i.e. a right to redeem at any time within
eighteen months of the date of the State purchase. If, however, redemption does not occur during this period, then the statutory entitlement no
longer exists because absolute title has vested in the State .

. .

. Once

this suit [to sell the land for the benefit of the school fund] is
commenced, a former owner has only the opportunity to petition as a
'privilege of redemption' [under § 11A-4-18].
221 S.E.2d at 182. The latter statute is the one in contention in the instant case.
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-3-7 (1974 Replacement Volume).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 11A-4-12 (1974 Replacement Volume).
The court recognized the general rule that:
While a court is not compelled to accept legislative standards of
intent ...

when the statements therein are not warranted in law, such

statements are entitled to great weight in support of the presumption that
the Legislature does not intend to offend the requirements or inhibitions
of the West Virginia Constitution.
221 S.E.2d at 183.
"I It should be noted that "acceptance" is used here in its technical sense as
denoting some intent on the part of the beneficiary to accept the benefit. Mere
receipt without this intent is not a technical acceptance.
"I See Moore v. Harper, 27 W. Va. 362 (1886).
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Satterfield," the court undertook to decide what constituted acceptance of a benefit under a will thus estopping a beneficiary from
contesting its validity.
In Tennant a mother devised property to her only son on the
condition that the son pay $1250 to each of his four sisters. In
compliance with the condition the son purchased four cashier's
checks in the amount of $1250 and sent one of the checks, by
registered mail, to each of his sisters. Three of the sisters signed
receipts and took custody of the checks. 4 However, none of the
checks were cashed and each sister retained possession until a will
contest was instituted, at which time the checks were introduced
as evidence. The sisters filed the suit within twenty days of their
receipt of the checks.
In determining whether the three sisters actually accepted the
checks, the court noted that although technical acceptance is presumed from taking possession of such benefits, the presumption
may be rebutted by express rejection of the benefits or by acts
inconsistent with their acceptance." 8 Recognizing a paucity in
West Virginia law on the question of what actually constitutes
acceptance of a benefit under a will, the court looked to other
jurisdictions449 and found that where the legatee or devisee receives
a benefit under the will, the receipt will not work a technical acceptance where there has been no unreasonable delay in bringing
a will contest5 and where no person has been prejudiced by any
delay. 5'
216 S.E.2d 229 (W. Va. 1975).
, The fourth sister, on the advice of her attorney, refused to sign for the check,
and thereafter became a party defendant. Id. at 231.
"'

"1 216 S.E.2d at 232, citing Hardesty v. Corrothers, 31 F. Supp. 365 (N.D.W.
Va. 1940).
," The court cited the following factual situations as examples of a technical
acceptance of benefits under a will.
(1) Where a beneficiary takes possession of a legacy and puts it to the beneficial use of earning income before the contest, he has made a technical acceptance.
Utermehle v. Norment, 197 U.S. 40 (1905).
(2) Unreasonably delaying the contest of the will and thereby creating
inconvenience and injustice to third parties has been held to create a technical
acceptance. Stone v. Cook, 179 Mo. 534, 78 S.W. 801 (1904).
(3) Unreasonably delaying the contest of the will and thereby making restitution of benefits under the will impossible has been held to create a technical acceptance. Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445 (1848).
'' In re Miller's Estate, 159 Pa. 562, 28 A. 441 (1894).
' Watson v. Watson, 128 Mass. 152 (1880).

https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol78/iss4/8

90

PROPERTY
Jackson et al.: Survey of Developments in West Virginia Law: 1975-1976
In the instant case the court held that there was not a technical acceptance which would estop the sisters from challenging the
will. Supporting this conclusion were the facts that the sisters did
not know what they were signing when the mailman brought the
registered checks, that the sisters did not act in any way inconsistent with their desire to challenge the will, and, by bringing suit
within twenty days, they did not unreasonably delay their challenge of the will, and did not cause any inconvenience or injustice
to third parties.
Therefore, taking possession of the checks did not constitute
a technical acceptance of benefits under a will which would estop
52
the beneficiaries from challenging the will.
B.

Ambiguities and Omissions

In Farmers'and Merchants' Bank v. Farmers'and Merchants'
Bank,453 the court considered whether extrinsic evidence could properly be used to remedy an omission of words in a will. The instant
case presented a situation in which a clerical error caused two lines
to be omitted from a bequest in a will. Because of the omission,
the bequest contained nothing of the amount to be given. At trial,
testatrix's attorney was allowed to testify as to the language which
should have appeared in the will, and, based upon this testimony,
the trial court interpolated into the will the clause as testified to
by the attorney. Judgment was thereby awarded for the legatee.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeals noted that where
ambiguity exists, the admissibility of extrinsic evidence is determined by whether the ambiguity is latent or patent. A latent ambiguity is one that is not apparent upon the face of the instrument
alone and that is discovered when it is sought to identify such
things as the property or the beneficiaries. 4 ' A patent ambiguity
is one which is apparent upon the face of the instrument, as where
in wills, the same tract is disposed of in different clauses to different persons.455 As a general rule, where the ambiguity is latent, the
extrinsic evidence is admissible to aid in construing the will.4 '
"2 As in most cases involving intent, Tennant was decided upon a specific
factual situation. Nevertheless, the case does establish certain criteria which may
be applied to future West Virginia cases.
'
216 S.E.2d 769 (W. Va. 1975).
'l Id. at 772.
i Id.
'~' Accord, Paxton v. Oil Co., 80 W. Va. 187, 94 S.E. 472 (1917).
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Conversely, where the ambiguity is patent, extrinsic evidence is
not admissible to aid in construing the will.4" 7 Since the language in this will was not only patently ambiguous, but totally
nonexistent, the court held that the testimony of the attorney who
prepared the will was inadmissible to allow the trial court to interpolate into the will a provision of which there was no semblance
in the instrument.45

Couch v. Easthan, 29 W. Va. 784, 3 S.E. 23 (1887).
To allow extrinsic evidence to interpolate into a will a provision which is
totally nonexistent would be speculation and conjecture, which the court has explicitly disallowed. See Harris v. Eskridge, 124 W. Va. 283, 20 S.E.2d 465 (1942).
'

'5
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TORTS
In 1975 there were a number of noteworthy developments in
the law of torts in West Virginia. The West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals abolished established doctrines in municipal governmental tort immunity and privity of contract in products liability cases. Generally, the 1975 decisions of the court reflected a
more liberal and well-reasoned attitude toward the tort victim.
I.

AUTOMOBILE ACCMENTS

In Clements v. Stephens459 a guest passenger was killed when
the automobile in which he was riding struck a hillside. Although
the accident was allegedly caused by the driver having fallen
asleep at the wheel, there was no evidence at trial to support this
allegation.
Under these circumstances, it is inevitable that the defense of
assumption of risk will be raised, but to invoke the defense, the
defendant must show that the plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily
exposed himself to the danger."
Thus, a passenger assumes the risk when a driver of an automobile falls asleep when the passenger knows or reasonably should
know that the driver is driving without his customary sleep; but
where the passenger, through actual knowledge or the use of ordinary care, is unaware of the condition of the driver he does not
assume the risk."' Before an instruction on assumption of risk is
justified, "the defendant should have offered proof that the injured
party knew or should have known that the driver of the automobile
was so fatigued or sleepy that his driving ability might thereby be
impaired, and second, proof that after learning of or after having
reasonable opportunity to learn of the situation, he voluntarily
continued as a passenger or failed to take other reasonable precautions for his own safety.""4 2 The evidence in Clements failed both
requirements. 63
211 S.E.2d 110 (W. Va. 1975).
Id. at 115.
"' Id.
882 211 S.E.2d at 116-17.
''

"

", The hour at which the hccident occurred is, without more, no basis to justify
an instruction on assumption of risk. 211 S.E.2d at 116. The giving or refusal of
instructions is not controlled merely by issues developed in the pleadings; it also
depends upon the amount of evidence introduced at trial supporting those issues.
Britton v. South Penn Oil Co., 73 W. Va. 792, 81 S.E. 525 (1914).
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Having decided that the deceased passenger had not assumed
the risk, the Clements court was faced with language in Hall v.
Groves,464 which supported the proposition that the act of falling
asleep while driving is negligence as a matter of law and that the
injured passenger is entitled to a directed verdict upon the issue
of liability of the driver.46 5 The court in Clements "regarded as
obiter dicta"4 6 the statements made in Hall and deemed it "inadvisable, if not improper," to follow the Hall rationale."' In disagreeing with Hall, the court found that falling asleep at the wheel
"may be prima facie evidence of actionable negligence if it was the
proximate cause of the injuries for which plaintiff complains." '
U[.
A.

DAMAGES

Special Damages

Special damages are "[t]hose which are the actual, but not
the necessary, result of the injury complained of, and which in fact
follow it as a natural and proximate consequence in the particular
case, that is, by reason of special circumstances or conditions.'."6
Therefore, any evidence of expenses which are unrelated to the
injury complained of should not be admissable at trial.
In Abdulla v. Pittsburgh & Weirton Bus Co.470 the plaintiff
was injured while riding in a bus. While undergoing examination
and treatment for back injuries sustained in the accident, it was
discovered that he had diabetes. During his stay in the hospital
and incidental to the treatment of his back injury, the plaintiff was
placed on a special diet for diabetics and given a daily pill to
control the diabetes. The special diet and pills were included in the
hospital bills introduced into the proof of special damages. The
question presented to the court' was whether the hospital bills
"'
"s
"'

151 W. Va. 449, 153 S.E.2d 165 (1967).
Id. at 455-56, 153 S.E.2d at 169.
211 S.E.2d at 117.
Id. at 118.

"'Id.

BI.cK's LAW DIrONARY 469 (rev. 4th ed. 1968).
213 S.E.2d 810 (W. Va. 1975).
,i The other questions that the court answered are settled (as much as they
can be) law in West Virginia. Common carriers owe their passengers the highest
degree of care compatible with the practical operation of a vehicle. Laphew v.
Consol. Bus Lines, Inc., 133 W. Va. 291, 55 S.E.2d 881 (1949). In a concurrent
negligence claim by a passenger against a public carrier, the carrier must be wholly
free from negligence. Any showing of negligence on the part of the carrier which
",
'°
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containing these items not connected with the injury sustained
could be introduced as evidence to prove special damages.
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that the
negligent party does not have to compensate the injured party for
damages that were not the proximate result of this tort, and the
burden of proving damages is on the injured party;47 2 but by the
use of its sound discretion, the trial court will decide whether to
allow proof of special damages which is "minimally tainted" by
extraneous charges. "If such matters may be isolated, they should
be removed from the jury's consideration. If such are so unsubstantial that there is little or no possibility of prejudice, they can be
ignored under the salutary protection of harmless error. 47 3 The
Abdulla court found the diabetes diagnosis and special diet to be
"routine hospital practices" necessary for the treatment of plaintiff's back injury and that the special pills to control diabetes were
4 74
"too insignificant" to be prejudicial.
B.

Wrongful Death Actions

In Kesner v. Trenton,475 plaintiff brought wrongful death actions against marina operators following the drowning of his two
daughters. Plaintiff alleged that defendants were negligent for failing to maintain their land in a reasonably safe condition for invi47
tees. 1
The West Virginia wrongful death statute provides for
separate recoveries for three items; (1) damages for wrongful death
not to exceed $10,000; (2) compensatory damages not to exceed
$100,000; and (3) special damages which include reasonable funeral, hospital, and medical expenses.47 7 In Kesner the jury resolved the question of liability in favor of the plaintiff and awarded
proximately contributed to the accident and plaintiff's injuries is actionable. Brogan v. Union Traction Co., 76 W. Va. 698, 86 S.E. 753 (1915). When it is shown
that a person was injured while passively riding as a passenger in a common carrier,
a presumption arises that the carrier was negligent, Isabella v. West Virginia
Transp. Co., 132 W. Va. 85, 51 S.E.2d 318 (1948); but the presumption disappears
after the carrier introduces rebuttal evidence. Mulroy v. Co-Operative Transit Co.,
142 W. Va. 165, 95 S.E.2d 63 (1956).
172
213 S.E.2d at 822.

Id.

$73

17,
Id.

" 216 S.E.2d 880 (W. Va. 1975).
" See INVITEES, this section, for a discussion of the invitee issue in this case.
§ 55-7-6 (Cum. Supp. 1975).

" W. VA. CODE ANN.
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damages for funeral expenses but awarded no damages for the
wrongful deaths. 7 " The court was faced with a "factual situation
'
of first impression"479
and had to decide whether it was mandatory
to award wrongful death damages under the statute if funeral and
burial expenses were awarded under the same statute."' The trial
court found that awarding funeral expenses without also awarding
wrongful death damages was inconsistent and awarded plaintiff
new trials "on the ground that the verdicts were inadequate as a
matter of law." 4 8'
The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals noted that the
jury is the absolute judge of the amount of the damages in a wrongful death action,"' and its findings will not be set aside for inadequacy unless the jury was misled or motivated by passion or prejudice.8 3 Thus, mere inadequacy is insufficient to set aside a jury
verdict. The jury has absolute discretion to award zero to ten thousand dollars in wrongful death damages when liability is determined, and "there is no legal inconsistency in the jury's determination to award funeral expenses but 'No' damages" since they are
separate recoveries.484
III.

INVITEES

One "who is invited to enter or remain on land for a purpose
directly or indirectly connected with business dealings with the
possessor of the land"4 is an invitee. The owner of the premises
owes an invitee the duty of exercising ordinary care in maintaining
his land in a reasonably safe condition."8 In West Virginia this
duty has been abolished where the landowner invites or permits a
person to use the premises for recreational purposes. 87 But there
" 216 S.E.2d at 886.
Id.
'No
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-7-6 (Cum.Supp. 1975).
216 S.E.2d at 886.
216 S.E.2d at 887, quoting Hawkins v. Nuttallburg Coal & Coke Co., 66 W.
Va. 415, 66 S.E. 520 (1909).
,1 216 S.E.2d at 886-87, quoting Legg v. Jones, 126 W. Va. 757, 30 S.E.2d 76
(1944).
1'3216 S.E.2d at 887. The judgment of the trial court awarding plaintiff a new
trial was affirmed because of the giving of an irrelevant and prejudicial instruction
on "unavoidable accident" which misled the jury; negligence was demonstrated on
the face of the record. 216 S.E.2d at 888-89.
- RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 332(3) (1965).
Morgan v. Price, 151 W. Va. 158, 150 S.E.2d 897 (1966).
," W. VA. CODE ANN. § 19-25-2 (1971 Replacement Volume).
V9
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are two exceptions which require the landowner to exercise ordinary care to invitees: (1) if he willfully or maliciously fails to warn
against a dangerous or hazardous condition, use, structure or activity, and (2) if he makes a charge to a person who enters or goes
upon the land. 8 A "charge" is "the amount of money asked in
return for an invitation to enter or go upon the land."'8 9
In Kesner v. Trenton,490 the court had to decide whether the
defendant marina owners made such a "charge" within the meaning of the statute such that they were required to exercise ordinary
care to protect the decedents. The defendants operated the marina
on a lake and provided swimming areas adjacent to the marina at
no cost.
Using authority from Wisconsin,49 ' the court decided that "the
defendants in this case reasonably could have expected to attract
prospective customers and thus, to increase sales and rentals at the
marina by allowing people to swim in the lake at no cost. 49 2 This
expectation was held to be a sufficient "charge" within the meaning of the statute thus obligating the defendants to provide ordi93
nary care.
IV.

MUNICIPAL GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY

In Long v. City of Weirton, the court held that "[niow and
hereafter, a municipal corporation shall be liable, as if a private
person, for injuries inflicted upon members of the public which are
proximately caused by its negligence in the performance of functions assumed by it. The . . . 'governmental-proprietary' distinctions are intended to be abrogated and declared obsolete by the
force of this ruling.""49 With these words, the West Virginia Su" Id. § 19-25-4 (1971 Replacement Volume).
Id. § 19-25-5 (1971 Replacement Volume).
'' 216 S.E.2d 880 (W. Va. 1975).
," Copeland v. Larson, 46 Wis. 2d 337, 174 N.W.2d 745 (1970).
192 216 S.E.2d at 885.
113 See DAMAGES, this section, for a discussion of the wrongful death
damages
issue in this case.
"' 214 S.E.2d 832 (W. Va. 1975).
' Id. at 859. The case also dealt with other issues. There is concurrent negligence when two or more persons are guilty of negligence which occurs in point of
time and place and together proximately cause or contribute to the injuries of
another. The injured party may recover against all of them. Lester v. Rose, 147 W.
Va. 575, 130 S.E.2d 80 (1963); Butler v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 147 W. Va. 402,
128 S.E.2d 32 (1962). Where one is charged with controlling substances of dangerous
character such as natural gas, appropriate and immediate response to gas leaks is
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preme Court of Appeals abolished municipal government's immunity in West Virginia and discarded the troublesome governmental-proprietary distinction.
In Long a private contractor working for and under the
supervision of the city struck a natural gas line. The resulting gas
leak was reported to the city manager who, in turn, contacted the
gas company. Even though a gas leak was considered an "emergency situation," the gas company did not respond immediately,
nor did it turn off the gas or evacuate the area. The leaking gas
subsequently exploded, severely injuring plaintiff. In the resulting
trial, the jury found against the city and the gas company, but the
judge exonerated the city due to municipal governmental
immunity.-'
In abolishing municipal governmental tort immunity, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals traced the growth of the
doctrine and decided that since it was not a part of the common
law and was not recognized in Virginia until 1867, the rule of
governmental immunity for municipal corporations did not become West Virginia law when West Virginia became a state." 7
Thus, the court was free to change the doctrine without the aid of
the legislature. Noting the changing social needs and demands of
the public, the court recognized that the governmental-proprietary
distinction was unworkable and unsatisfactory."' In abolishing
municipal governmental immunity, the court specifically mentioned that its ruling did not abolish the supposed immunities of
county governments."'
necessary. Groff v. Charleston-Dunbar Natural Gas Co., 110 W. Va. 54, 156 S.E.
881 (1931). The sovereign immunity granted the state of West Virginia by the West
Virginia constitution does not apply to a municipality and does not protect such
municipality from suit. Higginbotham v. City of Charleston, 204 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va.
1974). A verdict by which a plaintiff recovers against one or more defendants but
which is silent as to others is a verdict in favor of the defendants not named.
Facchina v. Richardson, 213 Va. 440, 192 S.E.2d 791 (1972).
214 S.E.2d at 839.
Id. at 854.
"' Id. at 858. The court also recognized that the distinction ignored the factor
of actionable negligence.
"1 214 S.E.2d at 860.
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V.

A.

PRODUCTS LIABILITY

Blood Supplied by Hospital

In Foster v.Memorial Hospital Association of Charleston,'-F" a
patient contracted serum hepatitis from a blood transfusion given
by the defendant hospital, permanently disabling her. The plaintiff alleged that the hospital impliedly warranted the blood as
being fit for the purpose of transfusion. The court was faced with
the question, for the first and probably the last time,50' of whether
the transfer of blood was a sale of goods under the law of warranty.
The great weight of authority in the United States holds that
a transaction involving blood is a service and not a sale creating
an implied warranty of fitness' 2° In West Virginia a warranty is
created "if the seller is a merchant with respect to goods of that
kind." 3 A hospital or a doctor, like dentists and lawyers, are not
"merchants" in the sense of actively promoting and selling a product, but are professionals who provide services to individuals. 04
The court held that:
where an individual contracts for professionalservices involving
an incidental transfer of personal property as a necessary part
of such service, and where the appropriate use of such personal
property depends primarily upon the skill and judgment of the
person rendering the service, such a transfer of personal property by the professional is not within the contemplation of W.
Va. Code, 46-2-314 [1963] or 46-2-315 [1963] and any injury
or damage resulting from such transferred property must be
219 S.E.2d 916 (W. Va. 1975).

ANN. § 16-23-1 (1972 Replacement Volume) now provides that
furnishing blood for transfusion is a service and not a sale and no warrantiesare
applicable. The statute was enacted in 1971, but the facts in Fosterarose in 1968;
thus, the statute was not determinative of the action. The court noted that the
decision in this case may have continuing importance in analogous situations. 219
S.E.2d at 918.
= Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital, 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46-2-314 (1966).
' The court noted that if a doctor or hospital negligently cared for a patient,
the plaintiff could bring an action in tort; but an action in warranty is not available
to a plaintiff who received contaminated blood in a hospital because blood is not a
standard commercial product within the meaning of the law of warranty. 219
' W. VA. CODE
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recovered by an action grounded in negligence and not by an
action grounded in warranty.3
In so holding, the court greatly limited actions of implied warranty
against professionals.
B.

Privity A bolished

Prior to 1975, persons who were injured by defective products
could not recover against the manufacturers and sellers of such
products unless privity existed between them. In Dawson v. Canteen Corp.516 the court broadly stated that "the requirement of
privity of contract in actions grounded in breach of express or
implied warranty is abolished in West Virginia . . . ."101 In
Dawson the plaintiff purchased a cheeseburger on a contaminated
bun from a vending machine that was operated by a retail seller
who purchased the bun from the defendant. The plaintiff alleged
that the defendant breached the implied warranty of fitness for
human consumption, but the trial court dismissed the action for
lack of privity between the plaintiff and the defendant.
The facts clearly show that the court was dealing with a problem of "vertical" privity as distinguished from "horizontal" privity.5 " The court noted that the privity requirement for warranty
actions in "horizontal" questions was eliminated by statute. " ' The
court further stated that statute also eliminated "vertical" privity
for "consumer" transactions. 510 Thus, the statutes had eroded the
common law doctrine prior to Dawson. In noting the trend in other
S.E.2d at 921. "If, however, the medicine itself is a standard product, and is defective in the sense that it deviates from the accepted standard, then the law of
warranty would apply." Id.
219 S.E.2d at 921-22.
212 S.E.2d 82 (W. Va. 1975).
." Id. at 82-83.
*" "'Horizontal privity' limits the extent that third parties benefit from the
warranties buyers receive from sellers. . . . 'Vertical privity' refers to the typical
manufacturer-distributor-retailer situation and involves the question of whether a
seller's warranty, given to his buyer, extends to one who purchases from this buyer."
Note, Products Liability-West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection ActDefinitional Inadequacies,77 W. VA. L. REV. 328, 336 (1975).
.. W. VA. CODE Ann. § 46-2-318 (1966). The statute does not eliminate privity
in all "horizontal" cases; it only applies to those in the family or household of the
buyer and to guests in the buyer's home.
510
Id. § 46A-6-108 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
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jurisdictions and the trend of the recent acts of the West Virginia
Legislature, the court stated that "[i]t is sufficient merely to hold
that lack of privity alone is no longer a defense to a warranty action
in West Virginia." 51 1 While the case, if read literally, may be
broader than the court probably intended,512 it is still a significant
case and represents a new and major departure from prior decisions.
VI. RELEASES

At common law an injured party may have only one full recovery, and complete satisfaction from any tort-feasor is satisfaction
of the total damages suffered by the injured party.5 13 If the injured
party uses ordinary care in choosing a physician, the law regards
an injury caused by the physician's mistakes or his want of skill
as part of the damages which naturally flow from the original
injury." 4 Thus, the original tort-feasor is liable for all damages
including those for injuries later inflicted by the physician. If the
injured party releases the original tort-feasor, are the physicians
and hospital who negligently provided medical care which aggravated the original injuries also released?
Prior to 1975, an injured person's unqualified release of the
original tort-feasor from liability for personal injuries barred recovery against successive tort-feasors for acts of malpractice or negligent hospital treatment.5 15 Thornton v. CharlestonArea Medical
Center5 6 overruled this by holding:
the execution of a general release in favor of the original tortfeasor or dismissal with prejudice of a civil action against such
tort-feasor is prima facie evidence of the intention of the injured
party to accept the same as full satisfaction of all damages
which naturally flow from the original injury, in the absence of
language or circumstances in the release or dismissal indicating
212 S.E.2d at 84.
",2
Cardi, The West Virginia Consumer Credit and ProtectionAct, 77 W. VA.
L. REV. 401, 500-01 (1975).
" New River & Pocahontas Consol. Coal Co. v. Eary, 115 W. Va. 46, 174 S.E.
573 (1934).
" Mier v. Yoho, 114 W. Va. 248, 171 S.E. 535 (1933).
Makarenko v. Scott, 132 W. Va. 430, 55 S.E.2d 88 (1949); Conley v. Hill,
115 W. Va. 175, 174 S.E. 883 (1934); Mier v. Yoho, 114 W. Va. 248, 171 S.E. 535
(1933).
5" 213 S.E.2d 102 (W. Va. 1975).
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a contrary intention of the parties; but whether such release or
dismissal is a bar to further action for malpractice against the
treating physician or hospital providing care is a question of fact
to be answered from the intention of the parties.51 1
Thus, the prior law in West Virginia was changed from a conclusive presumption to a rebuttable presumption, and the injured
party could now introduce parol evidence to explain the terms of
51
the release in favor of the original tort-feasor.
With this decision,
West Virginia adopted the more "modern" approach and rejected
the former one which worked to the benefit of negligent parties. 11'
VII.

RES IPSA LOQUITUR

In Walton v. Given,"'0 A, the defendant, sold and delivered a
mobile home to B, a dealer in mobile homes. B sold the home to
C, the plaintiff. B moved the trailer to the plaintiff's lot, installed
it on blocks, and connected and tested the water, gas and electrical
systems. The valve which regulated the flow of gas into the home
was on the outside. There was an explosion which seriously damaged the mobile home. Upon entering the home, it was noticed that
the furnace door was blown off. Since the furnace in the mobile
home remained unchanged from the time A delivered it to B, the
lower court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturwas available
to the plaintiff in providing negligence.
The doctrine of res ipsa loquiturrelates to the method of proving negligence; the doctrine furnishes a rebuttable presumption of
negligence sufficient to permit the jury to find negligence unless
the presumption is rebutted."2 ' Before the doctrine can be applied,
three essentials must be met: "(1) the instrumentality which
causes the injury must be under the exclusive control and management of the defendant; (2) the plaintiff must be without fault; and
(3) the injury must be such as in the ordinary course of events it
would not have happened had the one in control of the instrumentality used due care. ' 2 Applying the three essentials to the facts
' Id. at 108-09.

six
Id.
"
.22

213 S.E.2d at 107.
215 S.E.2d 647 (W. Va. 1975).
Id. at 651.

$n2Id.
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in Walton, the court found that the defendant had no control over
the mobile home at the time of the explosion, and thus the lower
court erred when it applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquiturto the
facts of the case. Anyone could have turned the gas valve off and
then turned it on again allowing gas to accumulate in the home.
Also, any negligence on the part of the dealer in installing the
mobile home could not be imputed to the defendant because the
dealer was not an agent of the defendant.sn

" The court also stated that the "sealed package" doctrine was not applicable
to the facts in the case. 215 S.E.2d at 652. This doctrine presumes that a manufactured product in a sealed package remains unchanged from the manufacturer to the
retail purchaser.
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION52 4
Because workmen's compensation is a statutorily created
right, the major cases in this area involve statutory interpretation.
Various statutes have recently been amended and are therefore
somewhat different from the statutes applicable to the reported
cases. Notwithstanding these changes, none of the alterations appear to affect the holdings in the following cases. For the reader's
information, related changes created by recent amendments are
cited throughout this article.
I.

DATE FOR DETERMINING RIGHTS OF DEATH BENEFIT CLAIMANTS

In Sizemore v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,2 '
the issue was "whether the workmen's compensation statute in
effect on the date of the employee's injury or the one in force at
the time of his death governs dependents' claims for death
benefits.

injury,

5 26

27

The language of the statute in effect at the time of

if applicable, precluded recovery; however, recovery

would be allowed if the statute at the date of death governed.5 2

Sizemore was not a case of first impression. In at least five
prior cases529 'the court had dealt with this issue. In both Hardin v.
Workmen's CompensationAppeal Board and Lester v. State Com521The following case contained an issue involving workmen's compensation,
but was not reported in this section: Eggleton v. Workmen's Compensation Com-

missioner, 214 S.E.2d 864 (W. Va. 1975).
s 219 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1975).
Id. at 914.
Acts of the 55th W. Va. Leg. ch. 160, Reg. Sess. (1961) (repealed 1967).
"I Acts of the 58th W. Va. Leg. ch. 203, Reg. Sess. (1967)(repealed 1974). The
claimant's husband was injured in 1961 and died as a result thereof in 1970. The
1961 version of § 23-4-10 provided death benefits for the injured employee's dependents if the employee died as a result of his injuries within six years of the date of
injury. In 1967 the legislature increased this time period between injury and death
to ten years.
It should be noted that § 23-4-10 has since been amended to eliminate the time
period between injury and death as a requirement for recovery of death benefits.
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-4-10 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Although this moots one issue in
the reported case, other issues, e.g. which level of benefits to award, still are relevant.
"I Maxwell v. State Compensation Director, 150 W. Va. 123, 144 S.E.2d 493
(1965); Peak v. State Compensation Comm'r., 141 W. Va. 453, 91 S.E.2d 625
(1956); Webb v. State Compensation Comm'r., 138 W. Va. 21, 76 S.E.2d 248 (1953);
Lester v. State Compensation Comm'r., 123 W. Va. 516, 16 S.E.2d 920 (1941);
Hardin v. Workmen's Compensation Appeal Bd., 118 W. Va. 198, 189 S.E. 670
(1937).
2

52
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pensation Commissioner the court held that the statute in force at
the date of injury governed claims for death benefits. In Webb v.
State Compensation Commissioner and Peak v. State Compensation Commissioner the court reversed, holding that the date of
death governed dependents' claims. In the most recent case,
Maxwell v. State CompensationDirector,the court again reversed
itself and chose the date of injury as determinative of dependents'
death benefits.
In Sizemore the court recognized two theories as to the source
of the dependents' rights under workmen's compensation statutes.
The date of injury theory is grounded on the view that either the
dependents' rights are strictly derivative of the injured employee's
rights, or that the injured employee's rights merely survive for the
benefit of his dependents. Conversely, the date of death theory is
based on the view that the dependents' rights accrue at the death
of the employee and are thus separate and distinct claims by the
dependents. By a long line of cases, including Maxwell, West Virginia has subscribed to the view that the dependents' rights are
separate and distinct, 50 thus creating a conflict when applying the
statute in effect on the date of injury, as was done in Maxwell. The
Supreme Court of Appeals resolved this inconsistency in Sizemore
by overruling Maxwell and holding that the date of death controls
the rights of dependents seeking death benefits because the dependents' rights accrue upon the death of the employee.
II.

SURPLUS FUND

Employers in West Virginia are generally required to participate as subscribers in the workmen's compensation fund."' To
support the fund, employers make quarterly payments based on a
percentage of the employer's payroll. 32 Ten per cent of this payment goes into a surplus fund to cover "the catastrophe hazard,
the second injury hazard, and all losses not otherwise specifically
provided for in [the workmen's compensation laws]."1
One exception to the requirement of participation in the work53 See, e.g., Staubs v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r., 153 W. Va. 337, 168

S.E.2d 730 (1969); Ashworth v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r., 150 W. Va.537,
148 S.E.2d 364 (1966); Terry v. State Compensation Director, 147 W. Va. 529, 129
S.E.2d 529 (1963).
' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-1 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
52 Id. § 23-2-5 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
' Id. § 23-3-1 (1973 Replacement Volume).
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men's compensation fund is the ability of employers with sufficient
financial responsibility to become self-insurers. 3 The self-insurer
pays its employees directly for their injuries, providing at least the
same values of compensation as would be provided under workmen's compensation.5 15 The self-insurer can elect either to pay into
the surplus fund, or to provide special security or bond in lieu
thereof. 3' His payments into the' 7surplus fund are to be used for a
catastrophe or a second injury.
The workmen's compensation laws provide that the commissioner shall pay medical expenses for injured employees from a
fund supported by the contributions of the subscribers.-"' There is
a maximum on the amounts payable from this fund for medical
expenses, " 9 but should the injured employee's medical expenses
exceed the maximum:
[T]he commissioner may pay out of any available funds
such additional sum as may be necessary, but such additional
sum shall not be charged to the account of the employer "D
In Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Commissioner,"' plaintiff, an employee of a self-insurer, was injured, and his medical
expenses exceeded the maximum amount payable by the Commissioner from the subscribers fund for personal injuries. Since the
corporate employer was a self-insurer, the corporation was required
to pay these expenses. " 2 However, since the corporation contributed to the surplus fund, the employer claimed that any excess
above the maximum amount which the commissioner would normally pay from the subscribers fund for injuries to employees of
subscribers should be paid by the commissioner from the surplus
fund. 43 Through statutory interpretation the Supreme Court of
Appeals held that the self-employer's contributions into the sur" Id. § 23-2-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
535 Id.
538

Id.

537Id.

= Id. § 23-4-3 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Id. At the time this case was tried the maximum amount payable was $3000.
The amount was increased by the Legislature in 1974 to $7500.
13

-40Id.
51 219 S.E.2d 361 (W. Va. 1975).
"' W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-9 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
113 The rationale for this argument is that the commissioner does pay the excess
medical expenses for subscribers from the surplus fund. Smith v. Workmen's Compensation Comm'r., 219 S.E.2d 361, 367 (W. Va. 1975).
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plus fund were to be expended only for catastrophes or second
injuries, and not for medical care in excess of the maximum
amount set by the applicable statute. 4 Therefore, under Smith,
the self-insurer is required to pay all expenses for medical attention incident to a compensable claim, at least to the extent provided by the workmen's compensation fund, without recourse to
the surplus fund.
Lloyd George Jackson II
John Burdick Koch
Alan Dale Moats
Thomas A. Vorbach
" The court found it persuasive that the language relating to the use of the
surplus fund by subscribers provided, inter alia, for its use to cover "all losses not
otherwise specifically provided for in this chapter." W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-3-1
(1973 Replacement Volume). However, the section which created the right of selfinsurers to pay into the surplus fund limited its use to situations of catastrophe or
second injury. W. VA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-9 (Cum.Supp. 1975).
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